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Tutkielma käsittelee Naim Ateekin palestiinalaisen vapautuksen teologian kriittisiä ja rakentavia tehtäviä. 
Yleisesti vapautuksen teologian ja postkoloniaalisen teologian tehtäviin kuuluu sekä sortoa aiheuttavien 
rakenteiden ja ajattelutapojen kritisoiminen että vapautusta edistävien ajattelumallien rakentaminen. Tutkielman 
tavoite on esittää Ateekin teologia näiden tehtävien kautta ja osoittaa yhteyksiä ja eroja Ateekin ajattelun ja 
vapautuksen teologian sekä postkoloniaalisen teologian metodologioiden ja keskeisten teemojen välillä. Lisäksi 
tutkielmassa hyödynnetään aiheen kannalta oleellisten teologien ja ajattelijoiden näkemyksiä, joiden avulla 
selvennetään, täydennetään ja osoitetaan jännitteitä Ateekin teologiassa. Menetelmänä on systemaattinen 
analyysi. Ateekin kaksi pääteosta sekä kahdeksan hänen artikkeliaan ovat tutkielman primaarilähteitä. 
 
Ensin esitellään Ateek osana palestiinalaista kristillisyyttä ja vapautuksen teologian sekä postkoloniaalisen 
teologian kriittiset ja rakentavat tehtävät. Tutkielman toinen luku käsittelee Ateekin kriittistä tehtävää, johon 
sisältyy sorron paljastaminen ja ymmärtäminen. Ateek ymmärtää sorron vallan väärinkäytön, väkivallan ja 
sionistisen imperiumiteologian kautta. Vapautuksen teologialle ominaisella tavalla hän käyttää Raamattua 
sorron tuomitsemiseen ja havainnollistaa sortoa väkivallan kierteenä. Postkoloniaalisen teologian tapaan hän 
käyttää imperiumin käsitettä ja ymmärtää rakenteellisen väkivallan laajemmin kuin vapautuksen teologia, joka 
korostaa köyhyyttä väkivallan muotona. Keskeisin ero Ateekin ja vapautuksen teologian välillä on 
suhtautuminen Vanhaan testamenttiin, jonka väkivaltaiset, eksklusiiviset tekstit eivät Ateekin mukaan tarjoa 
totuudenmukaista kuvaa Jumalasta Kristuksen ilmoittaman Jumalan inklusiivisen rakkauden valossa. Tässä hän 
seuraa postkoloniaalista teologiaa, joka Ateekin tavoin dekolonisoi tekstejä eli riisuu ne sortavista rakenteista 
omaksumalla sorrettujen, esimerkiksi kanaanilaisten, näkökulman. Ateekin oletus on, että väkivaltaiset tekstit ja 
niihin perustuva sionistinen teologia ovat keskeinen sorron syy. Uskontoa ja väkivaltaa koskevien teorioiden 
perusteella uskonto voi olla osasyy väkivaltaan, mutta sitä ei voi erottaa muista, esimerkiksi poliittisista, syistä.  
 
Kolmas luku käsittelee Ateekin rakentavaa tehtävää, joka korostaa Jumalan inklusiivista rakkautta ratkaisuna 
sortoon ja vaihtoehtona sionistiselle teologialle. Ateekin mukaan ihmisoikeudet ilmentävät Jumalan rakkauteen 
sisältyvää oikeudenmukaisuuden vaatimusta ja hän korostaakin ihmisoikeuksia universaalina mittana, jonka 
valossa kaikkia uskontoja on arvioitava. Kristityille Kristus ilmoittaa Jumalan rakkauden täydellisesti, kun taas 
juutalaisten ja muiden on löydettävä omista traditioistaan oikeudenmukaisuutta tukevat käsitykset. Erityisesti 
kristityille inklusiivinen rakkaus edellyttää sorron voittamista väkivallattoman vastarinnan keinoin Jeesuksen 
esimerkkiä seuraten, mikä mahdollistaa sovinnon sorrettujen ja sortajan välillä. Kuitenkin kaikkien uskontojen 
pitäisi korostaa, että Jumalan valittuna olemisen vähimmäisvaatimus on rakkauden toteuttaminen käytännössä. 
Ainoastaan silloin oikeudenmukainen rauha on mahdollista, mikä Israel-Palestiinassa edellyttää palestiinalaisten 
oikeuksien toteutumista ja konfliktin ratkaisemista kansainvälisen lain mukaisesti. Kristosentrisuus, sorron 
voittaminen väkivallattomasti, Uuden testamentin tulkitseminen täysin vapauttavana ja historiallinen eskatologia 
yhdistävät Ateekin vapautuksen teologiaan. Rakentavan tehtävän osalta postkoloniaalinen teologia poikkeaa 
merkittävästi Ateekista, sillä se dekolonisoi myös Uuden testamentin ja tuo esille kristosentrismiin sisältyvän 
eksklusiivisuuden. Kuitenkin Ateekin kristosentrinen vastaus sortoon on mahdollista nähdä postkoloniaalisena, 
sillä Ateekin kontekstissa palestiinalaiskristityt ovat juutalaisuuden ja länsimaisen kristinuskon kolonisoituja 
uhreja.  
 
Neljäs luku esittää johtopäätökset ja mahdollisia lisätutkimusaiheita palestiinalaisesta vapautuksen teologiasta.     
Ateekin ajattelu sisältää jännitteitä, koska hän korostaa partikularismia, mutta samalla pyrkii esittämään 
universaalin vähimmäisvaatimuksen oikeudenmukaisuudelle. Kriittisessä tehtävässään hän kritisoi 
eksklusivismia juutalaisuudessa ja Vanhassa testamentissa, mutta rakentavassa tehtävässään esittää Kristuksen 
ja Uuden testamentin täysin yhteensopivina rakkauden ja oikeudenmukaisuuden kanssa. Hän ei siis huomioi 
niihin sisältyvää sorron mahdollisuutta.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Research Question and Method  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the critical and constructive tasks of Naim 
Ateek’s Palestinian theology of liberation. Liberation theologies in general both 
criticize oppression in their particular context and aim to overcome the oppression 
by constructing alternative, empowering religious interpretations. In Ateek’s case, 
criticizing oppression involves exposing Israel’s abuse of power, its violence 
against Palestinians, and exclusive religious beliefs that seem to underpin the 
oppression. Ateek’s constructive task endeavours to provide a theologically 
grounded alternative that can contribute to justice and reconciliation. God’s 
inclusive love, revealed in Christ and the prophetic tradition, empowers the 
nonviolent struggle for a just peace based on international law.  
 This thesis uses the general methodologies of liberation and postcolonial 
theologies to organise and assess Ateek’s critical and constructive tasks. Ateek 
consciously adopts certain elements from liberation theology but other 
connections are more implicit. He does not refer at all to postcolonial theology but 
we shall see that there are certain relevant similarities. Theologies are always 
contextual but they also adopt and apply ideas from other theologies. Because 
Ateek identifies his theology as a liberation theology and because his context is, 
from the Palestinian viewpoint, an example of modern colonialism, using the 
methodologies of liberation and postcolonial theologies to define his thought is a 
relevant research goal. It highlights the contextual nature of Ateek’s theology by 
establishing similarities and differences between his thought and the 
methodologies, including central themes, of liberation and postcolonial 
theologies. Additionally, this thesis will, where relevant, use the views of other 
theologians and theorists to clarify and assess Ateek’s views.  
 First, Palestinian Christianity is briefly introduced in order to provide a 
background to Ateek. Then, the critical and constructive tasks of liberation and 
postcolonial theologies are introduced. In section two, Ateek’s critical task is 
considered. With reference to liberation and postcolonial theologies, as well as 
other relevant theological and social scientific views, Ateek’s criticism of the 
abuse of power, violence against Palestinians, and the spiral of violence is 
considered in section 2.1. Section 2.2 considers Ateek’s criticism of Jewish and 
Christian Zionism as exclusive and oppressive theologies that underpin the 
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violence. Theories concerning the role of religion in violence are used to clarify 
Ateek’s presupposition that religious beliefs cause violence.    
 Section three considers Ateek’s constructive task. Section 3.1 focuses on 
Ateek’s central idea that God’s inclusive love overcomes exclusive oppression. 
The human rights regime and international law, as universal standards of justice, 
reflect God’s inclusive love, which is revealed in Christ and the prophetic 
tradition. Ateek’s Christocentric interpretations of God, election, the land, and 
nonviolence are considered. Section 3.1 ends with an analysis of the problem of 
inclusion and exclusion in Ateek’s theology, which concerns the tension between 
his universalising and particularistic views. Section 3.2 analyses Ateek’s vision of 
peace, which is underpinned by his idea of God’s inclusive love. The section 
considers Ateek’s suggestion that liberationist interpretations lead to concrete 
change, his views on the application of nonviolence, and his ultimate vision of a 
just peace. Finally, section four offers a concluding overview of Ateek’s critical 
and constructive tasks and returns to consider the tensions in his views.       
 Ateek’s two main works on Palestinian liberation theology, Justice and 
Only Justice. A Palestinian Theology of Liberation (1989) and A Palestinian 
Christian Cry for Reconciliation (2008) are the primary sources of this thesis. 
Additionally, a number of Ateek’s articles and short essays are used to 
supplement the two main sources. Secondary literature includes relevant works in 
theology, history, and the social sciences, which are used to asses and clarify 
Ateek’s views.  
 The method used in this thesis is the systematic analysis of concepts and 
arguments, as well as unstated presuppositions and implications, in the source 
material.1 Ateek does not refer to critical and constructive tasks or organise his 
thought according to them. The decision to structure Ateek’s theology in this way 
reflects the result of the process of systematic analysis. First, Ateek’s texts were 
read and analysed in order to define his central argument. Then, connections were 
established between his views and other relevant views, especially ideas from 
liberation and postcolonial theologies, which clarify his arguments, reveal 
unstated similarities and presuppositions, and establish tensions or shortcomings 
in his arguments. However, it should be noted that the analytical process is not a 
rigid, step-by-step process but a fluid one: after establishing Ateek’s own 
                                                
1 The method used in this thesis is explained in Hallamaa 2006, 108–119.  
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argument, his views were constantly defined and redefined in relation to the other 
relevant ideas. Ateek’s own views are still presented faithfully even though they 
are structured and assessed in the light of liberation theology, postcolonial 
theology, and other relevant ideas. The result of this analytical process is the 
presentation of Ateek’s theology through the general framework of critical and 
constructive tasks.  
 
1.2 Palestinian Christianity  
Palestinian Christians pride themselves for being the oldest Christian community 
in the world. Until recently, Christians have constituted a significant minority in 
Palestine. They have greatly influenced Palestinian political and cultural life, for 
example they had a prominent role in shaping Palestinian nationalism and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. In the past few decades, the Christian 
population has dwindled, as many have escaped the conflict and oppressive 
occupation. Despite their small numbers, Palestinian Christians are a 
heterogeneous group: there are thirteen traditional churches, represented by 
different Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches. There have been tensions 
among Christians over rights to holy places, the appropriate Christian response to 
the occupation, and the indigenization of the clergy. Historically, relations with 
Muslims have generally been respectful but Christian Zionism, the rise of 
fundamentalist Islam, and Israel’s exploitation of religion to foment discord have 
increased Christian-Muslim tensions.2  
Reverend Dr. Naim Ateek (born 1937), who studied theology in the United 
States and was ordained as an Anglican priest in Haifa, developed Palestinian 
Liberation theology as a response to the Palestinian experience of oppression. 
Ateek notes that the 1967 war and the First Intifada awakened him to the need for 
a contextual Palestinian theology. Religious Zionists, Jewish and Christian, were 
invoking God and the Bible as justifications for Israel’s occupation, which caused 
Palestinian Christians to grapple with questions related to God’s nature, election, 
justice, and land. Some were even willing to abandon the Old Testament because 
it appeared to support Zionist beliefs.3  
                                                
2 Ateek 2007, 141–147; Munayer & Loden 2013, 53–54, 62–69; Sabbah 2007, 21–25; Wagner 
1992, 44–48. 
3 Ateek 1989, 77–78; Ateek 2008, 4–5, 8–10. Ateek writes from a Christian perspective and refers 
to Hebrew Scriptures as the Old Testament. The Hebrew Bible is used by scholars to refer to the 
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Clergy and parishioners gathered together to reflect on these questions and 
on how to apply God’s word to their experience of oppression. They were 
convinced that Christ stands with the oppressed and challenges them to follow a 
path of nonviolent resistance to oppression. At this grassroots level, Palestinian 
liberation theology began to grow into an ecumenical movement, and Ateek used 
the insights he had gained from clergy and parishioners to refine his earlier ideas, 
publishing his definitive book on Palestinian liberation theology in 1989. A year 
later, the first international conference on Palestinian liberation theology was held 
at Tantur in Jerusalem, which led to the founding of Sabeel as a liberation 
theology movement that attracted clergy and lay members from different 
Palestinian churches.4  
As founder and director of Sabeel, Ateek stresses that Palestinian liberation 
theology criticises Palestinian oppression and Zionist theologies that justify it, and 
aims to construct an inclusive theology based on Christ’s revelation of God’s 
love, justice, mercy, and peace. The goal is to empower Palestinian Christians 
with a politically and socially relevant theology. Also, Palestinian liberation 
theology is particularly concerned with raising awareness of Palestinian 
oppression and challenging Christian Zionism among western Christians who 
have ignored the Palestinian voice. Inter-faith work is important to Sabeel, as it 
tries to dispel the association of Christianity with Zionism among Muslims. As an 
international ecumenical organization, Sabeel promotes cooperation between 
Christians across the world on the struggle for justice and peace in Israel-
Palestine, and it also works on these issues with people from other faiths. Thus, its 
conferences on Palestinian liberation theology have included participants from 
various backgrounds.5   
The ecumenical work of Sabeel and others has resulted in joint efforts by 
Palestinian Christians for a just peace. For example, Naim Ateek was one of the 
authors of the Kairos Palestine Document, written by representatives of different 
Palestinian churches in 2009, calling the global church and all faiths to stand 
against oppression. However, there are also differences among Palestinian 
                                                                                                                                 
canonical collection of Jewish texts that also constitute the textual source of the different versions 
of the Christian Old Testament. Throughout this thesis, we shall follow Ateek and refer to these 
texts as the Old Testament.  
4 Ateek 2008, 9–10. By 1996, Sabeel also reached out internationally, establishing Friends of 
Sabeel organizations in several countries.  
5 Ateek 1989, 2–3, 159; Ateek 2008, xiii, 12–14. See also Strengholt 2008, 539–540.  
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theologians. Although sharing Ateek’s concern for justice, Greek Orthodox Dr. 
Geries Khoury, Latin friar Rafiq Khoury, and Lutheran Dr. Mitri Raheb prefer to 
use the term ‘contextual theology’ to describe their efforts. In their view, 
‘liberation theology’ is associated with South American and western contexts, 
where Christianity is the majority religion, and focuses on socioeconomic 
oppression. The Palestinian context requires a different answer because 
oppression concerns Muslims and Christians and is related to religious-ethnic-
national identity, not economic class.6  
A systematic comparison of Ateek’s theology with that of other Palestinian 
theologians is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in assessing Ateek’s 
critical and constructive tasks, some comparisons with alternative Palestinian 
answers are unavoidable in order to do justice to the context that Ateek is 
operating in.    
 
1.3 Critical and Constructive tasks of Liberation and 
Postcolonial Theologies 
Liberation theology developed within the Catholic Church in South America in 
the 1960s as a reaction against poverty in the region. Since then it has spread to 
other churches and different parts of the world, as diverse groups have created 
their own liberation theologies. In general, all liberation theologies share the same 
basic concern of establishing God’s revelation as a prophetic condemnation of 
injustice and as a liberating answer to concrete oppression.7  
 The concept of ‘hermeneutical circle’ is central to the method of liberation 
theology. It emphasises the close correlation between exegesis, theological 
reflection, historical context, and praxis. The reader moves from his context to the 
biblical text and vice versa. This reminds us that interpretation is based on one’s 
experience of reality. A liberationist interpretation is one that commits to 
transform that reality because it perceives it as oppressive.8 
                                                
6 Kassis et al. 2009, 15; Kuruvilla 2014, 12, 16–18; Munayer & Loden 2013, 119–120. 
7 Kuruvilla 2014, 1–3, 7–8; Libanio 1997, 278-283; Stam & Goizueta 2008, 490. Feminists, 
African-Americans, and sexual minorities, among others, have developed their own liberation 
theologies. For the purpose of this thesis, Latin American liberation theology is used as a reference 
point because it defines the basic liberationist methodology. Unless noted otherwise, in this thesis 
the singular term ‘liberation theology’ refers to Latin American liberation theology.   
8 Segovia 2012, 48–49; Stam & Goizueta 2008, 487; Sugirtharajah 2002, 106. Sugirtharajah 
summarizes the hermeneutical circle in three steps: perceive the reality of the oppressive context, 
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The method of liberation theology includes critical and constructive tasks.9 
‘Critical task’ describes the way in which liberation theology exposes the reality 
of oppression and condemns it. Exposing oppression involves understanding the 
causes and nature of oppression through social analysis. In general, oppression is 
perceived as structural violence, or structural sin, which enslaves both oppressors 
and oppressed, preventing them from living righteous lives. The prophetic 
message of the Bible is applied to judge the oppression. Theological views and 
biblical interpretations that justify or ignore oppression are denounced. The 
concept of ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ is central to this judgment because it is 
related to the unveiling of ideological bias in interpretations. It stresses that there 
is no neutral position, as all interpretations reflect the interests of the subject who 
interprets.10    
‘Constructive task’ describes how liberation theology provides a vision of 
liberation in place of the existing injustice. It involves rendering biblical and 
theological interpretations that empower the oppressed to transform reality. 
Typically, a Christological key is used to interpret the Bible because Jesus is seen 
as the exemplar of liberationist praxis. Jesus’s mission to bring concrete liberation 
to the poor, outcasts, and sick is a common theme. Jesus’s ministry reveals God’s 
preferential option for the poor, which means that God’s love and concern for 
justice touches the poor first and foremost because they are powerless and abused. 
The resurrection confirms Jesus’s victory over the sinful structures of oppression 
and the validity of his ministry, offering hope of salvation from oppression.11   
Liberation theology emphasises praxis and social activism: the 
transformative power of scripture must be applied concretely to the situation of 
oppression. Concrete emancipatory goals are inspired by Jesus’s revelation of 
                                                                                                                                 
seek the prophetic and empowering message of the Bible, return to the context with this message 
and apply it in practice. 
9 The division into critical and constructive tasks should not be understood rigidly because the 
tasks are closely related. For example, Jesus’s denunciation of oppressive institutions, a common 
theme in liberation theology (see e.g. Bravo 1996, 117, 119) can be seen as critical but also 
constructive in the sense that it inspires the oppressed to challenge injustice. Still, the tasks convey 
liberation theology’s method: it seeks to understand and condemn the causes of oppression so that 
it can construct a theological answer to transform it.   
10 Andinach & Botta 2009, 3, 5–6; Boff 1996, 6, 8–9, 11; Cooper 2011, 541–542, 549; Sobrino 
2012, 196, 199–200; Sugirtharajah 2002, 106. Hermeneutics refers to the process of interpreting 
texts. Boff explains that liberation theology is academic, pastoral, and popular, but stresses that it 
must also be socially relevant and based on the experience of oppression. The grass-roots biblical 
reflection of the oppressed is valued because they know best what they need liberation from.  
11 Andinach & Botta 2009, 2–3; Boff 1996, 16–18; Bravo 1996, 106–107, 113, 121; Gutiérrez 
2012, 179–181, 186–189; Sobrino 2012, 201.  
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God’s reign as one of justice and equality. The focus on praxis results in a 
historical view of salvation and eschatology. Salvation is liberation from 
oppression through the building of God’s reign in history. Transcendental-earthly 
dualism is rejected because it leads to passivity towards the reality of oppression. 
Rather, liberation theology posits a new duality of God’s reign vs. anti-reign in 
which the former stands for a just society that serves life and the latter represents 
unjust, sinful structures that oppress and bring death. The historicisation of 
salvation and eschatology, however, does not obviate personal salvation or the 
utopian eschatology of God’s transcendental reign.12   
 The discussion above reveals the methodology and central themes of 
liberation theology from a Latin American viewpoint. Liberation theologies are 
always contextual but they share the general methodology outlined above.13 In 
contexts of western colonial oppression, the methodology of liberation theology 
has been perceived as inadequate. It has adopted too many western theological 
concepts and is Christianity-centric. Instead, the victims of colonisation have 
developed postcolonial theologies. Still, postcolonial theology shares liberation 
theology’s general methodology: it criticises oppression and constructs 
emancipatory religious interpretations to transform reality in practice. But there 
are some significant differences as well, even though postcolonial theology can 
broadly be included among liberation theologies.14  
Concerning the critical task, liberation theology tends to focus on 
socioeconomic oppression but postcolonial theology recognizes the plurality of 
oppression which can relate to nationality, ethnicity, gender, class, etc. 
Postcolonial theology uses the concept of empire in its criticism of oppression. 
Empires are massive concentrations of power that are not controlled by any one 
actor alone and seek control over all areas of life, including the geographical, 
                                                
12 Boff 1996, 18, 20; Sobrino 2012, 197, 202–204, 209–214; Stam & Goizueta 2008, 487–488. 
Sobrino explains that there is always room for “a more” in eschatology, as no historical society can 
claim perfection. Utopian eschatology, through its vision of a perfect society, should inspire 
concrete steps towards making God’s Reign more of a reality and offers the hope of fulfilment 
already now but also beyond history.  
13 Libanio 1997, 283; Stam & Goizueta 2008, 487–489. 
14 Ireland 2008, 683–684; Kwok 2007, 18; Sugirtharajah 2002, 101, 113–116; Sugirtharajah 
2006a, 5. ‘Postcolonial theology’ can be used as a generic term to describe some of the common 
elements in different postcolonial theologies. Sugirtharajah (2006b, 64–67) explains that 
postcolonial theory, developed by Edward Said, among others, focuses on colonial and 
anticolonial discourses in literary texts. Anticolonial writers, including theologians, engaged in the 
criticism of colonialism before it was formulated into postcolonial theory, so their views can be 
described as postcolonial even though they don’t use the term themselves. Joseph Duggan divides 
postcolonial theology into three strands (Duggan 2013, 13–14).  
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political, economic, intellectual, cultural, religious, spiritual, and psychological 
spheres. Oppression emerges as a result of power imbalance and is evident not 
only in structural violence but also at the level of language and definitions. The 
powerful define themselves as superior to colonised others who are demonized as 
inferior, immoral and evil.15  
Postcolonial theology criticises theologies that justify empires. Such 
theologies can be referred to as ‘empire theologies.’ Empire theology presents the 
power of certain peoples and religions and their domination over others as 
divinely ordained and therefore inevitable or good. Although liberation theology 
also criticises oppressive theologies, its confessional nature and Christocentric 
focus means that it does not recognise the colonising elements in Christianity and 
the ambiguous nature of its God and its Bible. Postcolonial theology, on the other 
hand, attacks biblical texts that depict God as a coloniser and endorse oppression. 
In this way, postcolonial theology unmasks the colonising interests of the biblical 
narratives and the monotheistic God. It criticizes the colonising biblical narratives 
from the viewpoint of the victims, such as the Canaanites, with whom modern 
dispossessed groups can identify. Postcolonial theology criticises theological 
views that limit liberation to an exclusive Christocentric vision that seems to 
preclude freedom for non-Christian others.16  
The constructive task of postcolonial theology, like liberation theology, 
seeks to empower the oppressed. Unlike liberation theology, postcolonial 
theology decolonizes the Bible by offering alternative narratives that affirm the 
dignity and rights of groups that the biblical narrative marginalizes, for example 
women and the Samaritans. In this way it offers a voice to the victims of Western 
Christian oppression. Unlike liberation theology, postcolonial theology has a 
positive view of other religions and seeks pluralistic interpretations that 
acknowledge the validity and liberationist value of other religions. It explores how 
Christianity and local religions can accommodate and add to each other in an 
equal relationship. It regards pluralism and openness to hybridity as the way to 
                                                
15 Kwok 2007, 20; Rieger 2007, 3; Sugirtharajah 2006a, 1; Sugirtharajah 2006b, 70, 79.  
16 Ireland 2008, 684–685; Sugirtharajah 2002, 25, 47; Sugirtharajah 2006a, 5, 8; Sugirtharajah 
2006b, 67–70, 78–79. 
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overcome exclusive identities that often result in demonization and oppression of 
outside others.17  
Presenting Ateek’s theology through the general framework of liberation 
and postcolonial theologies’ critical and constructive tasks, outlined above, 
involves the definition of some of his arguments as both critical and constructive 
because the categories cannot be understood rigidly. For example, Ateek’s 
criticism of counter-violence as ineffective and immoral is inevitably connected to 
his constructive idea of nonviolence as an effective and moral alternative. Thus, 
cross-referencing cannot be entirely avoided in this thesis because it is necessary 
for revealing the connections between the critical and constructive tasks. 
 
2. Ateek’s Critical Task 
2.1 Oppression and Violence  
The Problem of Power  
Naim Ateek follows the first phase in liberation theology’s critical task, which 
involves understanding and exposing the causes of oppression. The nature of 
power is central to his understanding of oppression in Israel-Palestine. He writes 
at length about the history of the conflict in order to show that Israel has always 
used its greater power to abuse Palestinians. There is no need to recount this 
history here but it is necessary to note that it challenges Zionist history in which 
Israel is presented as the victim of Arab power. Rejecting this view, Ateek 
establishes that Israel has dispossessed the Palestinians and that its concerns have 
always overridden Palestinian ones, which is evident in international resolutions 
on the division of land, Israel’s violent takeover of Palestine, and the continued 
failure of the peace process.18 Ateek’s central point is that possessing great power 
                                                
17 Dube 2006, 302; Ireland 2008, 683–684; Sugirtharajah 2002, 116–122, 192–198. Hybridity 
acknowledges the dynamic nature of identities and is open to combining elements from different 
traditions.  
18 For Ateek’s history of the conflict, see Ateek 1989, 18–61 and Ateek 2008, 15–48. Israel 
committed acts of ethnic cleansing during the 1947–49 war, as 750 thousand Palestinians were 
expelled by Israel from their homes or fled because of the war. A further 200 thousand were made 
refugees in the 1967 War. By 2008, the original refugees and their descendants numbered 4.3 
million, the largest and longest displaced group of refugees in the world (Ateek 2008, 172). 
Ateek’s historical account is in line with Post-Zionist and revisionist histories, see e.g. Pappé 
2007. For a historical overview of the conflict, see Lesch 2008 (esp. 25–146). Revisionist and 
Palestinian history can be criticised, e.g. for ignoring the role of Arab aggression (Ottolenghi 
2005b, 74–75). Assessing the merits or shortcomings of Ateek’s historical account is not the point 
here. It consciously presents a Palestinian view in which the Palestinians are presented as victims 
of Israeli power. Thus, it offers a historical voice to the Palestinians as an oppressed people.   
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often leads to self-aggrandizement at the expense of others, which is the direct 
cause of oppression.  
 Reflecting biblically on the effects of power asymmetry, Ateek follows 
liberation theology’s critical task of judging oppression through the prophetic 
message of the Bible. Ateek contextualizes the parable of the persistent widow in 
Luke 18:1-8 as a depiction of the power imbalance between Israel and the 
Palestinians. Locating the context of the parable within the “oppressive system of 
laws” in the Roman Empire, Ateek defines empire as a system of governance that 
is based on the domination of one group and its exploitation of others for its own 
benefit. The judge, Israel, is the current empire that uses its tremendous power to 
exploit the vulnerable widow who represents the Palestinians.19 The concept of 
empire as a description of the injustice caused by power imbalance is central to 
postcolonial theology, so here we can also establish a connection between 
postcolonial theology and Ateek’s thought.  
 According to Ateek, empires emerge because the nature of power is 
ambivalent. He defines power as “the ability of a person or a group to initiate 
action…bring about a change…achieve a desired end.” Power is required to 
maintain peace and justice but, at the same time, it is a threat to peace and justice 
if it is abused. When power is concentrated in the hands of one group, it easily 
leads to the exclusion of others because there is no counter-balancing power. 
Laws are made to serve the interests of the powerful: what is right and just is 
defined as that which is good for the majority, or for those in power.20  
 God entrusts power to governments who should use it to protect justice 
according to “reason’s insistence upon consistency,” which demands that all 
people be treated equally before the law because of their common humanity. 
However, in humans power is grounded in sin and this is why, unlike God, they 
abuse power to pursue their own self-interest at the expense of others. Their sinful 
nature makes them susceptible to the intoxicating quality of power, which clouds 
their sense of right and wrong. Thus, “it is impossible for them to grant to others 
what they claim for themselves.”21   
                                                
19 Ateek 2008, 16–17. Ateek’s biblical citations are from the Revised Standard Version and New 
Revised Standard Version.   
20 Ateek 1989, 120, 123,130.  
21 Ateek 1989, 123–127, 129. Ateek draws these ideas, including the idea of “reason’s insistence 
upon consistency”, from Niebuhr 1955, 6, 20, 29.   
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Ateek’s view on power and sin is based on the Christian Realism of 
Reinhold Niebuhr who regarded sin as pervasive and persistent in humans, 
leading them to abuse power. The effect of sin is magnified in society’s groups 
and institutions because they reflect a conglomeration of individual interests. 
Even if an individual overcomes his personal selfishness, changing the selfishness 
of the group is considerably harder. If there is no competing interest, then the 
group will use its greater power unashamedly to further its own interests. It 
follows that the solution to sin, the abuse of power, is to restrict its effects by 
balancing power through structures that allow the existence of competing 
interests. The only viable way to do this is to build a democratic society. Ateek, 
too, envisions a democratic society as the solution to Palestinian oppression.22 
 Niebuhr’s and Ateek’s view of power is also common in liberation theology 
which stress the imbalance of power between the oppressors, whose interests the 
unjust institutions of society serve, and the oppressed, who have no influence over 
their own lives due to their lack of power. Similar to Niebuhr, liberation theology 
stresses the necessity of empowering the oppressed to challenge unjust 
concentrations of power, as well as building just societal structures that serve the 
interests of all people.23  
Liberation theologies often present the idea that the power wielded through 
institutions and structures should serve life.24 Ateek stresses that God expects 
governments to use power to promote justice and peace. Sin corrupts the 
structures so that they only serve some lives and not others. Thus, as Ateek writes, 
the laws, which are supposed to maintain peace and justice, are in fact 
“instruments of violence and oppression.”25 However, liberation theologies do not 
typically share Niebuhr’s pessimistic view of sin as persistent because such a view 
casts doubt on visions of social transformation. Niebuhr’s vision seems to leave 
even just societies in a perpetual state of competing selfish interests. By contrast, 
liberation theology has a positive view of the potential of humans to overcome 
sin, through God’s grace, and develop relationships based on trust and respect for 
                                                
22 Rasmussen 2007, 373, 376–377; Yoder 2009, 288, 290. See pages 88–89 on Ateek’s solution to 
the conflict.  
23 Comblin 1996a, 155; Magana 1996, 185–186; Sobrino 2012, 202–204, 207. 
24 For example, North American liberation theologian Walter Wink (Wink 1992, 101–102) refers 
to institutions and structures (laws, economic structures, etc.) as ‘powers’ that God has created to 
make organized and full life possible. But human sin, selfish interests and fear, corrupt the powers 
so that they become oppressive and do not serve life.  
25 Ateek 2008, 18.  
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others’ humanity. Although Ateek uses Niebuhr’s idea of competing selfish 
interests to explain the abuse of power, he does not share Niebuhr’s pessimistic 
view on sin.26 
 
Violence Against Palestinians  
Israel’s abuse of power, its perpetration of injustice, constitutes violence against 
the Palestinians. Ateek defines violence broadly as the use of power to harm or 
oppress others. More specifically, we may define violence as the use of power, 
framed by personal, social, cultural, or religious ideals of existence and fulfilment, 
to destroy the existence or fulfilment of another person. Violence always aims to 
subjugate or eliminate.27 It is possible to distinguish three types of violence in 
Ateek’s analysis that follows liberation theology’s critical task of understanding 
the nature of oppression. These are structural violence, repressive violence, and 
demonization.  
 Liberation theology focuses especially on exposing structural violence, a 
consequence of the power asymmetry that we examined above. Structural 
violence refers to the harmful effects of political, social, and economic inequality. 
Laws, education, the labour market, and other institutions of society are organized 
in a way that denies certain peoples’ rights to the goods, protection, or benefits 
produced by those institutions. Liberation theology specifically highlights poverty 
as a form of structural violence. Ateek differs in this respect, for in Israel-
Palestine structural violence is related to ethnic and religious identity rather than 
economic class. Here, then, Ateek comes closer to postcolonial theology which 
emphasises the plurality of oppression and violence.28  
 Ateek argues that Palestinian Arabs face systematic discrimination in Israel. 
Officially, Israel is a democracy that guarantees equal rights to all of its citizens. 
However, ethnic nationalism is central to the Israeli state that envisions itself as a 
homeland for the Jewish people. Ethnic nationalism promotes the privileges of 
one ethnic group over and against the rights of other groups. Ethnos overcomes 
demos in Israel because ethnicity, based on descent, religion, language, origin, or 
race, rather than citizenship, defines an inhabitant’s rights in the state. Israel 
                                                
26 See Comblin 1996b for liberation theology’s view on grace as transformative power. See page 
82 below for Ateek’s view on grace and the possibility of transformation.   
27 Ateek 1989, 125; Vondey 2008, 919.   
28 Barak 2003, 113; Cooper 2011, 541–542; Sugirtharajah 2006b, 79.   
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promotes its Jewish identity in order to protect the Jewish right to self-
determination and to avert a repetition of the horrors of the holocaust. In practice, 
this means ensuring a Jewish majority and retaining power in Jewish hands. There 
isn’t enough trust to imagine that Jewish rights could be ensured in a setting in 
which Arabs had more power or in which Jews were a minority.29   
In the Israeli ethnocracy Arabs, whose cultural and linguistic identity is 
Palestinian, are second-class citizens. They are underrepresented in the Knesset, 
their access to land and other resources are restricted, they have less access to 
education and employment, the government invests considerably less on the 
development of Arab neighbourhoods compared to Jewish ones, and only Jews 
possess the legal right to immigrate to Israel.30 This exclusion of Arabs from 
Israeli society constitutes structural violence that denies the fulfilment of their 
basic needs and prevents them from pursuing full lives similar to Jewish Israelis. 
Palestinians in the occupied territories are not Israeli citizens. They are victims of 
even greater structural violence than Arab Israelis, as they lack political and civil 
rights and access to services, and are subject to military law in areas administered 
by Israel. Also, Israel has appropriated the best land and most of the water 
reserves. Only Gaza and a minority of the West Bank are under full or limited 
Palestinian jurisdiction. The Israeli occupation, Israel’s system of control, and its 
siege of Gaza render Palestinian governance difficult and ineffective, which 
hampers the realisation of Palestinian rights and the creation of services.31  
Living under a violent structural order does not necessarily mean that a 
person has experienced direct inter-personal violence. Structural violence occurs 
in the establishment and maintenance of inequality throughout society and 
involves acts of omission like ignoring the lack of welfare of Arab 
neighbourhoods. As Ateek notes, a well-established empire does not have to use 
direct violence because it controls political, economic, and other resources. It can 
exclude the powerless by ignoring them, just like the judge ignored the widow in 
Luke’s parable. This is why structural violence may appear nonviolent, and the 
                                                
29 Ateek 2008, 154–162; Ateek 2012b, 98–99. Ateek uses demos to refer to citizens as a group 
irrespective of religion, culture, race, etc. In a democracy, the interests of the entire demos are 
represented and the state aspires to ensure equal rights for all. In an ethnocracy, one’s rights 
depend on membership of the privileged ethnic group.  Ateek stresses that Israel regards the 
growing Arab population as a demographic threat to its existence. 
30 Ateek 2008, 154, 157–158. 
31 Ateek 1989, 36, 45–46, 120–121; Pappé 2015, 28–29, 42; Farah et al. 2007, 237–245.  
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powerful can claim to represent stability and order while branding dissidents 
violent revolutionaries.32  
Structural violence involves a system of unequal relationships based on the 
dependence of the powerless on those who possess rights and resources. Ateek 
notes that the powerful often justify the relationship as “benevolence.” Israelis 
argue that Israel has provided the Palestinians with educational and economic 
benefits, so Palestinians don’t require their own state or more rights.33 This 
supposed benevolence entails the powerful deciding what benefits the powerless 
are entitled to and renders the Palestinians dependent on Israel for political rights 
and economic resources. The relationship is based on the omission of the 
aspirations that Palestinians have for themselves.  
Structural violence refers broadly to the harmful effects of political, 
economic, and social inequality. Because the injustice may spark resistance, 
enforcing the unjust structure also requires acts of commission in which 
governmental institutions, including courts, the police, and the army are used to 
perpetrate specific injustices. These acts of commission towards specific targets 
can be distinguished from omission which excludes the object but does not 
appropriate or destroy his property or harm him physically. We may refer to acts 
of commission as repressive violence. Ateek describes it as Israel’s imposition of 
a system of control that applies especially to the occupied territories but also 
affects Israeli Arabs who are subject, for example, to arbitrary security checks.34  
In the occupied territories, the Israeli military administration connives at and 
sanctions injustices, including land confiscations, physical violence against 
Palestinian civilians and the destruction of Palestinian property, committed by the 
Israeli army and settlers in contravention of international human rights and 
humanitarian law. Israeli military law allows Israeli forces to arbitrarily arrest 
Palestinians, including minors, and Palestinians do not receive fair trials in the 
military courts. Segmentation is at the core of the system of control. It refers to 
the isolation and fragmentation of Palestinian communities through movement 
restrictions and land confiscations for Israeli settlement building. By the Second 
Intifada, segmentation in the West Bank had resulted in over 600 checkpoints and 
                                                
32 Ateek 2008, 18; Barak 2003, 116.  
33 Ateek 1989, 41, 126–127. 
34 Ateek 1989, 34–38; Barak 2003, 113–114, Cooper 2011, 541–542; Hauerwas & Berkman 1995, 
867.  
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bypass roads to isolate Palestinian towns. Israel continues to build settlements and 
expel Palestinians from their land.35  
The latest development in segmentation is the separation barrier that 
encroaches on Palestinian land and prevents them from accessing work, school, 
and neighbours. There are separate roads and public transportation for 
Palestinians and Israeli settlers. Israel is colonizing the territories and uses 
segmentation to dispossess Palestinians, increasingly narrowing their living space 
by producing unviable exclaves. Thus, the purpose of segmentation is not only to 
separate and confiscate but also to make life so unbearable that Palestinians will 
leave. In Ateek’s view, the system of control amounts in practice to ethnic 
cleansing of the territories.36  
According to Ateek, in addition to the system of control there has been, 
since the Second Intifada, “a policy of subjugation and suppression” that uses 
excessive force to crush Palestinian resistance, following the right-wing Israeli 
adage “ten eyes for an eye.” The goal is to instil fear and cause so much misery 
that Palestinians will either leave or submit completely. Ateek notes that since the 
Second Intifada, Israel’s repressive violence has reached horrific levels of 
severity. It can be described as state terrorism which is defined as the illegal 
targeting of individuals and groups with the aim of creating fear in the target 
audience beyond the immediate victims in order to control the population, 
                                                
35 Ateek 1989, 34–35, 37–38, 46, 119–123; Ateek 2008, 17, 23–24, 43–44. The Absentee Property 
Law of 1950 sanctioned the confiscation of Palestinian land, even of those who never left Israel, so 
that by 1965 over 3 million acres of Palestinian land had been confiscated for Jewish immigrants 
and settlements. Building settlements and expelling Palestinians transgress the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which prohibits population transferrals by the occupying power. Israeli historian Ilan 
Pappé (Pappé 2015, 13, 17) stresses that Israeli building of settlements and the entire Zionist 
project of settling Palestine should be referred to as “colonialism” because it is in effect 
comparable to other colonial projects in which colonizers established themselves in a foreign land 
either by expelling the native population or committing genocide against them.  
36 Ateek 2008, 44, 158–160. In 2004, the International Court of Justice declared the separation 
barrier illegal precisely because it solidifies the occupation, impedes Palestinians’ right to self-
determination, and disrupts Palestinian life. There is a debate on whether Israel’s discrimination 
against Arab citizens and its system of control in the occupied territories merits a comparison with 
South African apartheid. Ateek is generally favourable to the comparison and refers to South 
Africans, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who have compared Israeli policies to apartheid 
(see e.g. Tutu 2008, xi–xii). A 2007 UN human rights report has also made the comparison (see 
Kuruvilla 2013, 183). However, Israeli Arabs are officially full citizens and Israel occupies the 
Palestinian territories, which makes the comparison unhelpful according to critics (see Pogrund 
2015). Ateek is also aware of the different contexts and suggests that the Hebrew word nishul, 
dispossession, should be used to describe Israel’s policy, rather than apartheid, because Israel is 
colonizing Palestinian land and expelling the Palestinians. Ilan Pappé and the Boycott, Divestment 
and Sanctions movement (see Pappé 2015, 18, 24, 41–42) maintain that Israel is an apartheid state. 
Israel increasingly applies the same violent and discriminatory policies against all Palestinians, 
both Arab citizens and those living under occupation. As of 2014, the “unofficial” apartheid is 
being replaced by openly racist legislation that segregates on the basis of ethnicity.  
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discourage support for opposition groups, or attain other political goals. When a 
state’s use of force violates international human rights and humanitarian law to 
pursue the aforementioned aims, its actions may be described as state terrorism. It 
can be argued that Israel’s mass arrests of Palestinians, demolition of Palestinian 
homes, and the high level of civilian casualties inflicted by its military operations 
constitute state terrorism.37  
Terrorism as a concept has been criticised, also by Ateek, for being an 
unhelpful label that is used simply to delegitimize violence that the user of the 
concept disapproves of for whatever reason.38 Rather than judging violence as 
terrorism, we should endeavour to understand the causes of violence in a certain 
context and the reasons that a group in that context has for labelling some violent 
actions terrorism and not others. Still, state terrorism as a concept is helpful in 
establishing that not all violence employed by the state is legitimate. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of Israel which uses the orthodox terrorism 
discourse to label Palestinian resistance illegitimate or criminal while maintaining 
that its own use of violence is just because states have a monopoly on violence 
and possess the right to use force in self-defence.39  
This leads us to the third form of violence, which we may refer to as 
demonization. It involves defining the other as threatening, inferior, or evil in 
language or symbolism, for example in statements, pictures, or religious language.   
Demonization serves as a justification for unjust structures and repressive 
violence. Postcolonial theology emphasises that oppression or violence exists also 
at the level of language and definitions, which portray the other as inferior.40 
Ateek writes that Israel often brands Palestinians as terrorists in order to 
rationalize the status quo. This includes the idea that national security requires the 
occupation because Palestinians want to destroy Israel and the labelling of all 
resistance, including nonviolent resistance, as terrorism. By branding the 
Palestinians rejectionist, hate-filled terrorists, like the judge in Luke’s parable 
labelled the widow a violent brute, Israelis are able to shut out the Palestinian 
voice and justify the need for violence against Palestinians.41  
                                                
37 Ateek 1989, 33–34; Ateek 2008, 43–46, 117; Blakeley 2012, 63–64, 69.  
38 Ateek 2008, 205 (see note 1). 
39 Franks 2012, 40.  
40 Ireland 2008, 683.  
41 Ateek 1989, 14, 68–69, 167, 178; Ateek 2008, 19, 31, 45, 47, 57. We cannot argue that 
demonization produces structural or repressive violence. Rather, they are all interconnected. 
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 Demonization includes attempts to erase and undermine Palestinian identity 
at multiple levels. In Israel’s Arab schools, students are taught Jewish and Zionist 
history but the Arab contribution to the area’s culture is overlooked. In public 
discourse, Palestinians are presented as lacking national consciousness, order, and 
morality. Religious Zionists, for example some in the Lubavitch ultra-Orthodox 
group, regard the Palestinians as “dispensable beings” or animals lacking human 
status. Thus, Palestinians are no longer humans with rights, but convenient 
caricatures.42 One of Ateek’s central assumptions is that religious language and 
beliefs, which Zionists use to demonize Palestinians, have a significant role in 
legitimating oppression.43     
 
The Problem of Counter-Violence  
Liberation theology typically distinguishes the violence of the oppressor, the 
structural, repressive and demonizing violence considered above, from 
liberationist counter-violence that the oppressed use to resist or overthrow 
oppression. Violence should not be used as an umbrella term to condemn the 
desperate actions of the oppressed and the unjust actions of the oppressors as 
equally reprehensible.44  
 Ateek agrees with the aforementioned distinction. He argues that we cannot 
equate Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians and Palestinian resistance. Like 
Brazilian liberation theologian Helder Camara, Ateek envisages violent conflict as 
a spiral in which an oppressive system understandably produces liberationist 
violence that then intensifies the oppressors’ repressive violence which engenders 
more resentment and resistance among the oppressed, and so on. Condemning the 
resistance of the oppressed is not the way to break the spiral because it is not a 
cause but a consequence of oppression. Instead, the oppression must be 
transformed into justice and then liberationist violence will also end. However, 
like Camara, Ateek is aware of the problematic nature of liberationist violence. It 
                                                                                                                                 
Violent actors use demonizing language to justify violence, e.g. see Chimel 1992, who writes 
about the violence of stereotypes and labels. 
42 Ateek 1989, 36–37; Ateek 2008, 47, 154, 157–158. Ateek notes that top government officials, 
like Prime Minister Golda Meir, could even say that there were no “Palestinian people in 
Palestine… They did not exist.” Palestinians face hate speech in the media and even from 
government ministers who have suggested that transferring the Arab population is the solution to 
the demographic threat. 
43 See the section on religion as a cause of oppression and violence (pages 41–47). 
44 Cooper 2011, 547; Stam & Goizueta 2008, 489. 
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may be an understandable reaction to oppression but liberationist violence is a 
futile response that only intensifies the spiral.45  
In order to show that liberationist violence is an understandable response of 
the desperate victim, Ateek describes the processes and experiences that may lead 
individuals to resort to violence. Violence is the culmination of a process of 
unresolved conflicts and failures. The Palestinians have tried time and again to 
resolve the conflict peacefully through negotiations and even nonviolent 
resistance but to no avail. It is precisely when people begin to feel powerless that 
some resort to violence. Thus, violence emerges out of frustration over the futility 
of one’s attempts to pursue one’s goals using other forms of power. Also, 
according to Ateek, experimental psychology shows that the most effective way to 
stimulate a violent response in a person is insult and humiliation through 
rejection. Physical and psychological humiliation defines the existence of 
Palestinians. They feel shame over their rejection, to which they respond with 
anger, which then boils over as violence. Ateek notes that it is not just a question 
of personal rejection because Palestinians react to the collective rejection of their 
national identity and human rights.46  
According to Ateek, Israel purposefully incites violence in order to gain a 
pretext for intensifying the oppression. Some Palestinian extremists play into 
Israel’s hands by perpetrating suicide bombings. In Ateek’s view, all Palestinian 
suicide bombers share one or more of the following elements: humiliation, desire 
for revenge over the killing of a friend or relative, desperation over Israeli 
domination, unemployment, imprisonment, experience of torture, and experiences 
of racism or discrimination. They are thus “products of the Israeli occupation.” 47 
Militants regard suicide bombings as a practical way to resist because they create 
                                                
45 Ateek 1989, 125, 137–138; Ateek 2008, 117; Camara 1971, 29–30, 55. 
46 Ateek 2008, 47–48. Ethicist Stanley Hauerwas (Hauerwas & Berkman 1995, 867) points out that 
revolutionary violence emerges when people have lost access to other forms of power that they 
could use to influence their situation.   
47 Ateek 2008, 116–117, 121–122. Ateek notes that critical voices in Israel echo the view that 
Israeli oppression breeds suicide bombers. Poverty or oppression per se are not adequate 
explanations of suicide bombing, however. Studies show that suicide bombing is the weapon of 
the underdog, is often related to territorial struggles, and is seen by the organizations that use it as 
an effective way to scare and demoralize. In addition to a strategic logic, it requires a social logic 
(support system), an individual logic (personal motive), and a moral logic (legitimizing religious 
interpretations). Personal motives of bombers vary considerably as do the exact motives of 
organizations. (See El-Affendi 2009, 62, 65–68) 
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a “relative balance of fear” in a situation where Palestinians have no chance to 
challenge Israel with conventional military power.48  
Describing Palestinian violence as an understandable reaction to Israeli 
oppression, Ateek emphasises Palestinian victimhood. He has been accused of 
ignoring Israeli suffering and presenting Israel only as an inhuman oppressor. This 
is not the case, however, for Ateek stresses that both sides are victims in the 
conflict. Israelis are victims of their own oppressive system that erodes their 
respect for human dignity, desensitizes them to Palestinian suffering, and prevents 
them from achieving security. Ateek has also been criticised of comparing 
Palestinian suffering to the holocaust, which appears to delegitimize Jewish 
suffering. It is true that the suffering of both sides should be considered important 
in its own right. Neither side should appropriate the other’s experiences or stories 
because the other may feel that it devalues his experience. Still, it must be noted 
that Ateek fully acknowledges the severity of the holocaust, clearly condemns 
anti-Semitism, and does not advocate violence against Israelis.49  
Even though Ateek emphasises that Palestinians are victims and oppression 
causes them to react violently, he does not believe that victimhood justifies 
violence. Ateek stresses that all intercommunal violence comes “down to 
destruction and devastation” and therefore lacks any constructive purpose. Ateek 
disagrees with Palestinian militants’ argument from practicality, which views 
suicide bombing as an effective way for the victim to resist. Instead, he 
commends most Palestinians for rejecting bombings as both ineffective and 
immoral. Bombings do not advance the Palestinian cause to overcome oppression 
and end the Israeli occupation. On the contrary, they only intensify Israel’s 
repressive measures and reprisals against Palestinians, which are usually much 
more destructive than suicide bombings. Suicide bombings are immoral because 
                                                
48 Ateek 2008, 118–120. Ateek explains that militants inspire suicide bombers with the idea of 
martyrdom. Martyrdom involves religious rewards, such as forgiveness of sins and intercession on 
behalf of bombers’ families. Many Islamic scholars do not accept suicide bombing as a legitimate 
form of martyrdom. Militants emphasise the effectiveness of suicide operations: cumulative 
casualties, panic, fear, psychological and moral trauma, emigration, and the economic impact.   
49 See the following for Ateek’s affirmation that also Israelis are victims and his condemnation of 
anti-Semitism and the Holocaust: Ateek 1989, 168–170; Ateek 2008, 46, 124, 156, 169. For 
criticism of Ateek, see e.g. Peterson 2014, 8–9.  
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they foment an attitude of fatalistic hopelessness and a logic of retribution among 
Palestinians.50  
Suicide bombings are also immoral because they are a form of collective 
punishment. Israel uses collective punishment, such as mass detentions, targeting 
of non-combatants, and demolition of homes. Palestinians mirror the same evil in 
their own way, becoming what they loathe, when they execute suicide bombings, 
which arbitrarily punish Israelis for their government’s repressive policies. This 
describes the spiral of violence well, as both sides compete to do their worst to 
each other. Ateek stresses that both Israeli and Palestinian violence is 
indiscriminate, inflicts suffering on innocents, and follows a logic of retribution 
that only intensifies the spiral of violence. Both sides feel that the other’s violence 
is disproportionate and unjust and therefore warrants revenge, creating a perpetual 
cycle.51  
 In the Old Testament, God enacts collective punishment in a few cases and 
sanctions indiscriminate killing, even ethnic cleansing. In the story of Samson 
(Judg. 13–16), God justifies the hate-filled suicide attack of an Israelite freedom 
fighter in a time when Philistines oppressed Israel. Contextualizing the story, 
Ateek notes that today we could substitute “Samson” for “Ahmad,” for it is the 
Palestinians who are oppressed and use suicide attacks. However, Ateek 
condemns the Samson story and all other instances where God condones violence 
against people. In his view, these stories reflect a primitive understanding of God 
as a tribal deity who favours only one people, which the writers of the texts used 
to justify perpetration of evil against their fellow men. These violent texts do not 
reflect the God of love revealed in Christ and only promote the retributive logic of 
the spiral of violence. Here Ateek deviates from liberation theology’s positive 
interpretation of the Bible as liberating. Instead, he follows a postcolonial 
hermeneutic that questions the validity and value of biblical texts.52   
                                                
50 Ateek 2008, 46, 111, 116, 120–121, 126. According to Ateek, in June 2002 fifty-eight 
Palestinian leaders, Muslims and Christians, signed a public statement against suicide bombing. 
Bombings only deepen hatred and distrust, and intensify the cycle of violence.  
51 Ateek 2008, 126–129. Collective punishment is prohibited in the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(see Geneva Conventions of 1949, Convention IV, Article 33). Ateek does not believe that 
intercommunal violence can ever escape the sin of collective punishment because non-combatants 
and bystanders are always affected. 
52 Ateek 2008, 88, 123, 126, 129. Samson’s hate-filled prayer (Judg. 16:28) is similar to the 
prayers of suicide bombers today. Religious Zionists use violent texts to invoke God in their cause. 
They see themselves following in Joshua’s footsteps. Ateek also notes that Palestinian Muslim 
militants have a similar conception of God who justifies war and violence. They see themselves 
earning a place in paradise by liberating the land from the infidels.  
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Ateek does not only use a postcolonial approach to the Bible in his criticism 
of violence but also liberation hermeneutics. Liberation hermeneutics does not 
focus on the assumptions or aims of the biblical authors. Rather, as noted in 
section 1.3, in its critical function it interprets biblical texts as prophetic 
judgments of oppression. Ateek finds three models in the Bible that demonstrate 
the immorality and futility of intercommunal violence. The first model is the 
killing of the innocents (Matt. 2), which “represents the very incarnation of evil.” 
Ateek interprets it as a reference to genocide and ethnic cleansing. The innocents 
were unjustly slaughtered because they possessed the “wrong” identity. The 
second model, the war paradigm of Joshua (Josh. 6), reveals that warfare often 
includes disproportionate, indiscriminate violence that results in the destruction of 
civilians along with combatants.53  
The third model, the ethical paradigm of Sodom (Gen. 18:16-33), promotes 
the idea of just intentions and means. Violence should not be meted out 
indiscriminately. Only the wicked are destroyed and the innocent are spared. 
Ateek’s Sodom paradigm is reminiscent of just war theory that seeks to limit the 
destructive effects of violence. However, Ateek does not trust in man’s ability to 
wage war only for just causes using just means that distinguish combatants from 
non-combatants and employ proportional force. The Sodom paradigm is “only 
wishful thinking” and the suffering of the innocent is inevitable. Violent conflicts 
always fall within the first two paradigms, even if they are justified with reference 
to the third. Both Israelis and Palestinians target civilians and Israel in particular 
uses disproportionate violence.54  
Ateek’s view accords with the views of Mennonite theologian John H. 
Yoder and North American liberation theologian Walter Wink, who also criticise 
just war theory as irrelevant in practice.55 This differs from the view of some 
Latin American liberation theologians who advocate counter-violence. They argue 
that horrendous injustice provides the people with a just cause to overthrow a 
                                                
53 Ateek 2008, 110–111. 
54 Ateek 2008, 109–111.  
55 Wink 1992, 213–215, 221, 223; Yoder 2010, 53–61. Wink and Yoder regard just war theory as 
an admirable but naïve attempt to produce violence reduction criteria. Modern wars consistently 
fail to apply just means, as civilians constitute over 70% of casualties. As Ateek (Ateek 2008, 111) 
also notes, “In modern warfare the number of civilian casualties are colossal and the destruction of 
property is massive.” Just war criteria are plagued by numerous problems, including disagreements 
over what constitutes just cause or who possess the legitimate authority to wage war. According to 
Yoder and Wink, no government and no church that upholds the just war theory has ever 
condemned its own country for fighting a war for an unjust cause or for using unjust means in war. 
This highlights the inability of the theory to prevent war in practice.  
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repressive regime. So, the proponents of liberationist violence extend the just war 
theory to intra-state oppression and argue that the people’s right to violent 
revolution is an act of last resort and self-defence.56  
However, other Latin American liberation theologians, like Gustavo 
Gutiérrez, Helder Camara, Adolfo Esquivel and Oscar Romero, although 
sympathetic to the violent reactions of the oppressed, argue that violence as a 
means is incompatible with the goal of liberation because violence only begets 
more violence. The struggle for liberation cannot mean that the oppressed simply 
beat the oppressors at their own game and establish a violent regime of their own. 
Power structures must not be reversed so that the oppressed become oppressors 
but transformed in order to create a society in which the dignity and rights of all 
people are respected.57 Ateek agrees with nonviolent Latin American liberation 
theologians, as well as with Yoder, Wink, and other advocates of nonviolent 
resistance.58  
Ateek does not directly consider Palestinian counter-violence from the 
perspective of just war. However, Yoder’s and Wink’s criticism of counter-
violence from the perspective of just war resonates with Ateek’s argument. They 
point out that the same weaknesses that plague conventional just war theory also 
apply to liberationist counter-violence. They note the problem of last resort. At 
what point is the oppression so unjust that it is worth taking the risk of violent 
revolution rather than pursuing other methods of change? Assessing the 
probability of success of the violent revolution, and the means required, is always 
difficult. There are no guarantees that the counter-violence will succeed in 
overthrowing the regime or that it will not cause more harm than good, which 
renders the lesser evil argument moot. As numerous cases in Latin America 
demonstrate, the oppressed rarely have the power to succeed in a violent 
revolution. Their fight becomes a futile and often pro-longed battle that only 
                                                
56 Stam & Goizueta 2008, 489. Some liberation theologians stress that the Bible uses the term 
“violence” only to describe oppression and not liberating struggle which it refers to as “salvation.”  
57 Camara 1971, 41–45, 50–51; Gutiérrez 1977, 275–276. See Dear 2013 for an overview of the 
nonviolence of Esquivel and Romero, among others. Wink and Yoder also stress that violence is 
incompatible with liberation (see Wink 1992, 102, 195, 198, 200–202 and Yoder 1995, 627–628). 
Revolutionary violence is not a solution, for it leads to untold, often unimaginable suffering and 
produces totalitarian structures and dependencies, which do not provide the people with the 
liberation they sought for. 
58 Ateek’s justification for nonviolent resistance is considered in section 3.1. 
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produces unimaginable suffering and destruction.59 Ateek’s criticism of suicide 
bombings, which cause harm to both Palestinians and Israelis and only intensify 
Israel’s repressive measures, accords with Yoder’s and Wink’s criticism. Like 
Yoder and Wink, Ateek views counter-violence as immoral and as an ineffective 
way for the oppressed to pursue liberation. 
Yoder argues that even if counter-violence succeeds in overthrowing the 
regime, the spiral of violence may still continue. The revolutionaries may not 
possess the resources and legitimacy to establish a just society. Violent revolution 
often results in the concentration of power in the hands of the violent group, and 
violence becomes ingrained as an acceptable method to pursue political 
objectives.60 In effect, one oppressive system is replaced by another. Ateek does 
not consider this point in his criticism of counter-violence. It would make a good 
addition to his argument. Also, by following Yoder’s and Wink’s criticism of 
counter-violence from the perspective of just war, Ateek could link his own 
negative view of just war, which we noted above, with his views on counter-
violence. All in all, this would allow Ateek to express a fuller and more nuanced 
view of the problem of liberationist violence.     
Ateek underlines that counter-violence is an understandable, human reaction 
to oppression and that ending counter-violence requires addressing the injustice. 
Nonetheless, we have seen that in Ateek’s view counter-violence is ineffective 
and immoral because it causes indiscriminate suffering and feeds the cycle of 
hatred and revenge.61 Liberationist violence, therefore, is not the solution to the 
injustice. It is a product of the unjust oppression and is tragically linked to it, as it 
reacts to it and intensifies it.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
59 Wink 1992, 195, 198, 200–202, 215, 223; Yoder 1995, 628; Yoder 2009, 379–380, 383; Yoder 
2010, 136–137. The lesser evil argument claims that counter-violence causes less harm than if one 
were to endure violent oppression. Holding liberation as an absolute goal poses the danger of 
producing unimaginable evils in the long-run, either because counter-violence only intensifies the 
conflict or because a disproportionate amount of violence is required to overcome oppression. 
60 Yoder 2009, 379–380; Sharp, 26–27, 427–429. Gene Sharp argues that nonviolent revolutions 
have more often resulted in more stable and democratic societies than violent revolutions.  
61 Ateek stresses that both the repressive imperial violence of Israel and the violent resistance of 
Palestinian militants are futile forces of destruction that perpetuate the spiral of violence (Ateek 
2008, 101).   
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2.2 Oppressive Religion  
Religion Colluding with Empire 
We may begin with Ateek’s major premise on oppressive religion: religion serves 
oppression by adopting a politically and socially passive stance, or by providing 
empires with legitimacy and the right to oppress.62   
The churches in Palestine have been guilty of the first charge. Upholding a 
strict regimental division between church and state, they have focused on rites, 
liturgy, and personal pastoral care, while shunning socio-political issues. The 
reasons for this include the demoralisation of the churches after 1948, the identity 
of Christians as a historical minority that cautiously avoids political issues, and 
inter-denominational conflicts that hinder the development of a unified Christian 
voice.63  
A church that advocates passivity fails to understand that the Gospel calls 
Christians to actively witness for justice. Ateek’s ideas are in line with the 
common view in liberation theology, which promotes the church as a counter-
cultural force that follows the example set by Jesus. Jesus was not apolitical but 
on the contrary confronted the powerful elites of his time for their injustice, 
brought physical and spiritual help to the oppressed, and created an alternative 
community that became the church. The equality and fairness of this community 
contrasted sharply with the injustice of Rome’s empire. The modern church is 
called to follow Jesus’s example: to witness for justice and bring concrete help to 
the oppressed, empowering them to work towards a better society that reflects 
God’s love for all people in its institutions.64   
Using a liberationist hermeneutic, Ateek compares the passive church to the 
Pharisees and Essenes whom Jesus censured for neglecting the calling to witness 
for justice (Matt. 23:23-26). The Pharisees focus on rituals and ceremonies, while 
the Essenes withdraw from society in the name of religious purity. Both ignore the 
calling to witness for justice because they draw a stark line between religion and 
the political sphere. Although Ateek condemns passivity, he also stresses that the 
church is not a political party. Its goal should not be to gain political power when 
national liberation is achieved. Ateek affirms the typical view in liberation 
                                                
62 ‘Religion’ here refers specifically to Judaism and Christianity, as Ateek focuses on their 
religious texts and traditions.   
63 Ateek 1989, 56–57, 59, 157. 
64 Ateek 2008, 21, 95–96; Magana 1996, 185; Yoder 2010, 86–95. 
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theology, which understands the church as a critical voice of conscience, an 
advocate of the oppressed, even when the goal of establishing a more just society 
is attained.65 Therefore, in accordance with liberation theology, Ateek perceives 
the church as a counter-cultural community that continuously criticises those in 
power, lifting up the voice of the marginalised whose concerns are ignored by the 
powerful.  
Unfortunately, the church has often been co-opted by political power, 
beginning with the adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman 
Empire. According to Ateek, ever since then, reconciling church and empire has 
resulted in the church and the Bible being used to bless militarism and 
imperialism. If the passive church is similar to the Pharisees and Essenes, the 
church that works for empire is like the Sadducees. They are pragmatic 
collaborators who serve empire out of fear and are enticed by power. By allowing 
itself to be co-opted by the empire, the church has in the past 1700 years often 
adopted the Davidic warrior messiah as its image of Christ. In the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, the warrior messiah is a descendant of David who establishes a reign of 
justice and peace by defeating evil through violence. There is another messianic 
strand, that of the suffering servant. In this strand, salvation and liberation are not 
attained through a victorious war against evil powers but “through the servant 
who suffers on behalf of others.”66  
Liberation theology in general criticises churches and theologies that 
support oppression, including domination Christologies that bless militarism, 
which correspond to Ateek’s Davidic strand. Liberation theology condemns 
oppressive theologies as distortions of the true message of the Gospel which 
promotes justice for the oppressed. Also, liberation theology highlights Jesus’s 
suffering servanthood as the epitome of his messianism. The suffering servant 
does not reveal a passive God who simply accepts suffering. Rather, God suffers 
                                                
65 Ateek 1989, 156–157; Ateek 2008, 94–95; Bravo 1996, 110–111; Magana 1996, 185–186. 
Liberation theology envisions a church that is a community of equals and one that upholds the 
values of God’s reign: human dignity, love, justice, mercy, and forgiveness. The redeeming and 
renewing power of Christ is at the centre of this community. As society’s prophetic voice of 
conscience, it should point out where society fails to establish the values of God’s reign in practice 
and it should put forth concrete suggestions for making God’s reign more of a reality. Counter-
culture refers to the notion that the Church’s values are in tension with the practices of society (see 
Clapp 2000, 21-29 for an analysis of the Church as counter-cultural follower of Jesus).  
66 Ateek 2008, 92, 94–95, 96–97, 100–101. 
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in solidarity with the oppressed and thereby vindicates them as people whom he is 
especially concerned about because they are victims of injustice.67 
 Even though the early church upheld the image of Christ as suffering 
servant, in accordance with Christ’s cross and vicarious suffering, the co-opted 
church has not remained faithful to this more authentic image of Christ. The 
militaristic son of David serves the interests of empire better because it can be 
used to justify violence as righteous. Ateek is extremely critical of this: 
We cannot continue to remain complicit. We must reject and condemn the church’s 
adoption of the warrior messiah image because it is a deviation from the gospel of Christ.68 
 
   
Zionism 
Zionism was at first defined by secular nationalism and a hostile attitude towards 
traditional Jewish religion. Zionists view traditional Rabbinic Judaism as passive 
and weak because it accepts Jewish life in the diaspora and waits patiently on God 
to redeem his people. By contrast, all strands of Zionism promote Jewish action 
on their own behalf. Early Zionists were motivated primarily by a desire to 
resolve the problem of anti-Semitism through Jewish statehood and the promotion 
of Jewish cultural identity. Orthodox Jews criticize Zionism for forcing the hand 
of God through human action to redeem the Jewish people by re-establishing their 
homeland, which only the messiah could do.69  
However, the relationship between Zionism and religion has been 
ambiguous from the inception of the Zionist movement.70 Despite their rejection 
of traditional religion, secular Zionists were keen to use the Hebrew scriptures as 
a title deed that gave their claims credibility. They were reclaiming the inheritance 
of the Jewish civilization that, according to scripture, once existed in Palestine. 
Also, religious Zionism was born in 1902 when the Mizrachi party was founded, 
which represented a revolution in Jewish tradition, as it placed the Torah at the 
                                                
67 Bravo 1996, 106–107, 117–118; Ellacuría 1996, 271–78. 
68 Ateek 2008, 100.   
69 Ateek 1989, 20-23, 25–26; Ateek 2012b, 94-96. Ateek explains that Zionism was influenced by 
nationalism and European colonialism. Ottolenghi (2005a, 55–57) stresses that Zionism was not 
simply born as a reaction to anti-Semitism, but was the product of a broad convergence of existing 
Jewish ethnic-cultural ties and modern ideas and trends that arose in Europe, including 
nationalism, emphasis on cultural identity, Jewish emancipation, the failure of Jewish assimilation, 
and Jewish disillusionment over the continuing problem of anti-Semitism, which was exacerbated 
by exclusive European nationalisms.  
70 Zionism has never been a unified movement even though Zionists share the vision of a Jewish 
national home as the solution to anti-Semitism and reject diaspora life as evil. There has been 
disagreement over the character of the national home: should it foster Jewish religion and heritage 
or should it be a secular liberal democracy? (Ottolenghi 2005a, 54).  
 27 
centre of Zionism and envisioned the Jewish state as enabling the return to 
halakhic purity and the collective redemption of the Jewish people. Religious 
Zionism thus perceives Jewish nationalism as a means to attain religious goals.71   
Religious Zionists believe that God’s covenant with the Jews justifies 
Israel’s existence and the settling of Jews in the land that God promises to them in 
the Torah. The promise of messianic redemption is central to the covenant and 
includes the gathering of all Jews back to the land of Israel (Isa. 43:5-6), the 
building of the third temple (Ezek. 37:26-28), the unification of all humanity 
under the God of Israel (Zech, 14:9), and an era of world peace in which all 
hatred, oppression, suffering, and disease has ended (Isa. 2:4). There is an internal 
disagreement in Judaism over the role of human action in bringing about the 
promises of messianic redemption. Most traditional rabbinic sources condemn any 
human role in hastening the coming of the messianic age and emphasise its divine 
or even wholly transcendental nature. However, some Jewish thinkers have 
envisaged redemption in historical terms and religious Zionism builds on this 
foundation.72  
 Rabbi Abraham Kook (1865–1935), the first Ashkenazi chief Rabbi of 
Palestine, was a key figure in the development of religious Zionism and 
influenced the ideas of religious parties like the Mizrachi, the National Religious 
Party and Gush Emunim. Taking from Maimonides the idea that prophecy cannot 
unfold under fear and persecution, Kook stressed that secular Zionism was 
creating the conditions required for the messianic process to advance because it 
had empowered the Jews. According to Kook’s kabbalistic interpretation, the 
earth itself in Israel is uniquely sacred and symbolizes various aspects of divinity, 
such as wisdom and righteous judgment. The borders of the land are given in the 
Torah and relinquishing any part of it is a sinful act. The joining of two 
                                                
71 Ateek 2012b, 103; Prior 1999, 71-78; Schwartz 2009, vii, 1–4. Nur Masalha points out that from 
the start Zionism adopted the Exodus and Joshua’s conquest as foundational myths. Despite its 
secular roots, Zionism has not been able to separate itself from Jewish religion because the land 
has too much symbolic significance and because its justification of the Jewish state was embedded 
in the symbols and ideas of religion, making Zionism a quasi-messianic movement of Jewish 
redemption. (Masalha 2014, 66–67, 71–74)  
72 Ateek 1989, 25–26; Dein 2009, 154–155; Schwartz 2009, 3–4. The Maharal of Prague viewed 
redemption as transcendental, involving divine intervention to create a new heaven and earth. 
Maimonides on other hand viewed redemption in historical terms. According to Schwartz, Rabbi 
Yitzhak Reines (1839-1915), one of the founding fathers of religious Zionism, stressed that God 
expected Jews to initiate the redemptive process and only then God would intervene.  
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metaphysical beings, God’s chosen people and God’s sacred land, are required for 
the full manifestation of God’s presence in the coming of the messiah.73  
The kabbalistic concept of two messiahs has influenced religious Zionists’ 
views of the human role in the messianic process. The first militant warrior 
messiah prepares the material conditions for redemption. The second spiritual 
messiah is divine and redeems the world through miracles. In religious Zionist 
interpretation, a central material condition is Jewish settlement of the sacred land. 
Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook (1891–1982), whose students established Gush 
Emunim, an organization of the religious settler movement, believed that humans 
acting out God’s purpose, the settlers, collectively constitute the militant 
messiah.74  
It should be noted, however, that religious Zionism is a diverse 
phenomenon. Some religious Zionists, for example those following Rabbi Joseph 
Soloveitchik (1903–1993), believe that the full realization of Jewish religious law, 
halakah, requires an autonomous theocratic Jewish state but do not imbue the land 
itself with metaphysical significance. Such views are more open to territorial 
exchanges that are required for peace. Still, the Kookian tradition of messianism, 
which perceives the land as divine, is prevalent among the religious right and the 
religious settler movement.75    
After the 1967 war and Israeli expansion into the heartland of biblical 
Judaism, religious Zionism became the driving impulse behind the settler 
movement that began and still continues Jewish settlement on Palestinian land. As 
long as the Israeli government supports Jewish expansion, refuses to relinquish 
territory and rejects peace with the Arabs, religious Zionists view the state as a 
servant of the covenant promises. Thus, increasingly since 1967, they have 
worked with right-wing secular Zionist parties who share their expansionist goals 
even though secular Zionists do not subscribe to their messianic beliefs. This has 
resulted in an alliance between right-wing and religious parties, which has given 
an inordinate amount of power to the religious minority in Israel.76  
                                                
73 Schwartz 2009, 3–4, 29–30, 59, 121.  
74 Dein 2009, 158.  
75 Schwartz 2009, 109–111, 117, 120–121.  
76 Ateek 1989, 101–102; Ateek 2012b, 103; Lesch 2008, 376–377; Schwartz 2009, 95–98. 
Establishing a greater Israel, based on the biblical land promise, has been on the religious Zionist 
agenda since the 1920s. Jerusalem and the West Bank constitute the heartland of biblical Judaism, 
so settling them is particularly important to religious Zionists but also to secular right-wing 
Zionists who see the land as a part of Jewish heritage. Nur Masalha refers to the alliance between 
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Ateek censures the amalgamation of Zionist nationalism and Jewish religion 
because it has produced a political theology that justifies Israeli oppression of the 
Palestinians. Since attaining the messianic age requires occupying the land and 
dispossessing the enemies of God, the concerns of Palestinians have no weight. 
God has promised the land to the Jews through his covenant with them, his chosen 
people. Those who do not belong to God’s chosen people are either destroyed or 
expelled from the land (Numbers 33:50-56, Deut. 20:16-18). Ateek points out that 
these views reveal that religious Zionists perceive God as an exclusive, tribal God 
who is only concerned about the rights of his chosen people.77  
Even though secular Zionism doesn’t share the beliefs of religious Zionism, 
it can be argued that secular Zionism possesses a national god that is very similar 
to the exclusivist God of religious Zionism. Ateek refers to this god as 
“Betahone,” Security, because in its name right-wing political parties justify 
Israeli oppression. Like the exclusivist God, Betahone destroys its enemies 
ruthlessly, without any concern for human rights, because it cares only for 
Israel.78 This is an effective portrayal of the differences and similarities between 
right-wing Zionism and religious Zionism. Secular Zionists rationalise violence 
against Palestinians and the occupation with the goal of security and Jewish rights 
to their cultural heritage. Religious Zionists rationalize them with their belief in 
God’s election of the Jews and the goal of advancing the messianic process. Both 
regard the Palestinians as enemies of security or of God, and both argue that Jews 
must occupy the land for security or for God.  
Earlier, we noted how Ateek criticized the Christian church for colluding 
with empire and for justifying imperialism with a militaristic conception of the 
messiah. Here, we have established that, in Ateek’s view, religious Zionism has in 
effect done the same with the Jewish religion. Religious Zionism justifies the 
oppression of Palestinians with an exclusive God who has promised the land to 
                                                                                                                                 
secular and religious Zionists as “militant Neo-Zionism” and argues that it has become central in 
Israel’s domestic and foreign policy since 1967. Neo-Zionism serves the interests of settler 
colonialism, as the settler movement draws support from all secular right-wing and religious 
parties. (Masalha 2014, 76–77)   
77 Ateek 2012b, 95, 103–105. Masalha points out that radical religious Zionists promote Arab 
emigration by making life difficult and even paying families to leave. In the meantime, 
Palestinians must accept Jewish rule and the status of temporary resident aliens with no rights. If 
they refuse to accept this and resist, they face annihilation on the grounds of the Amalek 
commandment, Deut. 25:17–19. These policies of ethnic cleansing, inspired by interpretations of 
Exodus, Deuteronomy, and Joshua, are supported by the majority in the settler movement as well 
as by nationalist religious parties. (Masalha 2014, 86–89).  
78 Ateek 2012b, 97–100. 
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the Jews absolutely, sanctions the expulsion of non-Jews, and redeems his people 
through a messianic process that legitimates violence and oppression.  
 
Christian Zionism 
Born in the early 1800s, Christian Zionism is defined by a dispensationalist 
theology.79 The birth of Israel and its expansion into the biblical heartland of 
Judaism in 1967 proved that history is moving towards fulfilment, the second 
coming of Christ. Ateek highlights the following beliefs as central to Christian 
Zionism: modern Israel is the fulfilment of God’s covenant with biblical Israel, 
Jewish restoration in the land is an important part of fulfilling the covenant, a dual 
covenant theology, biblical literalism, the rebuilding of the Jewish temple, the 
land and Jerusalem are the eternal exclusive inheritance of the Jews, God requires 
Christians to bless and support Israel, the destruction of two-thirds of the Jews at 
Armageddon, Christ establishes a millennial kingdom after which evil rises up 
and is totally destroyed, and after the millennial kingdom God creates a new 
heaven and earth where the Jews rule the earth and Christians rule in heaven. 
These beliefs concerning the Jews and their role in redemptive history result in an 
exclusive conception of God, which is similar to the Jewish Zionist conception of 
God. God is absolutely on the side of the Jews in the conflict because Jews, along 
with Christians, are God’s chosen people.80  
 Catastrophic millenarian beliefs are found in both religious Jewish Zionism 
and Christian Zionism. Catastrophic millenarianism refers to the belief in a 
catastrophic transition in which the existing evil order is replaced by a millennial 
kingdom of peace and justice. Humans, as agents of the divine will, often have an 
important role in advancing the process towards the advent of the millennial 
kingdom. In both Jewish and Christian Zionism, the creation of Israel and Jewish 
settlement of the land are important milestones in the process towards the 
                                                
79 The roots of Christian Zionism can be dated back to 16th–17th century European Pietism in 
which some advocated a dual covenant theology that presents the Jews as heirs to the covenant 
between God and Israel and the Old Testament promises concerning Israel (Ariel 2014, 200–206). 
Another significant source is 17th century English Puritanism and its fascination with premillennial 
eschatology. However, Anglican Reverend John Nelson Darby (1800–1882) was the most 
important theologian to systematise and popularise dispensationalist premillennialism and had 
considerable influence on Anglo-American Evangelicals. Premillennialism refers to the 
eschatological belief that Christ will return to earth after an apocalyptic period of tribulation to 
establish a thousand-year kingdom of peace. Dispensationalism divides God’s redemptive plan 
into dispensations or epochs. With the fulfilment of the goals of one dispensation, redemptive 
history proceeds to the next. (Wagner 1999, 200–203) 
80 Ateek 2008, 80–84.  
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millennial messianic age which will ultimately be established by divine 
intervention and the final destruction of God’s enemies. The basic difference is 
that in Christian Zionism the coming messiah is Christ, who redeems Christians, 
while non-Christians are eliminated in an apocalyptic war. Ateek notes that this 
renders Christian Zionism anti-Semitic because it proposes that most Jews will 
perish in the apocalypse before the millennium.81  
 Ateek emphasises the millennial-dispensationalist theology of Christian 
Zionism but it must be noted that Christian Zionism is a diverse phenomenon. 
Dispensationalist millenarian views are found mainly among evangelical 
Christians. A much larger number of mainline Protestants and Catholics in North 
America and Europe support Israel for other reasons, which colours their views 
and prevents them from supporting efforts for a just peace. Some believe that 
Israel is a part of God’s plan and constitutes the fulfilment of prophecy even 
though they do not possess catastrophic millenarian beliefs. Equating anti-
Zionism with anti-Semitism, others uphold the view that Zionism is integral to 
Judaism because Judaism is a national religion. Also, post-holocaust theology has 
led mainline churches to support Israel as an act of repentance for the holocaust.82  
Post-holocaust theology seeks to address the Christian foundations of anti-
Semitism, promotes the Jewish roots of Christianity, and tackles the problem of 
Christian supercessionism by affirming Jewish particularity. This affirmation 
results in a dual covenant theology in which both the Jewish and Christian 
covenants with God are valid paths to salvation. Dual covenant theology is 
integral to Christian Zionism in general. It leads Christian Zionists to affirm the 
Jewish religious Zionist beliefs concerning God’s covenant promises to Jews and 
even some prophecies about the end times, such as the rebuilding of the temple. 
However, especially evangelical Christian Zionists still uphold the ultimate 
superiority of the Christian covenant because they believe that the returning Christ 
is also the Jewish messiah.83 
                                                
81 Ateek, 2008, 81–82, 84–86, 89. For catastrophic millenarianism, see Dein 2009, 156–157 and 
Gallagher 2011 and Juergensmeyer 2003, 55–57 and Ruether 1992, 149–150.  
82 Ruether 1992, 149–150; Ruether 2014, 184–187. Ateek points out that, in addition to Christian 
guilt over the holocaust, in the 1980s a “new guilt” developed over the fate of the Palestinians, and 
mainline churches have since then begun to increasingly criticize Israel. (Ateek 1989, 66–67) 
83 Ateek 2008, 80, 82; Braverman 2014, 166–172; Ruether 2014, 184-87. Braverman notes that 
some post-holocaust theologians stress the primacy of the Jewish relationship with God. Christians 
have access to this relationship through Christ and are co-heirs of the Jews. Post-holocaust 
theology is by no means necessarily associated with Christian Zionism. However, Christian 
Zionism draws from post-holocaust theology’s affirmation of Jewish particularity. Christian 
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Ateek notes that, especially in the United States, the evangelical Christian 
Zionists and Jewish Zionists have formed an odd alliance, based on their shared 
support for Israel and anti-Arab, anti-Islamic attitude. Together, they lobby for a 
pro-Israeli American foreign policy and gather financial, media, and moral 
support for Israel worldwide. Neither side acknowledges the other’s deepest goals 
and visions because they are irreconcilable. As noted, the ultimate vision of 
millenarian Christian Zionism is anti-Semitic, while Jewish Zionists strive for 
security or envision the arrival of their own Jewish messiah. But the means to 
achieve their ultimate goals are the same: ensuring the existence of Israel and 
Jewish occupation of the land.84  
Ateek denounces Christian Zionism as a violent theology of the end, which 
ignores the Bible’s core message of God’s inclusive love. Christ revealed a God 
who loves all people, which contradicts the Christian Zionists’ obsession with 
Armageddon and Jewish covenantal rights. Using the liberationist hermeneutic 
that prophetically condemns oppression, Ateek argues that Christian Zionists 
neglect two fundamental biblical callings: Christians are called to be peacemakers 
(Matt. 5:9) and they have a ministry of reconciliation (2 Cor. 5:18–20). Therefore, 
God expects Christians to work for a just peace and to stand with the oppressed 
against empires that deny life and freedom to people. Christian Zionism ignores 
this and instead provides a theological justification for exclusion and oppression.85  
Millenarian Christian and millenarian Jewish Zionists both envision a 
violent transformation of the current age into a messianic age of peace. They share 
the concept of the warrior messiah as the agent of transformation. As noted, some 
Jewish Zionists perceive the warrior messiah as a collective incarnation of the 
                                                                                                                                 
Zionists view the Jewish covenant with God as valid. They respect the Jewish belief that God’s 
promises in the Old Testament concern Jews, privilege Jewish readings of the Old Testament, and 
promote God’s land promise as territorial and as integral to his covenant with Jews. Both Rabbinic 
and Christian traditions have more commonly interpreted the land promise and the obligations 
connected to it as spiritual and universal so that it concerns all lands and all peoples.  
84 Ateek 2008, 86–90. See also Ariel 2014, 220–224, 227–228 and Wagner 1999, 204–210. 
Wagner points out that The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), other Zionist 
lobby organizations, and Israeli right-wing parties like Likud have found significant support 
among American evangelical Christians. Ariel shows that in recent decades Pietist Europeans have 
collaborated with English and American evangelicals in creating Christian Zionist lobby 
organizations. They share the premillennial vision of Israel as a necessary step in the messianic 
process. The International Christian Embassy of Jerusalem (ICEJ) is the largest, with Pietist 
reformed Christians as leaders, and was established in 1980 as a gesture of support for Israel. Its 
goal is to foster support for Israel among Protestant Christians and it represents millions of 
Christians from various churches in Europe, Latin America and a number of African countries. 
Along with the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, ICEJ was the first Christian 
organization to systematically donate money to Israeli ventures, including settlement building.   
85 Ateek 2008, 90. 
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faithful. Christian Zionists also stress human input in advancing the redemptive 
process through Jewish restoration in the land and unequivocal Christian support 
for Israel, but their warrior messiah is the returning Christ who eliminates God’s 
enemies. Both Jewish and Christian Zionists use their religious beliefs, including 
the land promise of the Jewish covenant and the idea of a violent messianic 
process, to justify the Israeli occupation and Israel’s oppression of Palestinians.    
 
The Bible and Hermeneutics 
A critique of the Bible and Zionist interpretations of it are at the centre of Ateek’s 
criticism of oppressive religion. There are two main issues. First, there is the 
problem of Zionist biblical literalism. Second, Ateek finds parts of the Bible itself 
problematic because they relate an inauthentic knowledge of God.  
 Both Jewish and Christian millenarian Zionists are literalists in their 
interpretation of the Bible. This means that they have a high view of scripture as 
the inerrant and authoritative word of God. They accept the views expressed in 
biblical texts uncritically, especially those that concern the history of ancient 
Israel. They do not accept that biblical texts contain plural voices that often 
express divergent views or that interpretations are open to debate.86 Presenting 
their beliefs as the authentic and uniform message of the Bible, Zionists choose to 
ignore texts that challenge their worldview, for example passages expressing the 
conditionality of the covenant promises on Israel’s faithfulness to moral 
obligations, including fair treatment of foreigners. Zionists read the prophetic 
texts of the Bible as prewritten history, ignoring the prophets’ calls to justice, 
                                                
86 Ateek 1989, 74–86; Ateek 2008, 63–64, 80, 88; Ateek 2012a, 179–180; Ateek 2012b, 104. 
Zionists focus on passages in which God promises the land to Abraham’s descendants (e.g. Gen. 
15:18, 17:8), elects Israel above other nations (Deut. 7:6, Isa. 61:5-6), and destroys Israel’s 
enemies (e.g. Num. 21:1-3, 31-35, 33:51-52; Deut. 20:10-14). They apply these passages directly 
to modern Israel. So, when God promises the Israelites that he will destroy the Amalekites (e.g. 
Deut. 25:17-19) and commands them to annihilate, enslave, and plunder their enemies (Joshua 6, 1 
Samuel 15) Zionists view this as a justification for Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians who are 
God’s enemies robbing the chosen people of their inheritance. Both Jewish and Christian Zionists 
have referred to these passages as a justification for the forcible transfer, dispossession, and even 
extermination of Palestinians. For example, rabbi Moshe Segal made a moral distinction between 
Palestinians, whom he equates with Amalek, and other humans: “One should have mercy on all 
creatures…but the treatment of Amalek – is different. The treatment of those who would steal our 
land – is different. The treatment of those who spill our blood – is different.” The Bible contains 
numerous passages in which God commands Israel to treat foreigners fairly (e.g. Ex. 23:9, Ezek. 
47:21-23) but Zionists ignore these.  
 34 
which both Jewish and Christian traditions have interpreted as the primary 
message of the prophets.87 
Liberation theology typically criticises the historical-critical method of 
biblical research as inert and distant from the concerns of everyday life. Ateek, 
however, affirms the value of historical criticism in the Palestinian context 
because it discredits Zionist literalism. First of all, historical criticism establishes 
that the biblical texts concerning ancient Israel are largely mythical and reflect the 
ideals of later authors. Also, it reveals the rich plurality of voices in the Bible, 
shows that texts are open to different interpretations, and underlines that readers 
are prisoners of their own contexts and traditions, which means that no 
interpretation can achieve all the different dimensions of meaning. In the Jewish 
tradition, Orthodox, Reform, and Conservative Judaism also share the 
hermeneutic principle that texts yield plural interpretations and are open to debate. 
Thus, they condemn Zionist interpretation for violating Jewish hermeneutics.88 
The problem with Zionist literalism is that it selects individual 
commandments, promises, and prophecies and applies these literally to the 
modern situation. Ateek criticises this: “By clinging to the literal meaning of any 
holy book instead of its spirit, it is relatively easy to become an extremist.”89  
Ateek’s view echoes the common view in western Protestant biblical ethics 
according to which an ethical hermeneutics does not focus on the literal 
application of single commandments but rather searches the Bible for life-
affirming core principles, the “spirit” of the text, such as love and responsibility. 
                                                
87 Ateek 1989, 96, 102, 104–109; Ateek 2008, 82. Ateek stresses that the land promise brought 
ethical obligations with it, including the obligation to treat all people justly. Friedman explains that 
Rabbinic interpretation has emphasised that God’s covenant promises, including the land promise, 
are contingent on Jewish faithfulness to moral obligations. One of the most repeated 
commandments in the Torah (36 times) is the Jewish obligation to treat strangers justly as full 
members of the community. If the Jews oppressed the vulnerable, including strangers, and filled 
the land with injustice, they would be cast out from the land (e.g Deut. 4:25–26), so the land 
promise is not unconditional and election is not a privilege but rather a special obligation. 
(Friedman 2012, 208–209, 211, 216–217)  
88 Ateek 1989, 78–79, 92–96, 116; Ateek 2008, 54, 90, 168; Ateek 2012b, 102. Segovia notes that 
liberation theology typically criticises historical-criticism (Segovia 2012, 51–52). For Jewish 
hermeneutics, see Friedman 2012, 202–205. Ateek uses biblical scholarship to demonstrate that 
the Old Testament contains plural views and developed in stages. He notes that Zionists falsify 
archaeology in an attempt to show that a purely Jewish civilisation flourished in the land. Such a 
civilization never existed, for even the Old Testament texts testify to the diversity of inhabitants. 
See e.g. Collins and Warrior, who note that the exodus and Jewish conquest of Canaan are 
mythical (Collins 2004, 17–19; Warrior 2006, 236–237).   
89 Ateek 2008, 78. For example, Zionists apply God’s command to blot out Amalek (Deut. 25:19) 
directly to Palestinians (Ateek 1989, 84). Another example is that religious Zionists elevate one of 
the 613 mitzvoth (commandments) in the Torah above others – the commandment to settle the 
Promised Land (Appleby 2000, 91). 
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These principles are broad and therefore timeless. It is the responsibility of the 
faith community, guided by the Holy Spirit, to engage in discussion with society, 
Christian tradition, and other sources of knowledge in order to determine the 
meaning of core biblical principles in a specific context.90  
Of course, it can be argued that the Bible contains such a plurality of views 
that any number of core principles can be drawn from it. There are many texts that 
justify hatred of enemies, violent elimination of evil, righteous anger, retribution, 
and fear. They provide ready material for groups with aggressive worldviews, like 
Zionists, who see themselves as God’s righteous agents fighting against evil. 
However, there are also many texts that promote values like compassion, 
humility, respect for strangers, neighbourly love, and forgiveness. Both Jewish 
and Christian traditions have often emphasised that these values are life-affirming 
core principles that convey the central message of the Bible.91  
The choice of core principles is never determined by the Bible alone, but as 
noted above, by the faith community that interprets the text in discussion with its 
environment. The texts that a faith community chooses to focus on and the 
interpretations that it offers reveals its worldview. Is at an inclusive and open 
community that promotes respect for others? Or is it an exclusive community that 
builds barriers and demonizes outsiders? Ateek stresses that the Zionists are the 
latter type of community.92 Because of their exclusive conception of God, 
obsession with a violent messianic process, and literalist hermeneutics, they are 
incapable of producing life-affirming core principles that would reflect the true 
spirit of the Bible.  
  In Ateek’s view, the core principle of God’s inclusive love, which is 
revealed in Christ, expresses the true spirit of the Bible. We shall explore this 
more under the constructive task. Here, it suffices to note that Ateek interprets the 
Old Testament through Christ’s revelation. In this he follows liberation theology, 
which typically employs Christ and his liberating message of justice and love, 
revealed especially in the gospels, as a hermeneutical prism through which it 
interprets the Bible. Ateek stresses that a historical-critical view, though useful, is 
                                                
90 Jersild 2000, 48, 54–56, 72, 77, 80. 
91 Appleby 2000, 169; Collins 2004, 13–16, 23; Friedman 2012, 208–209; Jersild 2000, 72. 
92 Ateek 2008, 143.  
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not enough because the Palestinians need a theology that addresses the Bible in a 
relevant way in their present context.93  
Ateek perceives three major strands in the Old Testament: the nationalist, 
the Torah-oriented, and the prophetic, which represent different views of God, 
election, and the land.94 Ateek views the nationalist tradition (Joshua, Judges, 1 
and 2 Samuel, 1 and 2 Kings) as particularly problematic because it contains 
colonizing texts that Zionists use to justify their demonization and dispossession 
of Palestinians. The nationalist tradition emphasises Israel’s privileged 
relationship with a tribal God who blesses conquests and destroys non-Israelites. 
Entire peoples are annihilated so that Israel may possess the land God promised to 
it (e.g. Ex. 7–15 and Josh. 6). God gives Israel a land built by others, with houses 
and vineyards (Josh. 24:13), which corresponds disturbingly with the Palestinian 
experience.95   
 In Ateek’s view also Exodus, often employed by liberation theologies as the 
central paradigm of liberation, is a colonizing text for Palestinians. Zionists have 
appropriated it, equating Israel’s redemption from Egypt and God’s land promise 
with the creation of modern Israel. Exodus and the conquest of Canaan are 
inseparable. Ateek explains:  
For to need an exodus, one must have a promised land. To choose the motif of conquest of 
the Promised Land is to invite the need for the oppression, assimilation, control, or 
dispossession of the indigenous population.96  
 
Thus, it is very difficult to for Palestinians to read Exodus as liberating. Instead, 
they identify with the indigenous Canaanites, whom the God of Exodus has 
marked for destruction.   
 Because the colonizing texts depict God exclusively advancing Jewish 
privileges at the expense of others, they do not convey an authentic knowledge of 
God. In Ateek’s view, they reflect a human understanding of God, which is 
                                                
93 Ateek 1989, 79–80, 98, 153. Ateek emphasises that the contextual theology must reveal the 
word and purpose of God to and for the Palestinians in an authentic and relevant way. Liberation 
theology employs Christ as a hermeneutical prism (Boff 1996, 18).  
94 Ateek 1989, 94–97. This simplifies the plurality and is undoubtedly influenced by Ateek’s 
Christocentric interpretation, which establishes a progressive development from exclusive to more 
inclusive and universal views in the Old Testament. In Ateek’s view, the inclusive love of God 
culminates in Christ. (Ateek 1989, 98; Ateek 2012a, 178–179)  
95 Ateek 1989, 75, 77, 83–86, 93–94, 107, 197 (note 10); Ateek 2008, 131. Ateek argues that some 
post-exilic prophets, particularly Ezra and Nehemiah, espouse an exclusive nationalism. The 
Torah, which was finalized in the post-exilic period, also reflects similar exclusion and xenophobia 
and belongs to the same tradition.  
96 Ateek 1989, 87. 
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different from God revealed in Christ, a “God of justice, love, and peace.”97 
Colonizing texts reflect the narrow worldview of the authors and their need to 
interpret God as a sanctifier of the human desire to dominate others. They depict 
non-Israelites as evil, immoral enemies who deserve to be destroyed. Therefore, 
the colonizing texts must be rejected as unauthoritative: “Any text that reflects 
and expresses God as racist and violent must be detested and rejected.”98 In 
Ateek’s view, colonizing texts have a negative pedagogical value: they clarify 
what God is not rather than what he is. Ateek refers to his rejection and 
relativization of colonizing texts as “de-zionization.”99  
The discussion above reveals that Ateek employs his Christocentric 
hermeneutic to assess the validity of texts in the Old Testament. The just, 
inclusive, loving and nonviolent God revealed in Christ in the New Testament 
constitutes accurate knowledge about God in Ateek’s view. Texts in the Old 
Testament that contradict this knowledge are inauthentic expressions of God’s 
will. Thus, Ateek has a low view of the Old Testament, which conveys pluralistic, 
fallible, subjective knowledge about God. By contrast, he has a high view of the 
New Testament as the authoritative word of God, which reveals true and objective 
knowledge. Ateek’s high view of the New Testament leads him to disregard the 
plurality in it.100 The high view allows him to present Christ and the New 
Testament as unequivocally empowering answers to Zionism.  
It must be noted that Ateek’s view diverges considerably from liberation 
theology. Liberation theology typically has a high view of scripture and its 
approach to the Bible is unambiguously liberationist. It uses the Christocentric 
hermeneutic to interpret both the Old and New testaments as God’s condemnation 
of oppression and as empowering messages of hope for the oppressed. It views 
Exodus as a paradigm for salvation history because the narrative reveals a God 
who delivers from oppression. According to liberation theology, the biblical texts 
themselves are not the problem but interpretations that fail to convey the Bible’s 
                                                
97 Ateek 1989, 79–82, 110, 153. 
98 Ateek 2012b, 95. 
99 Ateek 1989, 83; Ateek 2008, 55. As he affirms the plurality of voices in the Old Testament, 
Ateek notes that even the most exclusive texts contain inclusive views that promote humanistic 
values like compassion for the weak and respect for foreigners, (e.g. Ex. 12:49; 23:9; Deut. 7; 
15:15; 20; 24:18, 22). The Old Testament vacillates between exclusive views, promoting Jewish 
privilege and a tribal God, and inclusive views that build bridges across ethnic boundaries and 
promote a universal view of God as the God of all humanity. (Ateek 2006, 231; Ateek 2008, 58) 
100 Segovia 2012, 59. See pages 57–58 and 74–76 below for more on Ateek’s view on the New 
Testament.  
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liberating core message. Texts that cannot easily be interpreted to convey this 
message are usually not addressed. Thus, liberation theology does not criticise the 
biblical narratives themselves for expressing violent or oppressive views.101   
Ateek’s low view of the Old Testament takes him closer to postcolonial 
theology, which also adopts the critical position that the Bible is ambiguous and 
open to diverse interpretations. Biblical texts endorse not only liberation but also 
oppression, which has allowed colonizers to invoke God in their imperialist 
projects. Postcolonial theology consciously aims to bring out the hidden and 
ignored voices of the victims in the biblical narratives. Unlike liberation theology, 
it does not claim that the Bible is unambiguously liberationist or that it necessarily 
demands a liberationist reading. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate that in colonial 
contexts the Bible does not provide adequate answers to the victims because it has 
been used as a mandate for oppression. Thus, postcolonial theology stresses the 
contradictory quality of the Bible and the contextuality of interpretations. It 
criticises liberation theology for failing to address the paradoxical nature of the 
biblical God who liberates some people and dispossesses and delegitimizes 
others.102     
Although postcolonial theologians do not employ a Christocentric 
hermeneutic to assess the authority of biblical texts, Ateek’s view of the Old 
Testament contains similarities to postcolonial theology. Of course, Ateek’s high 
view of the New Testament moves away from postcolonial perspectives. Like 
Ateek, postcolonial theologians undertake a critical ideological task that 
condemns colonizing texts by adopting the perspective of the marginalized 
victims. African theologian Musa Dube establishes that all colonizing texts, 
including those in the Bible, share the same motif of justifying the appropriation 
of foreign spaces and dispossession of the indigenous people who are demonized 
as evil and inferior. They glorify the use of force and promote the colonizers’ 
right to conquest. Ateek’s criticism of the nationalist tradition and other exclusive 
texts, presented above, accords with Dube’s characterization of colonizing 
texts.103    
Like Ateek, postcolonial theologians identify historical and modern victims 
of imperialism with the victims in the colonizing texts. They question the value of 
                                                
101 Segovia 2012, 55–56, 72.  
102 Sugirtharajah 2002, 98–102; Sugirtharajah 2006b, 78. 
103 Dube 2006, 297–299, 301. See also Sugirtharajah 2002, 101–102, 118. 
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the texts and the exclusive God presented in them. Dube describes exposing and 
condemnation of exclusive ideas in texts as part of the process of 
‘decolonization.’104 This accords with Ateek’s ‘de-zionization’ of texts described 
above, which involves the rejection and relativisation of exclusive and violent 
ideas. Native American theologian Rober Allen Warrior offers a similar criticism 
of Exodus to Ateek, for Warrior also points out its inadequacy as a paradigm of 
liberation in Native American and other colonial contexts. This is because it 
connects deliverance with conquest, turning God the deliverer into God the 
conqueror. Europeans have used Exodus to justify their conquest of America in 
the same way that Zionists use it against Palestinians. Like Ateek, Warrior 
condemns the militaristic God of Exodus and concludes that Exodus and other 
colonizing texts serve as warnings against exclusive conceptions of God and 
justice.105  
 Ateek’s approach to the Old Testament differs from the views of other 
Palestinian theologians. The other prominent Palestinian Protestant theologian, 
Mitri Raheb, follows liberation theology’s approach to the Old Testament. He 
reads Exodus as liberating and emphasises that the question of using texts to 
justify colonialism is a question of interpretation. The biblical authors and 
narratives themselves are not to blame. Raheb does not use the term ‘liberation 
theology’ to describe his thought because he feels that it does not provide space 
for inter-faith dialogue. However, in his interpretation of the Old Testament he is 
closer to liberation theology than Ateek is, as he upholds the high view of 
scripture. In Raheb’s view, Palestinian Christians must develop positive and 
empowering interpretations of the Old Testament because it offers a way to 
                                                
104 Dube 2006, 298–299, 302. Decolonization refers to the criticism of imperial domination and its 
strategies, including the ideologies behind it, the adoption of strategies of resistance, and the 
search for a liberating and fair interdependence. Decolonization extends to the constructive task of 
postcolonial theology: the oppressed should find alternative narratives that affirm their humanity 
and right to self-determination against colonizing narratives, and search for ways to affirm the 
interdependence of nations, races and cultures. Considering Ateek’s constructive task, we should 
note that his alternative narrative presents the traditional Christocentric answer of liberation 
theology. He does not follow postcolonial theology’s method of decolonization, which typically 
embraces religious pluralism.  
105 Warrior 2006, 235–241. See also Sugirtharajah 2002, 47 and Sugirtharajah 2006, 78. The 
Europeans saw America as the Promised Land. Native Americans, wicked Canaanites, were 
eliminated mercilessly. Just as Ateek questions the value of the exclusive God of the Old 
Testament for Palestinians, Warrior asks whether Native Americans can ever trust the Judeo-
Christian God who delivers one people at the expense of others. Like Ateek, Warrior sees 
pedagogical value in the Exodus. It teaches the lesson that in any struggle for justice, one cannot 
absolutize one’s own story as the whole story. Otherwise, the oppressed easily become oppressors.    
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dialogue with Jews and Muslims whose scriptures and traditions contain many of 
the texts and stories found in the Old Testament.106 
Raheb stresses that Exodus offers liberation to both Jews and Palestinians 
and, through God’s judgment of Pharaoh and the law given at Sinai, it reminds 
them that liberation should not lead to power abuse and oppression. Exodus 
encourages both to acknowledge each other’s suffering. By contrast, in Ateek’s 
view current Palestinian experience as victimised Canaanites precludes a 
liberationist interpretation of Exodus. He ponders whether the Palestinians could 
reclaim the exodus narrative once they achieve liberation and the refugees return 
to their homes, and notes that even then the problem of the second part of Exodus, 
the conquest, remains. Palestinian liberation must not result in oppression and 
dispossession of Jews, for the only way to justice is through sharing the land.107    
 Palestinian evangelicals feel that Ateek’s criticism of the Old Testament 
amounts to Marcionism. For them, as for Zionists, biblical authority and inerrancy 
are of paramount importance. Thus, unlike Ateek, they argue that violent texts 
reveal something valuable about God. They reject the Zionist interpretation, 
which in their view contradicts the Bible’s core message of Christ’s redemptive 
love. They allegorize or spiritualize even the most difficult texts according to their 
Christocentric understanding. For example, they interpret Joshua 6 as a story 
about God’s judgment. The Canaanites do not represent any particular people but 
symbolize God’s judgment of immorality and sin, from which Christ redeems 
believers.108 Ateek believes that allegorizing oppressive texts is unsatisfactory 
because the violence and exclusivity in them should be taken seriously. Like 
Warrior, he implies that colonizing texts have been used so often to justify 
oppression that they have become a part of the imperialist consciousness.109 This 
                                                
106 Raheb 1995, 62, 84–89. In Raheb’s view, Exodus is “one of the most beautiful and illustrative 
tales” of the relation between law, power and justice. In his interpretation, Israelites are 
Palestinians, the Pharaoh represents Israel, Moses’s criticism of Pharaoh calls Palestinian 
Christians to challenge Israel’s injustice, and the plagues as judgment for injustice are comparable 
to sanctions against Israel.  
107 Ateek 1989, 87; Raheb 1995, 90. 
108 Isaac 2012, 224–225, 226–232. Marcion (85–160 A.D.) rejected the Old Testament because, in 
his view, it presents a false view of God, which is incompatible with the New Testament’s 
authentic view of God revealed in Christ. Although the evangelical Christocentric understanding 
may share certain elements with liberation theology, it typically focuses on Christ as the way to 
personal salvation. By contrast, liberation theology uses a Christocentric interpretation to address 
oppression, justice, and liberation in temporal societies.  
109 Ateek 1989, 78; Warrior 2006, 240.  
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is why their intended meaning as witnesses to the human tendency to sanctify 
oppression and idealize exclusion of others should be acknowledged.  
In the discussion above, we have established that Ateek condemns Zionist 
literalism because it only selects passages that buttress its aggressive messianic 
worldview, ignores the plurality in the Old Testament and the fact that 
interpretations are open to debate, and fails to adopt an ethical hermeneutics that 
would convey the spirit of the Bible through life-affirming core principles. 
However, we have also seen that, for Ateek, not only Zionist interpretations but 
also texts in the Old Testament itself are a part of the problem of oppression. 
Violent and oppressive texts support the Zionists’ beliefs. In a way, then, Ateek 
confirms that the Zionists’ literal interpretation of these texts is correct. Zionist 
literalism is not the right way to read the Bible. Still, colonizing texts should be 
taken at face value because their intended meaning is oppressive and thus 
provides fuel for Zionist literalism. For Ateek, even a Christocentric interpretation 
cannot provide a positive, liberating meaning to these texts. Instead, they must be 
de-zionized and treated as revelatory of the dark side of human nature and the 
things that humans do in the name of religion for their own power and self-
interest.  
   
Does Religion Cause Oppression? 
Based on the discussion above, we can observe that a central proposition of 
Ateek’s critical task is that religious Zionism is an important cause of violence 
against Palestinians. Although Ateek notes that the conflict is about resources, 
living space and land, he argues that religion has a role:  
Religion can be a source of tremendous spiritual strength, but religion, when misused and 
translated into action by people of power, can also become a deadly weapon.110   
 
Thus, Ateek suggests that Zionist religious beliefs are connected to violence. 
However, he does not systematically explore how religious beliefs cause violence 
or problematize the connection in detail. Because the presupposition is important 
for the consistency of Ateek’s critical task, it is worth analysing it at some length.   
 In section 2.1, we noted that demonization is a form of violence.111 The 
Palestinians are demonized in may ways, for example as terrorists, as culturally 
inferior, and as lacking national consciousness. In the previous sections on 
                                                
110 Ateek 2008, XIV.  
111 See pages 16–17. 
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Zionism and hermeneutics, we have seen that Zionists use religion to demonize 
Palestinians whom they depict as evil enemies of God, comparable to the 
Canaanites. Religious language and metaphors have an important role in 
demonization because religion contains powerful symbolism on the metaphysical 
battle between good and evil. A group facing a conflict can use this symbolism to 
define the temporal conflict in Manichean terms, depicting their own community 
as good, on God’s side, and the enemy as fully evil. The conflict gains cosmic 
proportions, as it is not simply a question of worldly issues but is linked to the 
ultimate sacred struggle against evil. In effect, it becomes a holy war.112   
 It is more likely that a group defines protracted conflicts in cosmic terms. 
This is because a protracted conflict challenges the group’s belief in finding a 
solution, which induces a religiously motivated group to seek explanations and 
strength from religion. In an adverse situation, defining the conflict in cosmic 
terms enhances the group’s self-value and provides moral clarity. It is a way of 
self-justification that makes horrible acts of violence and callous treatment of the 
enemy possible, while maintaining the belief in the goodness of one’s own goals 
and the necessity of one’s own sacrifices. Understanding the conflict as a cosmic 
war enables the group to persist in the conflict. It is both a cause and a product of 
protracted conflicts.113  
 The group’s belief in the goodness of its own goals and the demonic goals 
of the enemy are rooted in the absolute truth claims of religion. Both Jewish and 
Christian millenarian Zionists regard certain biblical commands and promises as 
unquestionable absolutes, especially Jewish election and their right to land.114 
With these absolute truths, they turn the struggle over land and living space into a 
symbolic battleground: divine rights and election versus divine dispossession and 
rejection of the enemy. Compromises are not possible because ultimate truths are 
inflexible. Any means are acceptable for defending and pursuing the absolute 
truths, for absolute truths as goals take precedence over core principles, like the 
golden rule, which should define acceptable means.115 Thus, absolutism shatters 
                                                
112 Ellens 2004, 2–3; Juergensmeyer 2003, 149, 156–157, 177–178, 188–189. 
113 Juergensmeyer 2003, 164–168.  
114 Ateek 1989, 127. See pages 28–30 above. 
115 For the role of absolute truth claims in violence, including the idea that a sacred goal justifies 
any means, see Kimball 2008, chapters two and five. Zionists regard Jews who are willing to 
compromise as evil. It is sinful to compromise on the rights of election. In Zionist thinking, the 
Jewish right to land becomes an unconditional right or, in fact, an obligation that Jews must fulfil 
so that the process of messianic redemption may advance. So, for example, Prime Minister 
 43 
the link between ends and means. Ateek notes: “When the absolute becomes the 
end, no questions are raised about the means, as long as they achieve the end.”116 
The connection between means and ends should be preserved. If the only way to 
achieve a goal is through demonizing and destroying others, in flagrant 
contradiction of core life-affirming principles, the legitimacy of the goal ought to 
be questioned.  
Catastrophic millenarians hold the absolute belief that they are living in an 
extraordinary time. They use this to justify to their followers why the central 
peace-making, life-affirming principles of their tradition do not apply. Zionist 
rabbis refer to pickuach nefesh, a threat to the existence of Judaism, as a 
justification for using any means to defend the sacred land against God’s enemies. 
The emergency allows suspension of normal moral obligations. Also, normal 
moral obligations do not apply because both Jewish and Christian millenarian 
Zionists believe that they are struggling to establish an ideal time, the messianic 
era of peace. Attaining this utopia requires horrible sacrifices and actions that 
would normally be considered immoral. At the very most, Zionists may argue that 
these sacrifices and actions are necessary, temporary evils through which an 
absolutely good end can be achieved.117  
However, Zionists usually see violence as a spiritual imperative that 
eliminates the evil obstacles before the ideal messianic age. Violence is 
understood as a redemptive purifying act that saves from and judges evil powers. 
After all, in the scriptures God uses violence to eliminate evil. Because Zionists 
identify their temporal enemies with evil powers and themselves as God’s agents, 
they approve of violence as good in their particular situation. The evil enemies of 
God must be eliminated from the sacred land and they deserve to be punished. 
Understanding violence as redemptive is common to all theologies of holy war.118 
 Culturalists tend to emphasise that religious traditions and their contents 
cause violence. Violent narratives and metaphors found in religious texts provide 
the fuel for demonization. They are the sources of the aforementioned visions of 
cosmic war, absolute beliefs, and ideal times, which believers put into practice. 
                                                                                                                                 
Yitzhak Rabin was demonized and murdered by religious Zionists for his readiness to make 
territorial compromises (Appleby 2000, 84). 
116 Ateek 1989, 128.  
117 Appleby 2000, 16–17, 82, 88–89; Juergensmeyer 2003, 55–57. See also Kimball 2008, chapter 
four.  
118 Dein 2009, 157, 159; Wink 1992, 13–31. Wink stresses that redemptive violence is a delusion 
because violence cannot free from evil. It just begets more evil.  
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Believers view reality through the lens of these very ambiguous texts that both 
affirm violence and promote life-affirming principles, and externalise God’s will 
to human responsibility while also separating God from human action. Although 
most catastrophic millenarians are quietistic and leave vengeance to God, those 
who promote human responsibility find justifications for their actions in these 
texts. The ambiguous externalizing metaphors of religion thus contain the seeds of 
violence. If the world is the stage of a cosmic battle, mediated through human 
agency, then humans may resort to violence to win the battle for good. In the 
Judeo-Christian tradition especially the herem narratives, which devote enemies to 
destruction, and prophetic-apocalyptic texts, which set an expectation of violent 
redemption in the future, are problematic because they approve of violent 
solutions. Throughout history, they have prompted people to force the end and 
have shaped group identities through the aforementioned cosmic dualism.119  
Structuralists, however, emphasise that groups may use religious beliefs to 
justify violence under certain conditions but they do not see religious traditions 
themselves as causes. Texts and traditions are after all open to innumerable 
interpretations, as we have already established. Rather, structuralists stress that 
religion functions in relation to its environment, like any other ideology. 
Ideologies in general, as belief systems that explain reality, always interact and 
are intertwined with other spheres of human life which include political, 
economic, social, cultural, and psychological spheres. By interpreting the reasons 
for changes in these spheres, as well as by defining new goals, an ideology helps a 
group to adapt to crises in its living conditions. A crisis involves drastic changes 
or challenges that touch the different spheres. In a crisis, such as a conflict over 
resources, an ideology can strengthen the group’s identity and self-worth. One 
way to do this is to project the blame for the challenging conditions on the 
opposing side who is demonized as a threat to existence and as the source of all 
problems. The group’s identity is augmented through the negation of the opposing 
side’s identity.120   
Religion may serve as such a hostile ideology for a group that reacts to a 
crisis in an exclusivist manner. Zionists use religion in this way, sanctifying their 
                                                
119 Ellens 2004, 6–7; Collins 2004, 21–23; Gunning 2011, 513–516. 
120 Gunning 2011, 513–516; Kille 2004, 57–70. Kille cites an example where even one of the most 
peaceable and loving texts, Jesus’s command to love enemies, was interpreted as a justification for 
violence simply because of a hostile environment that prompted a redefinition of the meaning of 
love.  
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own goals and demonizing Palestinians. The main point of structuralists is that the 
religious response to a crisis is not primarily based on the contents of traditions 
and texts but on individuals’ and groups’ reactions to crises in living conditions, 
which influences the way they interpret religion.121 Groups do not necessarily 
react to crises by strengthening exclusive boundaries. Some remain open, self-
critical, and do not accept the dualistic zero-sum logic in which only one side is 
vindicated. For these groups, religion functions as a peaceful ideology, inspiring 
them to search for mutually beneficial solutions. Ateek’s constructive task is to 
empower mainly Christians, but also Jews, to work for a just peace.122 There are 
also many other examples, even in Israel-Palestine, of religion inspiring 
individuals and groups to reach out to the opposing side.123  
  Critics of culturalism emphasise that the aforementioned violent-inducing 
qualities of religion – cosmic dualism, absolute truths, and visions of an ideal time 
– are not specific to religion. Many so-called secular ideologies like ethnic 
nationalism and Marxism promote absolute truths and millenarian visions of a 
future ideal society. This supports the aforementioned structuralist argument that 
any ideology, as a response to a crisis, can be interpreted in a way that promotes 
violence. Religion and nationalism are often intertwined so that it is difficult to 
separate one from the other.124 As we have seen, also secular Zionists use absolute 
truths to justify violence. Their truths may not be based on beliefs about the 
transcendent but they are as absolute and inflexible, which makes them sacred 
truths. Among their sacred truths, as goals, are Israel’s security, maintaining 
Jewish cultural heritage, and an ethnically pure Jewish society. Religion, 
therefore, is not the defining factor in the violence but rather the nature of the 
goals that different groups in the conflict have. Exclusive goals, whether defined 
religiously or not, are connected to violence. The logic of exclusion is a logic of 
                                                
121 Kille 2004, 67, 70.  
122 See 59–60. 
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Rather than emphasising their unique election, Jewish, Islamic, and Christian leaders have used the 
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purity that stresses the homogeneity of religion, ethnicity, territory, etc. and leaves 
no room for plurality. 
 Both structuralist and culutralist arguments contribute to the explanation of 
religiously motivated violence. Certainly, religious texts and traditions promote 
Manichean worldviews, absolute claims, and millenarian visions, which offer 
violent groups plenty of material to sacralise their actions and demonize their 
enemies. However, the worldviews of these groups, especially ones like the 
religious Zionists who share concrete territorial goals with secular Zionists, are 
shaped by the broader context of crises in living conditions. A crisis and a group’s 
reaction to it influence the way in which it interprets its ideology. Of course, one 
cannot reduce religion or any ideology to a response to changes in conditions or 
experiences. Ideology is complexly intertwined with other spheres in human life 
and it not only reacts to them but also shapes these spheres by defining a group’s 
goals in relation to them. Precisely because ideological, social, political, 
economic, cultural, and psychological spheres of human life cannot be separated 
from each other, it would be a drastic over-simplification to argue that religion is 
the primary cause of violence or oppression.  
 Ateek appears to endorse the culturalist position because, as we have seen, 
he criticises absolute, dualistic, and messianic beliefs and texts, suggesting that 
they are significant factors in the violence. However, he also notes that the 
conflict is about resources and land, and that Zionism is a nationalist movement 
that seeks to maintain Israel as an ethnocratic state.125 So, it would not be correct 
to assert that he believes religion to be the primary cause of violence. Rather, he 
argues that exclusive religion is one contributing factor in it. He focuses on 
religious Zionism because it contrasts with his own religious answer to the 
conflict. In his view, religion should never become a tool for demonization and 
nationalistic fervour.126  
If religion legitimates or contributes to the abuses of the powerful, it can be 
referred to as an empire theology, which liberation theologies, postcolonial 
theology in particular, aim to expose and criticise.127 We have established that, in 
Ateek’s view, Israel is a powerful empire that oppresses Palestinians. We have 
seen that Jewish and Christian religious Zionism legitimates the oppression 
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through sacralisation, demonization, and violent millennialism. Because of this, 
religious Zionism is an empire theology that justifies Israel’s occupation of 
Palestinian lands and its violence against Palestinians.  
 
3. Ateek’s Constructive Task 
3.1 Inclusive Religion 
A Minimum Standard of Justice  
In the previous section we considered Ateek’s critical task that exposes Israel’s 
abuse of power and its violence against Palestinians. Above all, Ateek emphasises 
the role that religious Zionism, an exclusive empire theology, has in legitimating 
Israel’s oppression of Palestinians. In his constructive task, Ateek aims to offer an 
alternative to religious Zionism. He attempts to formulate an inclusive religious 
view that could empower the faithful to pursue a just peace founded on respectful 
coexistence.  
Although Ateek is clear that he is writing from the perspective of an Arab 
Christian, he writes: “I have…emphasized the major principles on which a just 
peace can be built, and these are not limited by a single religious tradition.”128 
Thus, Ateek’s central premise is that a just peace can only be built on principles 
that have universal legitimacy. In his view, a minimal, universal understanding of 
justice is the foundation for pursuing peace.  
Referring to Aristotle, Ateek defines justice as refraining from pleonexia, 
the attempt to gain an unfair advantage by denying another’s right to something, 
for example property or respect.129 This highlights justice as a relational concept 
defined by fairness. Fairness includes the idea of giving each person what is his 
due or right, which is the classical western concept of justice. All humans share 
the same rights before the law so that no one group is discriminated against. So, 
everyone possesses rights and is obligated to respect the same rights of others. 
Rights and obligations must be reciprocal because otherwise there are no rights in 
practice.130 Relationships break down when we feel that our rights have been 
violated. When this happens, we feel unworthy and unloved. This is why love and 
justice are inextricably linked. Treating another fairly, respecting his rights as a 
fellow human as we expect our rights to be respected, is to love him: “When we 
                                                
128 Ateek 2008, XIII.  
129 Ateek 1989, 115–116. 
130 Philpott 2012, 68; Wolterstorff 2012, 49. 
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teach people to love one another as they love themselves, we are also teaching 
them to live justly.”131 Thus, the virtues in Paul’s hymn to love (1 Cor. 13:4-6) 
apply equally to justice, for “love does not rejoice in injustice.”  
What rights should everyone possess, then? Ateek emphasises that 
international law is the foundation for defining the meaning of just relations in all 
contexts. In his view, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
the Geneva Conventions set the minimum standard of justice that everyone should 
accept. Additionally, he upholds certain UN resolutions that set more specific 
requirements for fair relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Ateek 
emphasises that fair relations require that Israel respects the Palestinians’ right to 
self-determination and ensures the human rights of Palestinians in Israel. He 
concedes that international law and the human rights regime are problematic, 
often representing the interests of western nations. However, in his view they are 
gigantic achievements in the effort to define a basic, universal standard of justice. 
Just because there are challenges does not mean that the effort should not be 
continued.132  
In fact, Ateek argues that every religion should evaluate its doctrines and 
beliefs in light of the human rights regime. Any doctrine that “infringes on human 
rights cannot be of God.” The human rights regime reflects the best ethical and 
moral teachings of various religions and complements them, as it leaves out the 
ambiguous and morally repugnant elements. In Ateek’s view, therefore, human 
rights represent a systematisation of the core life-affirming principles that can be 
found in religions. He stresses that all religions should focus on grounding human 
rights in their respective traditions. Focusing on the Judeo-Christian traditions, 
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Ateek notes that the doctrine of Imago Dei and the commands to love God and 
neighbour are foundations for human rights.133  
In Ateek’s view, all humans share God’s dignity because they are created in 
God’s image, which entails that they are worthy of respect. The love 
commandment is the summation of what it means to be just towards others. 
Loving God and neighbour entails that one respects the worth of one’s neighbour 
who possesses God-given rights. To love another human is to treat him justly, 
respect his rights, like Jesus did when he affirmed the value of the lives of 
despised outcasts and helped them in the middle of injustices that had deprived 
them of basic rights to life, freedom, security, and respectful treatment. Ateek 
stresses that, in Christianity, the incarnation expresses God’s affirmation of 
human dignity because God honours humans by identifying with them and 
vindicates their value through the examples and actions of Jesus. There is no room 
for an exclusive or partial theology in Jesus’s summary of the law and the 
prophets in the commandment to love. All humans possess dignity and God-given 
rights and obviously have the reciprocal obligation, defined by the golden rule, to 
respect others’ rights.134  
Ateek is correct that religious values have significantly influenced the 
formation of the human rights regime. Religions can, therefore, discover the roots 
of human rights in their respective traditions. A common view in Jewish and 
Christian tradition is that the second table of rights in the Decalogue belongs to all 
humans. Two powerful themes visible even in the early traditions of both 
religions press towards the universalization of rights, even though they did not yet 
conceptualise them as natural rights belonging to all humans. These are the Imago 
Dei and the command to love the neighbour, as Ateek also notes above. Limiting 
the obligations of neighbourly love at times primarily to the Jewish community, 
rabbinic thought has nonetheless emphasised that Jews must respect the lives of 
and provide beneficence to non-Jews whom they live in proximity to. In the 
Christian tradition, God’s impartiality has been a central theme, for God 
approaches all humans equally, which grounds everyone’s rights in their innate 
worth.135  
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Still, Ateek’s argument that a shared minimum standard of justice should be 
founded on the human rights regime is problematic. First, there is the issue of 
defining the meaning of human rights which are abstract principles. The exact 
meaning of a right like liberty depends on the interpretation and the context. 
Another problem is defining the limits of and relations between rights. Which 
rights should have priority and how should a conflict between rights be resolved? 
Second, there is the issue of the particularity of religions. Religions may share 
certain core principles, like the golden rule, but it would be a tenuous argument to 
suggest that religions agree on morality.136  
Nonetheless, it is also implausible that religions could not speak to each 
other or find common ground on ethical issues. The concept of ‘thin morality,’ 
which refers to universal principles like the right to life and respectful treatment, 
has been used to describe basic values that representatives of world religions 
agree on. ‘Thick morality’ refers to tradition-specific norms. Of course, the same 
criticism applies to religious ‘thin morality’ as to the abstract nature of human 
rights: it is too broad to be consequential because ‘thick moralities’ define the 
specific meaning of basic values differently. Still, critics of universalism 
underestimate the value of efforts to establish minimal standards of justice. This is 
because the emphasis on particularity must not lead to a relativism that legitimates 
the norms of oppressors, when the oppressed cry for a common standard of human 
rights.137  
If religions are to empower believers to work for peace, there must be a 
willingness to find shared principles. Common principles, based on the golden 
rule’s reciprocal requirement to treat others fairly, such as prohibitions on killing 
innocents, torture, and theft, are important precisely because they convey the 
message that oppression in the name of any religion is wrong. Religions differ in 
many ways but religious actors across the board have found ways to sacralise 
human rights in the languages of their respective traditions and engage in dialogue 
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with other faiths in order to formulate shared moral norms in specific contexts.138 
Ateek is not trying to synthesise religions. He is only suggesting that good 
religion does not sacralise oppression but instead upholds human dignity, 
grounded in basic human rights. Thus, Ateek uses justice as a theological 
measuring stick: “One principle is clear: any religion that does not promote 
justice…among people has lost its rudder and is undeserving of respect.”139  
The meaning of justice is of course dependent on the context. Ateek 
emphasises the political and civil rights of Palestinians, especially freedom of 
speech, equality before the law, and the right to self-determination, in addition to 
rights like the rights to life and liberty, and the bans on arbitrary arrest and 
exile.140 This is understandable because his theology focuses on the national 
liberation of the Palestinians. He differs from liberation theology in two respects. 
First, liberation theology has traditionally criticised the human rights regime for 
upholding what it has described as “the false universalism of elite first world 
liberalism.” It has accused the human rights regime for prioritizing individual 
political and civil rights at the expense of collective rights. For example, from the 
perspective of the poor in the third world, the individual right to property has 
become a right to deprive communities’ means of subsistence.141  
However, more recently liberation theology has affirmed the value of the 
human rights regime, especially because social and economic rights have received 
more emphasis, and has used it to censure oppressive Latin American regimes. 
Still, liberation theology stresses that human rights, although belonging to all, are 
always situated in specific contexts. A first world view will always differ from a 
third world view, not to mention regional differences. Liberation theology upholds 
rights that are important to the oppressed. Because it commonly focuses on 
poverty, liberation theology has stressed socio-economic rights, grounded in the 
right to subsistence. One of its main themes is distributive justice which concerns 
the just division of goods in society.142 This is the second distinguishing factor 
between liberation theology and Ateek on the issue of human rights. As noted, it 
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is Palestinian political and national rights that are important in Ateek’s context. 
The socio-economic perspective on justice is not his primary concern.  
 God’s preferential option for the oppressed is a central concept in liberation 
theologies, also in Ateek’s thought. Basically, it means that God has a special 
concern for the oppressed. It may seem that this is incompatible with Ateek’s 
emphasis on the human rights regime as the foundation of a fair relationship. If 
God is partial, then God’s justice is not grounded in universal rights or fairness. 
However, this is incorrect. Liberation theologies assert that the option for the 
oppressed is an option for justice. God is concerned for the oppressed because 
they are vulnerable and abused.143 Their most basic rights are violated and a fair 
relationship does not exist between them and their oppressors. The powerful do 
not require God’s concern in the same way as the least advantaged. Because 
God’s love is universal, the oppressed cannot claim the preferential option as a 
privilege. As Ateek notes, the oppressed are not innately more righteous or 
worthier than others. Their claim to justice must not lead them to become 
powerful oppressors. Instead, the preferential option reflects God’s concern to 
establish fair relations everywhere and it exists as long as there are unjust 
relationships, whoever the oppressed may be.144  
Using the liberationist hermeneutic that seeks to empower the faithful, 
Ateek reminds his readers that through his preferential option God calls believers 
to work for justice. Justice is integral to God’s nature (e.g. Deut. 32:4) and he 
demands just living among all nations. The Hebrew prophets emphasised that 
justice is more important to God than the cult and rituals (e.g. Amos 5:22-24, Isa. 
56:1-2). Just relations between people are the fruit of one’s faith in God. 
Therefore, those who know and love God will endeavour to establish justice. 
Ateek also reminds the Palestinians that God is with them because they are 
oppressed. This is evident in God’s concern for the protection of the vulnerable. 
The prophets promised vindication to the oppressed because their claim to justice 
is righteous, for they have been seriously wronged.145    
Ateek’s definition of justice as rights and obligations, based on the 
commonly accepted human rights regime, highlights justice as a description of 
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right conduct. Justice must also include a description of the right response to 
wrong conduct or injustice.146 In Ateek’s view, God’s righteousness is the model 
for responding to injustice. Ateek defines righteousness as a combination of 
justice, understood here as response to wrong-doing, and mercy that seeks to 
relieve distress and restore relationships. In the New Testament, Christ’s death 
and resurrection is a “complete event” that reveals God’s righteousness. Christ’s 
death satisfied the demand for justice because sin received its punishment. His 
resurrection is the ultimate expression of mercy because it makes the restoration 
of the relationship between God and humans possible. According to Ateek, the 
Old Testament also contains a similar idea of righteousness, for righteousness 
includes justice and compassion. In the story of Cain and Abel, God condemned 
Cain for murdering his brother. A concern for only justice would have 
necessitated the death penalty but, out of compassion, God spared Cain.147  
In Ateek’s view, having compassion means that we respect the value of 
human life, even the lives of our enemies, for we recognize our shared humanity. 
Our specific goals may be contradictory but at a general level most of us share the 
desire for a secure and fulfilling existence, for example both Israelis and 
Palestinians want security. Thus, compassion guides the faithful to recognize that 
at the deepest level there are hopes and fears that they share even with their 
enemies, which should lead them to understand the enemy. Ateek summarizes:  
Compassion is the way into the lives of others to understand their claims and shape our 
social and political institutions to respond to them. This sense of solidarity is grounded in 
the valuation of life. Justice is stressed because life, every life, is valuable…Justice in the 
last analysis is an act of respect.148 
  
As a model for human responses to injustice, God’s righteousness 
establishes that an absolute justice, based on the retributive principle of ‘eye for 
an eye,’ is an inadequate response, especially in inter-communal conflicts. In 
Ateek’s view, this would only result in an endless cycle of revenge, as the 
oppressor feels that he is being mercilessly punished and humiliated. Ateek 
underlines that justice should not be understood primarily as something that is 
exacted from or against the oppressor. Neither is mercy or compassion something 
that is only asked for the oppressed. It is a hard but necessary truth to understand 
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that God’s mercy extends even to our enemies. He emphasises that building a 
right relationship between Israelis and Palestinians requires finding a balance 
between justice, as right response to wrong-doing, and mercy.149  
There are two main points that we can deduce from Ateek’s emphasis on 
God’s righteousness as a model. First, the primary goal of the response to 
injustice should be to facilitate the building of right relationships or, in other 
words, to normalize the situation in which human relations are defined by right 
conduct. In an inter-communal conflict, this is a question of transitional justice, 
which concerns the appropriate ways to redress the injustices after a violent 
conflict. Retributive justice is often legitimated with the idea of balance: a 
punishment must be proportional to the wrong it punishes. A typical criticism of 
retributive justice in the process of transitional justice is that it can never be 
proportional to the horrible crimes that have been committed, and that it fails to 
take into account the feelings of victimisation on both sides of the conflict. As 
noted above, also Ateek stresses that it would only lead to a perpetuation of the 
cycle of revenge or the spiral of violence. Punishment may have a role in the 
process but other methods, like redressing the actual causes of injustice through 
the creation of just institutions, are also important.150  
Second, Ateek’s view that God’s righteousness entails the evolution of a 
deeper understanding for the enemy through mercy or compassion reveals that his 
definition of right relationship in fact goes beyond the human rights regime’s 
demand for reciprocal acknowledgment of rights and obligations. Ateek stresses 
that the ultimate goal is reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, which 
suggests a more profound level of trust and understanding than a distant respect 
for the other’s rights. We shall consider this when we examine Ateek’s vision of 
peace below. We shall also see that, in Ateek’s view, God’s righteousness 
demands nonviolent resistance which is the only way to respect the enemy’s 
worth and maintain the hope of reconciliation with him.151  
 Ateek’s emphasis on God’s righteousness shows that he bases his 
understanding of justice on his interpretation of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Yet, 
as the discussion above reveals, he also argues that the human rights regime 
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should function as a universal minimal definition of justice. Religions disagree 
and contain too much dubious material that extremists, like the Zionists, can use 
to legitimate their exclusive, unjust visions. Thus, Ateek feels that the human 
rights regime is needed as a universal arbiter that has the last word on at least the 
most basic principles that all religions should promote.  
 
Christ and the Prophetic Tradition   
In Ateek’s view, the prophetic tradition and Jesus Christ provide the principles 
that accord with his understanding of justice as right conduct and as right response 
to injustice. In line with the discussion above, he stresses that the Bible and the 
human rights regime should complement each other:  
And it is important to remember that the principles that can be deduced from the Bible 
regarding justice and morality do not, nor should they, contradict those of international 
law.152  
 
The principles that accord with international law constitute the “eternally true” 
message of the Bible. These principles should guide interpretation and action 
because they reveal the spirit of the Bible or its core message.153 Here, Ateek 
follows a common view in western Protestant biblical ethics, which argues that 
the faith community has the authority to reread texts in light of its own experience 
in order to find timeless, applicable core principles.154  
Rereading the Bible in light of one’s context leads to the idea of the primacy 
of the Bible in decision-making. The primacy of the Bible means that its core 
principles, including agapeic love, freedom, and responsibility, ought to guide the 
faithful in their actions. It does not mean that the Bible should be the primary 
source of specific knowledge that is required in decision-making. Instead, the 
principle of responsibility should guide Christians to take into account all of the 
possible resources and knowledge that can contribute to an ethically sound 
decision in their specific circumstances.155 Ateek’s ideas echo this view. He 
argues that the human rights regime provides universal knowledge about the 
minimal requirements of justice. Additionally, international resolutions stipulate 
more specific requirements for the just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict. The Bible’s core message is in line with international law, revealing that 
international law accords with God’s will.156  
Ateek argues that the Jewish prophetic tradition represents the culmination 
of the Old Testament’s views on justice. For him, the prophetic tradition contains 
the core principle of God’s inclusive love, which underpins human dignity and 
requires respect and compassion for others. The prophetic tradition is the high 
point in a process of progressive inclusion from the exclusive and nationalistic 
Torah towards a more inclusive post-exilic theology. Even though some prophets 
express an exclusive nationalism, and others vacillate between exclusive and 
inclusive views, the central message of the prophets is inclusive: God is not just 
the god of the Jews, but of all people, and he is concerned about just relations 
everywhere. The prophets stress God’s affirmation of the dignity of all humans, 
for God cares about all people, irrespective of power, social status, or nationality. 
In human relations, the prophets stress God’s calling for just conduct towards all 
people, including foreigners whose right to live in the land must be respected 
(Ezek. 47:21-23).157  
Ateek is certainly correct that the prophetic tradition breaks ethnic 
boundaries by universalising God’s love and by spiritualising the land so that 
God’s presence and concerns are not limited to a single territory. The rabbinic 
tradition has viewed Isaiah’s exhortation to observe what is right and do what is 
just (Isa. 56:1) as a summary of the entire Torah. A common view in the rabbinic 
tradition is that justice involves compassion which requires the active promotion 
of others’ welfare. The prophets often criticised the Israelites for failing to liberate 
those who have for long been in debt, poverty, or slavery. The rights of widows, 
orphans, and resident aliens were to be guaranteed and land was to be restored to 
owners (Isa. 58). This underlines that justice as a response to wrongs, defined by 
compassion, should not simply focus on punishing wrongdoers but on restoring 
the rights of victims. The prophets’ emphasis on restoring right relations 
underpins the rabbinic tradition’s conception of peace not only as an absence of 
war but as a positive peace in which the welfare of all people is a reality.158  
                                                
156 Ateek stresses that God’s will is to see justice done everywhere (e.g. Ateek 1989, 108). 
157 Ateek 1989, 96, 110; Ateek 2008, 55, 63, 132–134; Ateek 2012a, 179–180. 
158 Braverman 2014, 170–171; Philpott 2012, 123–126. Ateek notes that a maxim of the rabbinic 
tradition is, “seek peace and pursue it,” where peace is understood as a holistic social concept in 
which fair relations are integral. (Ateek 1989, 146–148) 
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In Ateek’s view the prophets’ message promotes an inclusive vision of the 
peaceful unity of all humanity under God. Such a vision is incompatible with 
discrimination. Rabbinic Judaism built on this tradition, not on the exclusive 
nationalist tradition. The prophetic tradition is dynamic and forward-looking 
because it stresses principles that are wide enough to be applied to new situations. 
Thus, it encourages openness to new lessons of faith, where the faith community 
trusts God to show them the exact meaning of faith in a particular time. An 
inclusive God, who loves the whole world and is against oppression, summarises 
the view of the prophets, which both Jews and Christians should take as the 
primary message of the Old Testament. Ateek stresses that this inclusive 
interpretation is not only based on his own reading but on the rabbinic tradition.159  
The prophets define the Old Testament but Christ defines the entire Bible 
and reveals the clearest knowledge about God’s inclusive love. For Ateek, Jesus 
Christ is the hermeneutic lens through which the Bible should be read, which is a 
prevalent view in liberation theology. Ateek writes: “The Word of God incarnate 
in Jesus the Christ interprets for us the word of God in the Bible.”160 Confronted 
with difficult biblical passages or challenging situations, Christians must ask 
themselves: “Is the way I am hearing this the way I have come to know God in 
Christ? Does this fit the picture I have of God that Jesus has revealed to me?”161 
Ateek notes that this could lead to subjectivity but he is convinced that in the 
revelation of God in Christ in the New Testament, “there is for the Christian an 
objective knowledge which one cannot deny, in spite of certain human 
limitations.”162  
Ateek implies that Christ’s objective revelation of God contains a message 
that is unequivocally in unison with the requirements of justice in international 
law and adds to it by promoting nonviolence as the right way to struggle against 
oppression and reconciliation as the ultimate goal in human relations. Christ 
reveals a God who upholds love as the greatest principle, requires love of 
enemies, approaches oppressed and despised outcasts, and breaks ethnic and 
social boundaries. Through his passion, Christ reveals a God who personally 
understands the agony of the oppressed. Through his resurrection, Christ defeats 
                                                
159 Ateek 1989, 95–96, 102, 108–109; Ateek 2008, 133–134. 
160 Ateek 1989, 80. See also Ateek 2012a, 175–176. 
161 Ateek 1989, 82. 
162 Ateek 1989, 82.  
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evil, not by conquering it violently, but by transforming it with love. This love 
breaks the walls of enmity between God and humans and between humans of 
different ethnicities. In this sense, Christ is “our peace” (Ephesians 2:14-17).163  
In Christ, people are justified, or declared righteous, through God’s mercy. 
God condemns their injustice but at the same time offers reconciliation. He 
liberates both oppressed and oppressors from the enslavement of sin and 
empowers them to live in a restored relationship with each other. This is reflected 
in the numerous occasions when Jesus forgave sins but simultaneously exhorted 
and empowered the sinner to start a new life without sin. The fruits of justification 
are concern for the weak and the poor, doing good to all, peace and harmony, and 
carrying others’ burdens. The fruits reflect reconciliation, a comprehensive 
restoration of relations, which requires correcting the injustice but also 
forgiveness and the desire to promote the other’s good. A fully restored 
relationship is not, therefore, only a question of refraining from violating the 
rights of the other.164  
  What distinguishes Christ from the prophetic tradition is the clarity of the 
inclusive, loving, nonviolent, and merciful message. Ateek argues that ‘God 
revealed in Christ’ is an improvement on the prophetic tradition because in Christ 
there is supposedly no vacillation between exclusive and inclusive concepts. 
Ateek proposes a progression from the still ambiguous prophets to the fully 
inclusive Christ so that the Hebrew prophets are in effect precursors or witnesses 
to the full revelation of God in Christ.165 This creates a problem for Ateek’s goal 
of affirming the Jewish tradition’s principles that support justice and peace. His 
elevation of Christ to the position of objective knowledge and his very high view 
of the New Testament could be an obstacle to dialogue with Jews. Doesn’t Christ 
set new boundaries that lead to the demonization of outsiders? Doesn’t 
appropriating the Old Testament as a witness to Christ accord with the traditional 
supercessionist view of Christianity? Doesn’t Ateek’s view also threaten to 
become exclusive?  
                                                
163 Ateek 1989, 149; Ateek 1997, 101; Ateek 2008, 95–96. Ateek writes, “The God that we have 
come to know in Jesus Christ is a God of peace, mercy, and love.” (Ateek 2008, 126)  
164 Philpott 2012, 136, 138, 146–148. See also Miroslav Volf, who stresses that Christ’s act of 
reconciliation on the cross is a model for the restoration of human relationships (Volf 1996, 126, 
130). 
165 Ateek 1989, 97–100; Ateek 2008, 58; Ateek 2012a, 176–179. 
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Ateek’s answer to these questions is inadequate precisely because he 
elevates the New Testament to such a high level that he fails to treat its plurality 
and ambiguity fairly in relation to the Old Testament. Still, Ateek’s thought 
contains elements that may provide the way to a solution. Ateek writes that he in 
no way expects Jews to accept his Christocentric view. As a Christian, he asserts 
his right to view the Old Testament as important only “in the presence of the New 
Testament.” Jews equally have the right to interpret the Old Testament in light of 
the Mishna and the Talmud. Ateek writes: “To read the Old Testament through 
Christian eyes…does not preclude its reading through Jewish eyes...”166 This is 
important because it clarifies Ateek’s purpose. His Christocentric interpretation is 
meant as an answer to Christians, Palestinians and others, who are grappling with 
Christian Zionist claims. Its aim is to affirm Christ’s inclusive message of love 
and justice and the core message of the Hebrew prophets against the exclusivity of 
Zionism.  
Ateek hopes to demonstrate that despite the Old Testament’s ambiguity, 
made evident by Zionist interpretations, it still contains a powerful message of 
justice which the rabbinic tradition upholds. His purpose is to affirm mainly to 
Christians that both Judaism and Christianity have and should be interpreted in 
ways that promote God’s inclusive love which negates the exclusivity of 
Zionism.167 Ateek’s acknowledgment that both Jewish and Christian readings, as 
long as they are compatible with justice, are equally legitimate reveals his respect 
for the particularity of religious traditions. He does not shy way from affirming 
his confessional Christian beliefs and views this as the only way to honest 
dialogue.168   
In Ateek’s view, honesty leads Jews and Christians to respectfully agree that 
they disagree on many issues. Yet, it should also lead them to affirm the best in 
each other’s traditions. Ateek stresses that the prophetic tradition and Christ reveal 
that Christianity and Judaism agree on the basic idea of God’s inclusive love as an 
ethical demand on the faithful to promote just relations between people. Ateek 
                                                
166 Ateek 2008, 54. Ateek affirms that Jews have the right to “interpret their scriptures according to 
their own faith tradition” (Ateek 2008, 62) but Christians, too, have the right to read the Old 
Testament in light of their own faith in Christ (Ateek 2008, 53).  
167 Ateek 2008, 141, 162. Ateek suggests that Israel should adopt a new theology, based on the 
inclusive view of the prophetic tradition in its “own Hebrew scriptures.”  
168 Ateek 2012c, 2. Ateek’s respect for particularity is evident, for example, in his affirmation that 
all Abrahamic faiths regard Jerusalem as holy for different reasons. Their theologies of Jerusalem 
do not need to be reconciled or set into a hierarchical order. They only need to respect each other’s 
faith and right to Jerusalem. (Ateek 1997, 96–97, 104) 
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writes that such a mutual affirmation should lead Jews and Christians to compete 
in the work to establish a just peace.169 It does not mean denying their beliefs in 
the truth claims and practices of their respective faiths, which are inevitably 
incompatible. What is important is for each religion to look into itself and propose 
interpretations that emphasise the practice of justice as an expression of God’s 
love so that the aim to restore right relations between Israelis and Palestinians 
receives unshakable moral legitimacy.   
 
God, Election, and the Land   
We have established that, in Ateek’s view, the core principle of Christ and the 
prophetic tradition is inclusive love. God loves all people, irrespective of their 
personal qualities, and expects humans to emulate this. Ateek’s interpretation of 
God, election, and the land, through Christ and the prophetic tradition, elucidate 
his understanding of inclusive love.  
First, Ateek stresses that inclusive love is founded on God’s universal 
presence which entails that God’s concern extends to all people. In Ateek’s view, 
God’s universal covenant in Christ reflects a complete understanding of God’s 
relationship with the world. Christ is the fulfilment of God’s promise to Abraham 
to inherit the entire world. The New Testament reveals that access to God’s 
covenant is not limited by ethnicity, life in a particular land, or any other human 
factor. Christ redeems the world from enslavement to oppressive sin, and through 
Christ all people have access to God whose purpose is to create one humanity in 
Christ. There are no divisive boundaries between people and all stand as equals 
before God (Gal. 3:26-28). Since God’s love extends to all people through Christ, 
Ateek emphasises that Christians have no basis for constructing exclusive 
theologies that restrict God’s concern to a single people or land.170      
From the Old Testament, Ateek lifts up the Book of Jonah as the clearest 
expression of God’s universality. For Ateek, the author of Jonah represents the 
“first Palestinian liberation theologian” because of his insight into the inclusive 
nature of God. The unknown author uses the “jingoist” character of Jonah to 
                                                
169 Ateek 2008, 141, 163; Ateek 2012c, 2–3. Ateek’s article (2012c) is primarily on the Christian-
Muslim relationship but also concerns Christian relations with Judaism. He argues that the 
Abrahamic faiths should agree on the basic meaning of God’s inclusive love and the basic 
requirements of justice in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Respect for others entails affirming their 
right to the land, for example.  
170 Ateek 2008, 61–64. On God’s purpose to create one humanity in Christ, Ateek refers to Eph. 
1:8-10, 2:19-20, 3:5-6, 3:9, 3:11. 
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highlight the fact that God’s people are not restricted to Israel. Contrary to Jonah’s 
wishes, God is merciful to Israel’s deadliest enemies. The non-Israelite sailors 
come to know God (Jonah 1:14-16) and, “even the ugly, savage, and brutal beasts 
called the Assyrians fall within the care and embrace of a God who shows concern 
for their well-being.”171 Thus, the book reveals a God who loves all peoples, 
which is defined by his concern for just relations among people and between 
different peoples. Again, this should encourage Christians and Jews to respect and 
have compassion for others instead of building exclusive barriers.  
Second, Ateek implies that, whatever else Christians and Jews may attach to 
the idea of election, God’s inclusive love entails that ‘being chosen’ is reflected in 
ethical behaviour, which of course means respect for others’ humanity and rights. 
Jesus taught that God’s kingdom is close wherever righteousness, justice 
combined with mercy, reigns among people. The meek are those who endeavour 
to live according to this teaching, and for this they shall inherit the earth (Matt. 
5:8). The meek are aware that they are only tenants living in a world that belongs 
to God. They understand that God expects them to live righteously in whatever 
land they live in. So, they are compassionate towards their neighbours and take 
care of the land for the benefit of all its inhabitants. By contrast, evildoers are 
obsessed with ownership, exploit their neighbours, and are unwilling to share the 
land. They do not belong to God’s spiritual kingdom, and their domination over 
actual lands will also end because oppression is unsustainable.172  
  Because of God’s inclusive love, Ateek argues that the idea of an exclusive 
chosen people is problematic. Above all, God’s concern for all is reflected in his 
                                                
171 Ateek 2008, 74. See also Ateek 2008, 69–73, 75. The prophetic tradition in general reveals an 
inclusive God, e.g. Amos testifies to God’s concern for other peoples (Amos 1-2, 9:7), but Jonah is 
the most consistent. The greater prophets vacillate between exclusive and inclusive views. For 
example, Isa. 43:1-4 and 61:5-6 depict an exclusive God who condemns other nations so that Israel 
can be saved, offers the wealth of other nations to Israel, and enslaves others for Israel (Ateek 
2008, 55). As noted earlier, in Ateek’s view, such exclusive texts do not reflect an authentic 
knowledge of God. Adele Reinhartz confirms that Jonah represents a culmination in the 
inclusivism of the Old Testament and is upheld as a model of reconciliation in rabbinic tradition. 
Jonah reveals that God’s love extends to all of creation. His inclusive love requires reconciliation 
with the enemy, as he demanded that Jonah forgive the Assyrian oppressors, and breaks the cycle 
of violence since God does not punish the Ninevites. The Assyrians had committed horrendous 
injustice against Israel but repent genuinely, so the merciful God is open to reconciliation. 
(Reinhartz 2011, 11, 24–26)   
172 Ateek 2008, 59. Ateek creates a beatitude that Jesus would have, in his view, approved: “Woe 
to those who are obsessed with the land and are not willing to share it for they will lose it.” He 
writes: “The kingdom is not for those who cling to the land in an exclusive and aggressive way, 
denying others their God-given right to live on the land and share the blessings of life. In the end, 
the land does not belong to people of power who occupy it, rule it, exploit its resources, and 
oppress others.” See also the following for Ateek’s points concerning the connection between 
ethical behaviour and faithfulness to God: Ateek 1989, 67; Ateek 2006, 229; Ateek 2008, 170. 
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command “to act justly and love mercy” (Mic. 6:8).173 God’s specific 
commandments to Israel to abide by his will should be understood as a model for 
all people. All nations must subscribe to the maxim, “This is the Lord’s land and 
the Lord demands a life of righteousness and justice in our Land.”174 At the very 
least, being a member of God’s people entails that one endeavours to live justly. 
The Old Testament emphasises that election is not an exclusive privilege to abuse 
but a responsibility. The Israelites do not own their land, for it belongs to God 
(Lev. 25:23).175 Living in God’s land, as his covenant people, requires faithfulness 
to ethical norms.  
Disobeying God, defiling the land with injustice, would lead to the Israelites 
being thrust out from the land (Deut. 4:25–26). Even the more exclusive texts of 
the Torah command the just treatment of strangers and aliens, who had no right to 
the land but were still under God’s protection. Written after the exile and 
developing a more inclusive theology, Ezekiel declares that foreign inhabitants 
have the same right to the land (Ezek. 47:21-23). In effect, this establishes a 
similar level of entitlement for the two groups, requiring them to respect each 
other’s rights. Thus, Ateek underlines that Jews should not be obsessed with 
owning the land. They should be obsessed with establishing justice in the land.176   
Third, Ateek argues that the land of Canaan does not have any special 
theological significance that would distinguish it from other lands. God’s 
inclusive love is incompatible with any exclusive territorial nationalism that 
promotes the value of land above the value of human beings. In the New 
Testament, the holiness of land has been transferred to Christ whose coming has 
consecrated the world and all of humanity. Referring to Jesus’s encounter with the 
Samaritan woman (John 4:21-24), Ateek argues that all places are equally 
important to God whose reign is not limited to one area or one people. Jesus did 
not tell the woman where Samaritans and Jews should worship because the 
physical place is no longer significant. Because of Christ, all people are able to 
worship God everywhere in spirit and in truth, which includes the requirement to 
live justly.177  
                                                
173 Ateek 1989, 112.  
174 Ateek 1989, 109. 
175 Ateek 2006, 228–229. 
176 Ateek 1989, 106–107; Ateek 2008, 63–64.  
177 Ateek 2008, 145–147. Ateek stresses that respect for holy places and territory should never 
override the ethical obligation to treat others justly (Ateek 1997, 99). C.J.H Wright confirms that 
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The spiritualization and universalization of the promises associated with 
land is also found in the Hebrew prophets. Second Isaiah realized that belonging 
to God’s people is not a question of living in a specific land. Instead, he 
envisioned the outpouring of God’s spirit on people (Isa. 44:3-4), which means 
that people are important, not specific lands or places. Overall, the land loses its 
special significance as one moves to the more inclusive texts in the Old 
Testament. According to Ateek, this is visible in the “second exodus,” from 
Babylon, briefly recounted in the prophetic tradition (Jer. 23:7-8). The first 
exodus sacralised land, which resulted in conquest and dispossession. In the 
second exodus, God simply calls Israel to live in the land, without any references 
to dispossession or purifying the sacred land. Jews should draw inspiration from 
this exodus story rather than the first.178 
 Ateek’s reflections on God, election, and the land are based on his 
Christocentric reading of the Bible. Liberation Christologies tend to emphasise the 
liberating life of Jesus who condemned oppressive institutions and empowered 
excluded outcasts. Because liberation theology often focuses on socio-economic 
oppression, it stresses Jesus’s actions that helped and honoured  
marginalized groups. For example, feminist theologians interpret Jesus’s 
encounter with the Samaritan woman as Jesus’s way of reintegrating women, 
calling them to God’s reign. Latin American liberation theology promotes the 
economically deprived as the meek in Jesus’s beatitudes.179 Ateek’s context is 
different. His reflections above suggest that Christ liberates from exclusive 
conceptions of God, election, and the land.   
As noted, for Ateek, Jesus’s encounter with the Samaritan woman reveals 
that holy space has lost its significance and that God’s love extends to all peoples. 
This contains the general emphasis of liberation theology that God’s love extends 
especially to all oppressed people. However, Ateek’s interpretation of Jesus and 
the Samaritan woman is also clearly aimed at the Palestinian context: because 
God’s concern extends to all people in all lands, the Jews cannot claim that a 
different set of rules apply to their sacred land. God demands justice in all lands, 
so Jews must respect the Palestinians’ right to live in the land. In Ateek’s context, 
                                                                                                                                 
New Testament texts transfer the promises, gifts, and blessings associated with land to Christ, 
universalizing the Old Testament’s promise of God’s presence (Wright 2008, 467–468). 
178 Ateek 1989, 111–112; Ateek 2006, 230–231. 
179 Kärkkäinen & Levison & Pope-Levison 2008, 177–178.  
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exclusive Zionist beliefs and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination are 
central. So, the meek are those who acknowledge that God’s inclusive love 
demands justice in their land, also in Israel-Palestine. Ateek’s reflections on God, 
election, and the land aim to empower primarily Christians to struggle for 
Palestinian rights. Christians have to affirm that God is concerned about justice 
for the Palestinians in the same way that he is concerned about justice for other 
peoples. 
 
The New Way of Jesus 
Ateek stresses nonviolence as the right way to struggle against oppression because 
it is compatible with God’s righteousness which condemns oppression but 
maintains compassion for the oppressor. In Ateek’s view, the prophetic tradition 
and Christ promote nonviolent resistance as the way to pursue justice because 
nonviolence is consistent with the goal of creating a right relationship between 
oppressors and oppressed, which reflects God’s inclusive love.  
Christ shatters the legitimacy of the Davidic warrior messiah that, as noted 
in section 2.2, the Church since Constantine and Jewish and Christian Zionists 
more recently have used to promote militarism.180 The image of a warrior 
messiah, who establishes a reign of eternal peace for his followers by crushing 
evil through a violent apocalyptic war, was popular in second temple Judaism. 
The Maccabean and Zealot resistance movements used it as an inspiration for 
their revolutionary violence. Undoubtedly, Jesus shared the revolutionaries’ 
concerns about oppression and injustice but his response was different. Ateek 
emphasises that Jesus built on ideas that already existed in the Jewish prophetic 
tradition. Jesus revealed that God’s nature corresponded to the suffering servant 
strand of messianism that appears in Isaiah’s prophetic texts. Second Isaiah’s 
novel idea was that vicarious suffering for the sake of others and the sacrificial 
offering of oneself for a just cause were paths to liberation.181  
The prophet Daniel adopts the role of the suffering servant. He does not 
resist oppression violently but he doesn’t collaborate, like the Sadducees, either. 
Rather, he trusts God to provide him with the power to stand up for justice non-
violently, even if he has to suffer for it, in his case for the right to retain his Jewish 
identity. Oppression is overcome without violence, as Babylon’s king has to 
                                                
180 See pages 25, 29, 32–33. 
181 Ateek 2008, 93–94, 97–98, 135.  
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admire Daniel’s courage and the greatness of his God.182 The implication of the 
suffering servant strand is that nonviolent methods are more moral and effective 
as responses to injustice than retribution or violence.  
 Adopting the suffering servant strand, Jesus criticised the conception of the 
Davidic warrior messiah on several occasions. The Davidic strand is visible in the 
New Testament because the writers had to show that Jesus fulfilled all of the 
messianic prophecies, including Davidic lineage. The messianic images, however, 
are contradictory and the suffering servant strand is prominent in the New 
Testament and the pre-Constantinian church.183 Rejecting David’s militarism, 
Jesus taught a new way to resist injustice. His way is defined by the following: 
standing against evil without resorting to evil means like the Zealots; rising above 
the world’s ways without abandoning a commitment to work for justice like the 
Essenes and Pharisees; seeking the humanity of the oppressor without losing 
integrity through appeasement or collaboration like the Sadducees. Jesus revealed 
that the primary rule in God’s kingdom is love. God’s unconditional love for 
humanity is the example that Christians must emulate in their pursuit of justice.  
“The inclusive love of neighbour that denies boundaries” directs them to use 
nonviolent methods to transform oppression into justice.184  
Ateek’s emphasis on Jesus as the suffering servant who did not passively 
accept evil but sought to transform it is based on the views of John Yoder. Ateek 
refers to Yoder’s view that Jesus was a political activist who presented a radical 
nonviolent alternative to the violence of the Zealots, the passivity of the Essenes 
as well as the accommodation of the Sadducees.185 Although Ateek refers to 
Yoder, his view of Jesus as the suffering servant also accords with the typical 
Christological emphasis of liberation theology that stresses God’s revelation 
                                                
182 Ateek 2008, 135–136. Ateek’s “Daniel strand” is ethically the same as the suffering servant 
strand, as Daniel suffers for a just cause and does not seek justice through violence. Ateek refers to 
this nonviolent ethic as the ethic of “Daniel and the Suffering Servant.”    
183 Ateek 2008, 98–100. Ateek refers to Jesus’s argument that the messiah must suffer (Mark 8:27-
36, Luke 24:26) and that the messiah is not David’s son (Matt. 22:41-46). The New Testament’s 
vision is that Jesus is the Davidic messiah but he is not the warrior king that was often associated 
with Davidic lineage. Instead, he adopts the mantle of the suffering servant, so the New Testament 
combines two very different messianic views. 
184 Ateek 2008, 96. 
185 Ateek 2008, 202–203 (notes 3–5); Yoder 2010, 86–95. Ateek stresses that Jesus was a radical 
political figure who presented a nonviolent answer to oppression (Ateek 2008, 180). Yoder 
censures views that depict Jesus as an apolitical figure. Jesus criticised the elite for practicing 
unjust politics. He gathered a community that was based on voluntary membership, equality, 
forgiveness and concern for the marginalised. All of this makes Jesus profoundly political, for his 
actions relate to issues of status, power, and wealth.  
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through kenosis, the self-giving suffering love of Christ, in which God identifies 
with the suffering of the oppressed. Liberation theologians stress that the suffering 
servant does not represent a passive Christology of resignation because Jesus 
acted in practice to relieve the suffering of the oppressed and empowered them to 
live in a new relationship with each other, defined by neighbourly love.186  
The suffering servant empowers the oppressed to adopt a way of 
nonviolence. Ateek refers to Jesus’s nonviolent way as the “paradigm of the 
cross.” Christ’s cross and resurrection signify God’s unconditional love for the 
entire world. This love is willing to endure suffering and does not inflict suffering 
on others. The evil oppressive powers condemned Christ to suffer on the cross. 
The resurrection signifies Christ’s victory over them through God’s 
transformative love. In a conflict situation, “This is love that categorically refuses 
to use war and violence in order to crush an enemy.”187 In human relations, this 
love is reflected in the will to seek compromises because its mercy towards all, 
even an enemy, requires that everyone’s concerns be considered. The cross 
paradigm shatters the war paradigms, rejecting even the Sodom paradigm of 
destroying the wicked and saving the innocent. Instead, it “would pursue the 
wicked in order to melt their wickedness and turn them toward justice and 
liberation.”188  
Ateek’s view accords with nonviolent liberation theologians’ emphasis on 
Christus Victor as the foundation of liberation and nonviolence. Liberation 
theology typically proposes that the primary reason for Jesus’s death was not 
God’s will but the oppressive powers that regarded Jesus’s radical message of 
justice and solidarity with the oppressed as a threat. Through the resurrection, God 
vindicated Jesus’s mission and defeated the sinful powers via his transformative 
love that restores right relations and repudiates the violent means of oppressors. 
Although liberation theologians see value in satisfaction and substitution theories 
of atonement, they also criticise them for depicting a passive Jesus who simply 
submits as an innocent victim.189  
                                                
186 Bravo 1996, 106–107, 111, 118; Ellacuría 1996, 276–278.  
187 Ateek 2008, 111. Ateek notes that oppressive powers were responsible for Jesus’s death while 
the resurrection signifies Christ’s victory over the evil powers, as the truth cannot be killed (Ateek 
1997, 101; Ateek 2008, 128, 136).  
188 Ateek 2008, 112.  
189 Kärkkäinen & Levison & Pope-Levison 2008, 179. Ateek also refers to satisfaction atonement 
in his explanation of God’s righteousness that demands a punishment for sin (see page 53 above). 
From the viewpoint of liberation theology, none of the three traditional atonement theories are 
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Ateek does not problematize the relationship between different atonement 
theories and nonviolence but he could ground his nonviolent theology more 
systematically if he did. According to the peace church tradition and nonviolent 
liberation theologians, substitution and satisfaction theories promote a vengeful 
God who approves of violence as a redemptive solution to injustice. God employs 
the same methods as the oppressors and seems to participate in the spiral of 
violence and retribution. Christus Victor, on the other hand, juxtaposes the sin of 
oppression, which enslaves all of humanity in spirals of hatred and violence, with 
God’s game-changing answer to oppression. God breaks the violent power of sin, 
not by destroying the oppressors, but by showing that truth and self-giving love, 
which demand just relations and love for others, can never be overcome by 
violence and oppression. Christus Victor vindicates Jesus’s revelation of a 
nonviolent God who transforms, instead of destroys, injustice. Christus Victor has 
been central to liberation theologies because it offers hope of overcoming 
injustice rather than reproducing it. God suffers in solidarity with the oppressed 
and defeats oppression without resorting to oppressive methods.190 
 Liberationist Christus Victor promotes a nonviolent God who loves all 
humans and is against oppression. For this reason, it is compatible with Jesus’s 
clear teachings on the inclusive love of neighbour and nonviolence. In the Sermon 
on the Mount, Jesus taught a way of nonviolence that empowered the oppressed 
while maintaining love towards the oppressor by respecting his humanity and 
right to life. Ateek interprets the sermon using a liberationist hermeneutic that 
                                                                                                                                 
adequate because they canonize passive suffering and do not speak about the liberating God 
revealed by Jesus. Still, they all contain truths. Substitution atonement underlines that Jesus died 
as a sacrifice for humanity’s sins. It contains the valuable idea of giving our lives for the sake of 
others. Satisfaction atonement stresses that Jesus satisfied God’s legal demand for retribution 
against human offenses. It contains the idea that we all have a responsibility to do justice to our 
fellow men. The traditional Christus Victor theory proposes that God gave Jesus as a ransom 
payment to the Devil for humanity. It underlines that liberation and life often require a price and 
Jesus offered his life in order to free us from slavery to oppressive sin. The liberationist and peace 
church interpretations of Christus Victor discard the idea of ransom and instead contrast Jesus’s 
death as the worst that oppression can do with the resurrection as God’s confirmation of Jesus’s 
nonviolent message of justice and love, which transforms oppression into restored relationship. 
(Bravo 1996, 119–121; Ellacuría 1996, 271–275). E.g. J. Denny Weaver represents the 
interpretation of the peace church tradition (see Weaver 2001, 164–169).  
190 Eddy & Beilby 2008, 86, 90; Weaver 2001, 152–163, 169; Wink 1992, 140–142, 149–150. 
Weaver explains that black liberation theology has connected satisfaction and substitution 
atonement with justifications of the slave-master relationship and colonialism. This is because they 
link violence with redemption and liberation so that, even at the divine level, doing justice requires 
violent retribution. Weaver stresses that satisfaction separates salvation from ethics, allowing 
Christians to claim Christ’s salvific work and simultaneously wield violence in the name of 
justice. Thus, satisfaction and substitution don’t challenge but accommodate the violent practices 
of society. 
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encourages the faithful to resist injustice rather than submit passively to it. His 
interpretation is directly based on North American liberation theologian Walter 
Wink’s understanding of Jesus’s teaching and accords with the views of 
nonviolent Latin American liberation theologians Adolfo Esquivel and Oscar 
Romero, who also underline the sermon as a call to nonviolent resistance. First, 
Jesus exhorted turning the other cheek (Matt. 5:39) to a strike that intended to 
insult and humiliate. Turning the cheek is an act of defiance, rejecting the power 
of the oppressor by conveying that the first strike failed to achieve its intended 
effect. It presents the oppressor with two options: either escalate the violence with 
another strike or back down. The victim does not threaten the striker with 
violence.191  
Jesus exhorted the oppressed to resist the inhumane justice system that 
sanctioned extortion. He instructs the victim to give his inner garment to the 
oppressive creditor in court (Matt. 5:40), which exposes the cruelty of the creditor 
and the system. Stripping down naked was considered shameful, so it would have 
been a defiant act. It may have opened the eyes of the creditor to the cruelty of his 
demands. Refusing to be awed by unjust powers and ridiculing their pretensions 
to justice are ways for the oppressed to seize the initiative. Jesus also instructed 
the oppressed to resist the unjust laws of the Roman occupation. He taught them 
to go the second mile (Matt. 5:41), which is a reference to Roman military law 
that allowed a soldier to press a civilian to carry his baggage for one mile. 
Expecting hostile submission, the solider is surprised by the civilian who follows 
Jesus’s counsel to go a second mile. The soldier finds himself in an awkward 
position because the civilian is actually making him break the rules by going 
further than the law permits. Jesus teaches the oppressed not to resist evildoers 
(Matt. 5:39) but this is not an exhortation to passivity. In the original Greek, it 
should be read as a command to refrain from violent resistance, highlighting that 
Jesus’s disciples should find nonviolent means to challenge oppressive power.192 
                                                
191 Ateek 2008, 136–137; Wink 1992, 176. See Dear 2013 (no page numbers available) for 
Romero’s and Esquivel’s affirmation of Jesus’s sermon as a call to active nonviolence.  
192 Ateek 2008, 137; Wink 1992, 179–183, 185–186. Jesus’s way was not passive but an 
aggressive, though nonviolent, challenge to oppression. He was not afraid to criticise the injustices 
of the powerful. He demanded that they explain their actions, but they had no adequate answers, 
which exposed their injustice. For example, when struck by a guard (John 18:19-24), Jesus did not 
submit but demanded the reason and condemned it when it was evident that the strike was unjust 
(Wink 1992, 228).  
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According to Ateek, reflecting on Jesus’s teachings and the meaning of 
Christ’s cross should lead Palestinian Christians to adopt Jesus’s way as their 
“personal paradigm of nonviolent resistance”.193 Ateek stresses that Christians 
should view violence as a crime against the neighbour. The perpetrator of 
violence loses his ability to love the victim, or to see him as a human with God-
given value and rights like himself. The victim loses his ability to love the 
perpetrator, as he seeks revenge and distrusts the perpetrator. Thus, violence 
severs any connection to those whom one commits violence against, preventing 
love and just relations. Ateek underlines the connection between means and ends. 
Injustice and evil cannot be overcome with injustice and evil, as the 
aforementioned Christus Victor atonement also stresses. A violent response does 
nothing to rectify injustice and does not help in establishing right relations.194 It is 
incompatible with the demand of righteousness, which requires showing mercy to 
enemies in order to break the cycle of violence and open the way to creating a just 
relationship.  
Ateek writes that Christians must transform oppression by overcoming evil 
with good (Rom. 12:19-21). To inflict suffering is to surrender to the injustice 
because it only perpetuates the cycle of hatred and violence.195 Palestinian 
Christians should be ready to witness to God’s love for both Israelis and 
Palestinians even if it results in their suffering and death. Palestinian suicide 
bombers pray the vengeful prayer of Samson, which demonizes and excludes the 
oppressor. However, Palestinian Christians must relate to Christ’s prayer on the 
cross, asking God to forgive persecutors. Ateek writes:  
It is not through acts of violence and revenge that we can achieve the justice we seek, but in 
the work of nonviolent resistance and in the spirit of sacrificial love that was exemplified 
by Jesus Christ himself.196  
 
 Ateek’s view on the Christian responsibility to adopt a personal paradigm of 
nonviolence echoes the views of nonviolent liberation theologians and the peace 
church tradition. Like Ateek, they all stress that nonviolent resistance maintains 
                                                
193 Ateek 2008, 137. 
194 Ateek 2008, 124–125, 182. Ateek underlines what he calls the “Gandhian” view that means 
must be compatible with the goal. Nonviolence opens the way to justice, peace, and a nonviolent 
society. Violence only causes bitterness in the opponent and reinforces violent habits.  
195 Ateek 2008, 125–126. 
196 Ateek 2008, 129. Ateek writes that following Jesus’s example requires Palestinian Christians to 
reject “any use of violence and terror whether perpetrated by the government or militant groups.” 
Instead, they must witness to the “prophetic vision of a world without violence,” as in Isa. 2:4 and 
Mic. 4:3-4. (Ateek 2008, 128) 
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the connection between means and ends. Nonviolence is an expression of love for 
the enemy because it respects his worth as a human and maintains the hope of 
establishing right relations and attaining reconciliation with him. As a response to 
oppression, nonviolence contains the seeds of justice in it, for it upholds the most 
basic demand of justice, which is respect for another’s life. A nonviolent response 
upholds the hope of transforming the oppressive system rather than replacing it 
with the victor’s system that is likely to be at least as oppressive.197   
The goal of transforming the oppressive system highlights mutuality as a 
requirement for right relations and reconciliation. Mutuality entails retaining the 
humanity of the opponent in one’s consciousness, sharing power, and recognizing 
the opponent’s hopes. Nonviolence and mutuality repudiate the exclusive zero-
sum logic of violence because they accept the existence of the other side and 
search for a solution that satisfies both sides.198  
 Responding to oppression violently means “becoming what we hate”. It is a 
reaction on terms of the oppressor and follows the logic of mimesis in which 
belligerents soon mirror each other. The victims of violence justify their own 
violence by projecting their suffering on others. The weakness of violence is that 
it begets what it seeks to destroy, creating a never-ending spiral. By contrast, 
nonviolence attempts to rise above the hatred. Following Christ’s example, it 
seeks to awaken God in the opponent’s soul, trusting that the opponent longs to be 
just if it weren’t for hatred and fear. Nonviolent methods seek to alleviate fear and 
open the opponent’s eyes to the necessity of justice.199  
 The idea that nonviolence will overcome evil with good by converting the 
oppressor to realize the error of his ways and agree with the resisters’ cause, 
thereby opening the door to reconciliation, is very idealistic. Nonviolent resistance 
rarely results in the conversion of the opponent. More often, the opponent is 
willing to accommodate the demands of the resistance out of self-interest, for the 
resistance has weakened his power base. Nonviolence doesn’t necessarily lead to 
                                                
197 Camara 1971, 54–58, 82; Dear 2013; Gutiérrez 1977, 275–276; Wink 1992, 267–269, 276–278. 
Yoder refers to the Latin American Bishops’ Conference in Colombia in 1977, which established 
nonviolence as the path to liberation. The bishops stressed that liberation is possible only if the 
values that are sought for are implanted in the process itself (Yoder 2010, 142–145). Yoder 
perceives a strong connection between the nonviolent theology of the peace churches and 
liberation theology, arguing that pacifists ought to be liberationists (Yoder 2009, 388, 390). See 
page 22 above for the argument that violence is incompatible with the goal of liberation.  
198 Barak 2003, 275–276, 280, 290. Gene Sharp affirms that the process of nonviolent resistance 
produces structures of cooperation, which are useful after the conflict for establishing more 
democratic societies (Sharp 2005, 427–429). 
199 Ateek 2008, 125–126; Wink 1992, 195–202, 276.  
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profound trust, apologies, forgiveness, and reciprocal promotion of each other’s 
good, which constitute reconciliation. Still, a nonviolent struggle provides a 
stronger foundation for pursuing just relations, as well as the more demanding 
goal of reconciliation, because it respects crucial values of life and dignity even in 
the middle of the confrontation.200 
Critics of nonviolence doubt its applicability in contexts where the opposing 
regime has no respect at all for human rights or where the resisters are weak. 
Although Wink and Sharp show that nonviolent resistance has in fact succeeded 
even against totalitarian regimes, it is true that successful nonviolent resistance 
requires organization, perseverance, strategic planning, and resources.201 Even if 
nonviolence were not effective, some liberation theologians, like Helder Camara, 
uphold nonviolence in principle as the only acceptable response for Christians 
who have an obligation to emulate Christ’s sacrificial love.202  
 Based on the discussion above, it is clear that Ateek also upholds 
nonviolence in principle as the only path that Christians may follow. However, he 
is not a vocational pacifist like some in the peace churches who argue that 
nonviolence is a specifically Christian calling and do not expect the sinful world 
to accept it. Like other nonviolent liberation theologians, Ateek stresses that 
nonviolent resistance is an effective and moral means for the oppressed in general. 
He argues that Palestinian Christians, inspired by the paradigm of the cross, 
should be an example to the rest of the Palestinian community in the practice of 
nonviolent resistance. Unlike many in the peace churches, Ateek and other 
nonviolent liberation theologians do not advocate non-resistance. Non-resistance 
is based on absolute pacifism in principle and argues that Jesus repudiated any 
form of resistance, even the use of nonviolent power.203  
By contrast, Ateek and other nonviolent liberation theologians are interested 
in the pragmatism of nonviolence, which takes them closer to the broad 
nonviolent resistance movement.204 Nonviolent resistance does not have to be 
                                                
200 Koontz 2008, 234–235; Sharp 2007, 21–22.  
201 Sharp 2007, 11–15, 27–31; Wink 1992, 253–255. 
202 Camara 1971, 82; Yoder 2009, 388.  
203 For non-resistance and vocational pacifism in the peace church tradition, see Koontz 2008, 233, 
244–245, 248–249, 255–256 and Yoder 2009, 292–295, 297, 358. For example, the Amish 
advocate non-resistance. 
204 Ateek not only focuses on the morality but also on the practicality of nonviolence. Palestinians 
cannot overcome the much more powerful Israelis through violence. Nonviolence provides tactical 
advantages in the struggle for peace and is the only viable way for the oppressed to resist (see 
pages 83–88 on the application of nonviolence). See also Camara’s view that “violence of the 
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grounded in Christian theology and its primary argument is that nonviolence is a 
more effective method of struggle than violence because it protects crucial values, 
gains the support of third parties by occupying the moral high ground, and is less 
costly. Its active pursuit of liberation or justice and its focus on pragmatism 
clearly distinguish it from non-resistant pacifism. However, it must be noted that 
pacifism, defined as the principled advocacy of nonviolence, is a general term that 
encompasses non-resistance and more active forms of pacifism. It is possible to be 
a principled pacifist, grounded in Christian moral requirements, and advocate 
pragmatic nonviolent resistance. This is the position of Ateek and other 
nonviolent liberation theologians who have been cited in this investigation.205   
However, grounding nonviolent resistance in theological moral arguments 
has been criticised especially by Reinhold Niebuhr. As we established in the 
critical task, Ateek agrees with Niebuhr’s basic premise that sinful humans use 
power to pursue selfish interests.206 In Niebuhr’s view, Jesus’s Sermon on the 
Mount is a model of moral perfection that condemns sin and was never meant as 
an ethical rule for flawed human societies. He emphasises that pacifists who 
understand Jesus’s ethic as a personal ethic of non-resistance, requiring 
withdrawal from politics, are correct. According to Niebuhr, the idea that 
nonviolent resistance is compatible with Jesus’s ethic, based on perfect self-giving 
love, is flawed. The sinless Jesus repudiated the use of power for selfish motives 
or for harming others. Nonviolent resistance, however, is simply one way for a 
group of people to pursue their own political objectives. Protests, nonviolent 
interventions, and non-cooperation coerce the opponent to make concessions and 
do not necessarily help in overcoming enmity or hatred. They do not cause bodily 
harm to the opponent but they do undermine his political, social, cultural, and 
                                                                                                                                 
peaceful” or “liberating moral pressure” is the way to struggle for peace in practice (Camara 1971, 
54–57). Yoder stresses the tactical benefits of nonviolence even though he argues that nonviolence 
must be grounded in Christ in order to ensure commitment to it even when nonviolent resistance 
fails to overcome oppression (Yoder 2010, 46–48).  
205 The nonviolent liberation theologians that have been cited include Helder Camara, Adolfo 
Esquivel, Oscar Romero, Gustavo Gutiérrez, and Walter Wink. Theodore Koontz presents three 
categories of nonviolence. In addition to pacifism, which grounds nonviolence morally, and 
nonviolent resistance, which focuses on pragmatism, nonviolence includes abolitionism, which 
advocates abolishing the evil of war. Abolitionism envisions a grand global transformation in 
which international institutions resolve conflicts peacefully. The liberal protestant pacifists of the 
early 1900s were abolitionists. These categories are not rigid and thinkers have combined elements 
from each. (Koontz 2008, 233–235, 247) Even Ateek briefly expresses the abolitionist hope that 
the spirit of nonviolent love could penetrate international institutions so that war would become 
obsolete, as conflicts would be resolved non-violently (Ateek 2008, 112).  
206 See pages 10–11. 
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economic capital. Thus, in Niebuhr’s view nonviolent resistance is sinful and 
incompatible with Jesus’s way like any other application of power.207  
 Ateek could follow Yoder’s response to Niebuhr’s criticism. Yoder points 
out that all applications of power are not the same. When power is used to 
struggle against oppression and for just relations, its goal is not wholly selfish 
because it seeks to include the opponent in accordance with inclusive neighbourly 
love that extends to enemies. Power has to be applied in a way that is compatible 
with the goal of justice. Nonviolent resistance should never be used for an 
oppressive goal because then it would turn into a form of violence. Its goal should 
always be to restore just relations.208  
In practice, successful nonviolent resistance requires broad support and 
commitment, which entails that its goal is perceived as moral and just by a wide 
audience, including third parties.209 By respecting the opponent’s life, nonviolent 
resistance upholds the hope of creating a right relationship and breaks the 
retributive spiral of violence. Violence precludes the possibility of creating a just 
relationship since it destroys the opponent and intensifies the spiral. Thus, 
nonviolent resistance is more compatible with God’s righteous love that seeks to 
restore relations. Addressing injustice requires the application of power because 
the oppressors believe that the status quo serves them better than any alternative. 
Nonviolent resistance shows them that the status quo is untenable and that a more 
just solution has to be found. This is not incompatible with God’s righteousness, 
for Jesus also condemned oppression and exhorted oppressors to change their 
ways in order to create a right relationship that reflects neighbourly love.  
                                                
207 See Yoder 2009, 292–297 for an overview of Niebuhr’s criticism of nonviolence. See Niebuhr 
1955, 172, 240–252. Niebuhr still endorsed nonviolent resistance as an effective way to pursue 
justice, especially for groups facing more powerful opponents. Niebuhr agrees that nonviolent 
resistance does not cause as much resentment as violence does and that it may improve chances for 
peace. However, it is not applicable to all situations and it cannot be sacralised with Jesus’s ethic 
of selfless love. Nonviolent resistance is a method in power struggles, which always involve 
selfish interests and are never outside sin.  
208 Yoder 2009, 358. Wink also affirms that nonviolent coercion is not violent if its goal is to 
liberate both oppressed and oppressor in order to restore the humanity of both (Wink 1992, 128). 
Of course, Christian advocates of nonviolent resistance do not share Niebuhr’s basic premise that 
Jesus’s ethic is an individual, apolitical, and apocalyptic ethic concerned with personal relations 
and imminent salvation. As we have seen, Ateek shares other liberation theologians’ and Yoder’s 
view that Jesus’s ethic is profoundly political because it aims to transform communities and people 
in practice (see pages 65–66). 
209 Sharp 2005, 44, 367, 380–381, 384, 390; Sharp 2007, 18–20. In sum, Sharp argues that 
nonviolent resistance requires a broad support base and cause consciousness among the people 
who must be willing to commit to nonviolence even in the face of violent repression. If the cause 
is not widely perceived as just, it is unlikely that the resisters will persevere, that third parties will 
provide support, or that an internal opposition will develop in the opponent’s ranks.  
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The Problem of Inclusion and Exclusion 
We have established that, in Ateek’s view, God’s inclusive love, revealed in 
Christ and the prophetic tradition that points to Christ, requires the faithful to 
respect others rights so that they can contribute to the realisation of just relations, 
and to pursue justice through nonviolence. Through Christ, God’s love extends 
inclusively to all of humanity, so God is concerned about justice everywhere. 
However, Ateek does not consider the danger of exclusivism in his Christocentric 
view even though exclusivism is precisely what he criticises Zionism for and 
hopes to overcome.   
By reading the Old Testament through Christ, Ateek risks delegitimizing 
Jewish claims. He universalizes the land promise and suggests that Jews do not 
have a special right to the land, which undermines Jewish claims to uniqueness. 
He criticises the Jewish claim to election but does not problematize the claims to 
uniqueness and universal superiority that are inherent in his Christocentric 
view.210 This may give the impression that Christian claims to uniqueness are fine 
and do not contain ethical problems, while Jewish claims to uniqueness are 
problematic and exclusive.   
Ateek’s promotion of Christ’s revelation as complete and objective leads 
him to ignore the ambiguity of the New Testament. He does not apply the same 
critical approach to the New Testament as he does to the Old Testament.211 He 
primarily ignores violent and exclusive passages in the New Testament. When he 
does address them, he allegorizes them so that they accord with his interpretation 
of Christ as loving and nonviolent.212 This is precisely what he refuses to do with 
the Old Testament because it is important to expose violent and oppressive texts. 
Also, the relationship between Christ and international law remains unclear. Ateek 
promotes human rights as a universal standard of justice because of the ambiguity 
of religions.213 However, because he argues that Christ provides unambiguous and 
objective knowledge about God, it follows that Christian views must be consistent 
                                                
210 Ateek underlines the Jewish claim to uniqueness as a problem: “Many religious Jews continue 
to see themselves in a special relationship with God: they are God’s chosen people, God belongs 
to them alone, and the entire land of Palestine is their eternal patrimony from God.” (Ateek 2008, 
75–76) 
211 See pages 36–37 for Ateek’s critical approach to the Old Testament.  
212 For example, Ateek allegorizes Revelation 19:15 so that Christ fights with the word and not an 
actual sword. Ateek stresses that Zionists have incorrectly interpreted Revelation to promote a 
militaristic view of the returning Christ. In his view, Revelation should be understood as a story 
about terror defeated, not terror inflicted. (Ateek 2008, 101–102)  
213 See pages 48, 55.  
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with the demands of human rights which reflect God’s justice. Only other 
religions, including Judaism, need to ensure the validity of their principles by 
comparing them to human rights because other religions do not possess complete 
knowledge about God.  
Instead of asserting that Christ absolutely reveals God as loving, just, and 
merciful, Ateek could problematize the exclusivity of Christ. He could note the 
fact that the gospels contain several portrayals of Jesus, and he could assess the 
liberationist value of each in the same way that he assesses texts of the Old 
Testament. He could note the work of postcolonial theologians who have focused 
on the gospels as colonizing texts. For example, African theologian Musa Dube 
argues that John’s story about Jesus’s encounter with the Samaritan woman (John 
4:1-42) depicts the Samaritans as passive natives who lack the knowledge and 
morality of the superior Jesus travelling through their land. Jesus suppresses 
particularity through an absolute universalism when he declares that Gerizim and 
Jerusalem will be replaced by the spirit and truth of Christ.214  
The New Testament contains plenty of material that demonizes Jews, 
condemns those who do not accept Christ, and affirms that salvation comes only 
through Christ. The same cosmic dualism visible in the Old Testament is present 
in the New Testament, for example righteous followers of Christ will be separated 
from the evil ones at judgment (Matt. 13:36-43) and the returning Christ wages a 
war against evil nations (Rev. 19). There is a similar antithesis between God’s 
chosen, those in Christ, and sinful others who are represented by Jews in 
particular. Despite his mercy, God in the New Testament is ambiguous because he 
also appears to validate retribution and the cycle of violence.215  
Ateek’s approach to the New Testament differs from postcolonial theology 
and other critical views. In Ateek’s context, the Palestinian Christians are the 
colonized victims of Zionism. We have seen that Ateek interprets Jesus’s 
encounter with the Samaritan woman as a story that reveals God’s love towards 
all people, not only Jews, and promotes the importance of people and morality 
over the sacralisation of territory.216 So, Ateek feels that a liberationist 
                                                
214 Dube 2006, 307–310; Segovia 2012, 72, 74. 
215 Collins 2004, 21–23. Ronald Miller stresses that from a Jewish perspective the gospels are anti-
Semitic because they depict Jews as evil, e.g. Matt. 27:25, John 8:44 (Miller 2008, 180–182). S. 
Wesley Ariarajah notes the exclusivity of passages that limit salvation to Christians, e.g. Acts 4:12 
(Ariarajah 2006, 364). See also page 67 above for the violence of atonement.  
216 See page 62. 
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Christocentric answer is the way for Christians to affirm themselves against 
colonial religious Zionism. 
The point of the above discussion is to show that a Christocentric view is 
not unambiguously consistent with tolerance, peace, and love towards outsiders. 
Ateek can maintain his confessional Christocentric view without promoting 
exclusion in practice. However, it is not the only option. Instead, Ateek could 
acknowledge the plurality of the New Testament and the fact that its meaning is 
open to debate. He could problematize the exclusivity of Christocentric views. 
Promoting Christ as the ultimate revelation inevitably results in new boundaries 
because it suggests that other faiths are inferior. If the goal of God’s inclusive 
love is to create one humanity in Christ, as Ateek affirms, then God appears to be 
delegitimizing particularity.217 From a non-Christian viewpoint, this is 
disrespectful because other faiths are subsumed under Christ. The voices of other 
faiths are suppressed if they do not accord with Christ’s revelation. 
Conceding that Christian texts and Christocentric views are ambiguous 
would result in a more equal attitude towards Judaism and other religions. 
Acknowledging the problem of Christian exclusivism would serve Ateek’s goal of 
promoting reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. This is because, 
instead of criticising Judaism and idealizing Christianity, he would admit the 
exclusivity in his own faith tradition as well. He could concede that assessing the 
Old Testament in light of the New Testament is problematic because it violates 
Jewish rights and because the ambiguous New Testament is not an objective 
criterion. All in all, this would promote a fairer relationship with Judaism since 
Ateek would not assert Christ’s absolute superiority. Of course, it would require 
Ateek to revise his high view of the New Testament and his Christocentric focus. 
 However, Ateek would argue that his Christocentric view does not lead to 
excluding others in practice but instead promotes just relations. Excluding others 
in practice amounts to violating their rights. Exclusive beliefs about the 
transcendent do not necessarily lead to exclusive morality in practice. On the 
contrary, strong universal moral themes like God’s care for all, respect for 
                                                
217 Ateek stresses that God’s purpose is to redeem the world through Christ and create one 
humanity in Christ (Ateek 2008, 61–62). Christian inclusivists (Cheetham 2008) have argued that 
other faiths provide authentic knowledge about God but Christ’s revelation is ultimate. They argue 
that they do not disrespect other faiths but seek to affirm those elements that are compatible with 
Christ, e.g. the golden rule. Christ’s redemptive work extends to the entire world and perfects the 
incomplete knowledge of non-Christians even if they do not know Christ. Still, from a non-
Christian perspective, Christianity claims superiority. 
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diversity, and tolerance can accompany exclusive beliefs.218 It all depends on how 
the believers interpret the unique revelation that they possess. They may feel that 
God has especially revealed to them that they must love others. So, confessional 
Christians may uphold the exclusive view that salvation comes through Christ 
alone but at the same time they can maintain that one’s possession of salvation in 
Christ is reflected in concrete acts of neighbourly love, which requires respecting 
others and promoting their welfare. They haven’t been called to forcibly convert 
anyone but to witness to God’s love.  
Ateek does not expect Jews to accept his Christocentric view.219 Both Jews 
and Christians, and everyone else, have a right to their own beliefs. We should 
note that Ateek rejects the evangelical objective of actively converting others to 
Christianity.220 He stresses that witnessing to God’s love entails respect for others 
and their different beliefs. Ateek’s position is best described as particularism. 
Particularism upholds the uniqueness of each faith and stresses that faiths are 
incompatible.221 Different beliefs, for example about the exact nature of God or 
salvation, cannot and do not need to be reconciled. This does not mean that 
particularists reject the idea that religions can agree on issues. Religions should 
pursue dialogue with each other in order to find common ground on issues that are 
important in the context in which they interact with each other. In the previous 
sections, we established that in Ateek’s view religions should agree on a minimal 
standard of justice. Also, we noted that in his view the Abrahamic faiths in Israel-
Palestine should cooperate to affirm each others’ beliefs that promote respect and 
tolerance for outsiders. Together, they can define the basic requirements of justice 
in Israel-Palestine. They can all agree that God is loving and merciful and that the 
faithful honour God by showing compassion towards fellow humans.222 
Based on the discussion above, we can argue that Ateek affirms doctrinal 
particularity. There is no need for formal doctrinal agreement between faiths. 
Unique, exclusive doctrines and language are a necessary part of faith. Only they 
                                                
218 Daniel Strange emphasises the potentially universal ethical themes in exclusivism (Strange 
2008, 38).  
219 See page 59.  
220 Ateek 2012c, 2.  
221 Hedges 2008, 113, 119.  
222 See pages 48–51 and 59–60 above. Paul Hedges affirms that religions can agree on ethical 
issues in particular contexts. This happens when they pursue a radically open dialogue that does 
not over-emphasise unity or difference but instead speaks openly to the other in order to determine 
what is right in that specific context. (Hedges 2010, 268) 
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can inspire and give meaning to members of that faith.223 For example, Christian 
nonviolence is based on the specifically Christian view that Christ inspires 
Christians to nonviolence through his revelation of God’s love that extends to all 
of humanity. It cannot be separated from the totality of God’s love in Christ, 
which offers salvation in Christ to all people.224Ateek agrees with this view. The 
purpose of his Christocentric focus is to empower his Christian audience to pursue 
justice through nonviolence.225 Christians must love and promote the well-being 
of others, regardless of their background, because love has no boundaries in 
Christ. Judaism and other faiths use their own unique beliefs and language to 
inspire their followers to respect others. Confessional claims are only valid for the 
particular faith. They should be used to inspire believers in their faith but never to 
oppress outsiders. If one uses them to delegitimise others, then one violates 
others’ experience and the central moral principles of one’s own faith, which 
exhort love towards outsiders.226   
 The particularistic position, which Ateek implicitly endorses, proposes that 
doctrinal differences and tensions do not need to be resolved. Instead, each faith 
must inspire its followers to witness to God’s love in practice so that respectful 
coexistence is possible. Each faith understands God’s love in a unique way but 
they can all agree that God’s love is inclusive. By inclusivity Ateek means that we 
should not only love members of our own community. We have an obligation to 
love all humans because God loves all humans. Thus, we should practice the 
golden rule, which requires that we respect others’ basic rights and promote 
others’ good, in an inclusive way. Promoting another’s good means that we take 
into consideration his hopes and goals and do not impose our own views on him. 
It entails searching for mutually beneficial solutions in dialogue with the other. In 
Israel-Palestine, this means that the Abrahamic faiths should endeavour to 
promote human rights and equal citizenship through their common heritage that 
allows them to agree on basic issues concerning God, election, and the land. 
Ateek expresses a Christian perspective on these issues, which underlines the 
                                                
223 Ariarajah 2006, 366.  
224 Hauerwas 2000, 98. One of Hauerwas’s points is that the Christian argument for nonviolence is 
a particularly Christian one. It cannot be watered down or reduced to a universal argument.  
225 See page 69. 
226 Ariarajah 2006, 366. 
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obligation to love others and work for justice, and also affirms Jewish views that 
emphasise justice.227 
 
3.2 A Vision of Peace 
Transformation of Attitudes  
Having considered the religious beliefs that promote just relations – beliefs about 
God, election, the land, and nonviolence, all underpinned by Christ and the 
prophetic tradition – we must now consider the practical implications of these 
beliefs. In Ateek’s view these beliefs, in contrast to exclusive Zionist views, 
empower the faithful to work for a just peace. The beliefs should, first of all, set in 
motion a process in which attitudes are transformed.  
If the faithful truly internalise the fact that God loves all people, which 
entails respect for others, it should lead them to reject the demonization of the 
other. Instead, they should desire to understand each other. Understanding the 
other requires, above all, acknowledging his fears and hurts. For Palestinians, it 
means respecting the legitimate trauma and concern that Jews have over the 
holocaust and over anti-Semitism. This is significant, because many Palestinians 
have refused to accept the uniqueness of Jewish suffering, stressing instead their 
own suffering at the hands of Israel. However, everyone’s suffering deserves to be 
recognized. The premise of creating a Jewish homeland as an answer to Jewish 
suffering is acceptable even though the implementation was unjust and 
imperialistic. Israel must exist as a safe haven for Jews. Dismantling it now would 
amount to a horrendous injustice against millions of Jews who call it home. In 
turn, Israeli Jews should acknowledge and apologise for the hurt and distress that 
Palestinians experience as a result of Israel’s oppression. They should give 
Palestinians the recognition they desire and deserve, as people who have a right to 
live in the land alongside Jews.228 
                                                
227 See pages 59–60.  
228 Ateek 1989, 168–171. Ateek’s point about the need for new attitudes highlights the fact that in 
a conflict it is typical for each side to regard itself as the victim. Especially in protracted conflicts 
opposing sides typically demonize each other, depicting the other as uncompromising and 
aggressive (see page 42 above). In order to overcome the cycle of demonization, and therefore 
move closer to breaking the spiral of violence, it is imperative that both sides admit that they are 
aggressors and victims. They should acknowledge each other’s suffering and the fact that both 
have legitimate concerns, even if their narratives of the conflict cannot be completely reconciled. 
Both must also acknowledge their own role in causing the violence. For more on the need of 
Israelis and Palestinians to acknowledge each other and develop self-critical views, as a way to 
build peace, see for example Munayer & Loden 2013, 26–36.   
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Internalising God’s inclusive love should lead especially Palestinian 
Christians to emulate the Good Samaritan. The parable portrays three life 
philosophies of which only one is compatible with God’s inclusive love. The 
thieves narrowly pursue their own interests at the expense of others. The Priest 
and Levite also possess an exclusive outlook, ignoring the plight of the victim. 
The Samaritan, however, practices the inclusive love of neighbour because he is 
willing to help the victim regardless of the victim’s background: “A fellow human 
being is there to whom love and acceptance must be extended.”229 For too long, 
Israelis and Palestinians have competed for the place of the victim and demonized 
the other as the robber, or as the negligent Priest-Levite. It is time for them to 
compete for the Samaritan’s place because only such a change in mentality “will 
ensure healing and life.”230 
Ateek’s point about competing for the Samaritan’s place underlines the need 
for a self-critical, empathic understanding of the other. Instead of adopting the 
role of the victim and demonizing the other side, one should perceive the human 
in the other and the multiple roles that both sides possess. Both sides are not only 
robbers and Priest-Levites but also victims who need recognition. The Good 
Samaritan symbolizes the inclusive love of God, which respects the other’s 
identity and promotes his good. As an outsider, who is not expected to help, the 
Samaritan nonetheless breaks the boundaries of identity and decides to help, 
reaching out to a fellow human being. His assistance is wholly determined by the 
victim’s needs. He does not try to convert the victim or impose on him. Similarly, 
Palestinians and Israelis should turn their exclusive attitude into an inclusive one 
that sincerely promotes the other’s good.  
 Ateek implies that interpreting the Bible in light of Christ and the prophetic 
tradition will lead to a concrete transformation in attitudes and thereby contribute 
to social change, a just peace, in practice.231 This is a common view in liberation 
theology, which stresses the practical liberating potential in biblical texts and 
interpretations. However, Hans de Wit points out that it is unclear how the Bible 
is connected to social change because the environment of course influences one’s 
interpretation of the Bible.232 Many factors influence the formation of religious 
                                                
229 Ateek 1997, 103 
230 Ateek 1997, 103.   
231 Ateek stresses that a “new knowledge of God,” drawn from the Bible, underpins the concrete 
struggle for peace, which the Church must undertake (Ateek 1989, 153, 155–156).   
232 De Wit 2009, 45–47. 
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beliefs. The contents of religious traditions are only one factor that cannot be 
separated from other factors.233   
Just as we cannot assume that the contents of religious traditions are 
primary causes of violence, we cannot assume that they alone can transform 
exclusive attitudes into inclusive ones. Believers will always interpret the contents 
in relation to their life circumstances. Also, even if believers accepted Ateek’s 
interpretation as correct in principle, it may still not lead to a change in behaviour 
in practice. The challenge in liberation theology, also in Ateek’s view, is that it 
suggests that a liberationist interpretation is the only correct interpretation. The 
liberationist value of biblical texts needs only to be drawn out through 
engagement with the oppressive context. When it is drawn out, it can then 
transform lives in spite of all of the other factors that influence one’s behaviour 
and one’s interpretation of the Bible in the first place. 
However, we must remember that liberation theology has a high view of the 
Bible as God’s living word. God’s grace, revealed in Christ and conveyed by his 
Spirit, enables the oppressed to discern and put into practice the liberationist 
message of the Bible. Grace is not an absolution of sin without the promise of 
freedom from sin. Instead, grace is the concrete effect of God’s love on human 
life, which enables the oppressed to follow the example set by Jesus in the 
gospels. Grace awakens the oppressed and empowers them to struggle for 
liberation from sinful enslaving structures. The presence of sin is persistent but 
through grace, which reflects humanity’s future fulfilment, sin is gradually 
overcome.234 Although Ateek does not expound on the meaning of God’s grace, 
he agrees with this view. Ateek implies that through Christ, the loving God 
regenerates and renews the faithful so that they are able to work for justice. The 
Holy Spirit empowers Christians to discern the meaning of God’s inclusive love 
in Christ and to live it in practice.235 Thus, Ateek suggests that God empowers the 
transformation of attitudes.  
                                                
233 See pages 44–46. 
234 For the practical transformative power of the Spirit and Grace in liberation theology, see 
Comblin 1996a, 146, 155; Comblin 1996b, 206–207, 210–212. 
235 The Spirit guides Christians to know the “mind of Christ” (Ateek 1989, 82). The power of the 
Cross and the Spirit empower the Church to act for justice and peace (Ateek 1989, 161). Ateek 
notes the “regenerative” power of Christ (Ateek 2008, 101), stresses that “Our faith motivates and 
drives us to act justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God” (Ateek 2008, 128), and notes that 
Christians possess a “new nature in Christ” which enables them to be agents of peace in the world 
(Ateek 1989, 150).  
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 Ateek uses Niebuhr’s idea of competing selfish interests to explain the 
abuse of power.236 Niebuhr expresses a pessimistic view of sin as a persistent evil 
that cannot be overcome in this age. Sin prevents any profound transformation of 
attitudes in humans who are all bound to pursue their selfish interests. This is why 
the abuse of power cannot be entirely eliminated even though it can be controlled 
through counteracting powers that represent competing interests. Although Ateek 
explains the abuse of power with reference to Niebuhr’s ideas, it is evident that he 
does not share Niebuhr’s pessimistic view on sin. Based on the discussion above it 
is clear that, for Ateek, God renews humans and empowers them to struggle 
against sin, so transformation is possible. By contrast, Niebuhr emphasised God’s 
grace as absolution and not as a transforming power. Humans simply have to live 
with sin and do the best they can, but they should not expect utopian 
improvements. They will not overcome sin by developing better social structures 
and institutions or by becoming more educated.237  
So, even though Ateek refers to Niebuhr’s view on selfish interests, he also 
affirms that with God’s help transformation is possible, which is in line with 
liberation theology. Sobrino explains that unjust social structures, which allow the 
concentration of power, are not only products of sin but also cause sin. God 
empowers people to construct good social structures that serve life and draw out 
the best in humans. History and experience also reveal that humans are capable of 
promoting each other’s good.238   
  
Nonviolence Applied 
Ateek’s theological basis for nonviolence is anchored in Christ’s example, which 
reveals nonviolence as a way to resist oppression without oppressive means in 
order to enable the restoration of a right relationship.239 Palestinian Christians 
have a unique role in setting a model for nonviolent resistance because, unlike 
Islam and Judaism, which have both suffered blows to their credibility due to their 
                                                
236 See pages 10–11. 
237 Niebuhr 1955, 42, 70. For an assessment of Niebuhr’s perspective on sin, social transformation 
and grace, see Rasmussen 2007, 373, 376–377 and Yoder 2009, 288–290.   
238 Sobrino 2012, 196–197. See also Comblin 1996b, 210–211 and Magana 1996, 185–187 for the 
idea that transforming evil structures, with God’s help, constitutes liberation and freedom from sin 
(even though full freedom from sin cannot be attained). 
239 See the section on the New Way of Jesus (64–73). 
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involvement in justifying violence, Palestinian Christians have not colluded with 
militants.240  
The Palestinian churches have a dual imperative. This imperative includes a 
prophetic ministry, which entails exposing the truth about injustice in Palestine 
and calling both sides, as well as the international community, to work towards 
ending the oppression. The second part of the imperative is a peace-making 
ministry, which requires the church to challenge the credibility of violence as a 
way to establish right relations. Instead, the church must promote nonviolent 
action because it respects the other’s life and seeks to establish a right relationship 
with him. Just as Christ breaks the wall of enmity between God and humans 
through love, the church must make this love concrete, breaking the walls of 
enmity between humans by working towards a just peace.241   
Ateek provides a ten-point outline for the practice of nonviolent resistance, 
which the Palestinians should follow. The first step in Ateek’s outline is that 
confrontation with oppressors must not be avoided. The powerful oppressors have 
no incentive to change the status quo because they have rationalised oppression as 
necessary. Thus, like the persistent widow (Luke 18:1-8), the oppressed must cry, 
“Grant me justice”. They have to continuously remind the oppressors of their 
injustice. Nonviolent methods, like sit-ins, strikes, protests, publications, and 
statements by church leaders make the plight of Palestinians public. They raise 
awareness about the injustice internationally and among Israelis and pressure 
Israel to end the oppression. The violent power of empire must be challenged with 
the power of truth and justice. The truth is that Palestinians deserve rights, and a 
lasting peace will only be achieved through establishing just relations.242  
Nonviolence requires consistency and perseverance. Ateek stresses that the 
Palestinians have no chance to defeat Israel through armed resistance and that 
violence is incompatible with the goal of a just peace. If violence is used once, the 
threshold to use it again lowers. Every violent act increases resentment on the 
Israeli side, and Palestinians lose the moral high ground that nonviolence 
provides. Consistent nonviolence would make it extremely difficult for Israel to 
justify its repressive measures in any way. Persevering is necessary because quick 
results are unlikely in a conflict that has lasted for decades. The parable of the 
                                                
240 Ateek 1989, 161.  
241 Ateek 1989, 151–155; Ateek 1997, 102.  
242 Ateek 2008, 19–20, 180–182. 
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persistent widow stresses the value of determination and hope because finally the 
judge grants justice to the widow who persisted in her demand.243   
Non-cooperation with everything that oppresses is an important principle of 
nonviolence. It exposes the oppressive system and pressures the oppressor to 
change it because maintaining the system is unbeneficial. During the first years of 
the First Intifada, Palestinian boycotts, sit-ins, and strikes damaged the Israeli 
economy. In 2004, Ateek and Sabeel called for an international divestment 
campaign, encouraging churches to divest from companies that directly benefit 
settlements or facilitate the occupation.244 Ateek stresses that morally responsible 
investment is a part of the nonviolent Christian witness for justice. Numerous 
mainline churches have joined the campaign and have begun to pressure for 
peace, calling for divestment from companies that buttress the occupation.245   
During and after the Second Intifada, Palestinian churches have increasingly 
come together in a spirit of ecumenism in order to advocate the Palestinian cause 
internationally. In 2002, leaders of Palestinian Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox 
churches in Jerusalem issued a joint statement in which they appealed for help in 
monitoring human rights abuses and support for Palestinian efforts at nonviolent 
resistance. They underlined the prophetic obligation of all churches to condemn 
violence and discrimination, and called for a just peace based on international law. 
The international response resulted in the creation of the World Council of 
Churches’ Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme, which monitors the human 
                                                
243 Ateek 2008, 138, 182–183. 
244 Ateek 1989, 47–48; Ateek 2008, 139, 181. Galen Peterson (Peterson 2014, 7–8) criticises Ateek 
for advocating divestment and boycotts against Israel. In Peterson’s view, boycotts simply coerce 
the opponent into submission without actually addressing the problem of enmity. Although 
nonviolent, they still impose a forced justice on the enemy like violence does. They do not listen to 
the opponent’s view but instead harm him and pressure him. Therefore, boycotts do not represent 
Jesus’s way of transforming evil with good. However, we have seen that Ateek and other 
advocates of nonviolent resistance disagree with this assessment. Nonviolent resistance is an 
answer to the opponent’s unwillingness to hear the concerns of the resisters. In other words, 
negotiations have consistently failed to produce results. Listening to the opponent does not mean 
that we should ignore the truth about oppression and injustice. Nonviolent resistance challenges 
the opponent to acknowledge this truth and to establish a just relationship with the resisters. Jesus 
condemned the injustice of oppressors and exhorted them to make amends for it. Because 
nonviolent resistance respects the life of the enemy, it is more compatible with Jesus’s way of 
fighting evil with good than violence is. Violence tends to beget more violence and, because it 
destroys life, it prevents the possibility of restoring relations.  
245 For an overview of Sabeel’s divestment campaign and its success, see Kuruvilla 2013, 185–
191. E.g. The World Council of Churches has endorsed divestment.  
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rights situation and supports Palestinian nonviolent action by being present on the 
ground.246 
Palestinian churches have also approached Muslim and Jewish religious 
leaders. An important principle of nonviolence is the search for resolutions that 
opposing sides can accept.247 Both sides have to search for visionary individuals 
and influential leaders who are willing to approach the other side with the goal of 
building a fair relationship. The hope is that these peaceful leaders will become 
the leading voices in their communities, replacing the hawks and militants. In 
2002, Israeli and Palestinian Christian, Muslim, and Jewish religious leaders 
signed the Alexandria Declaration. It stresses that all three religions agree that 
killing in God’s name is wrong, God loves all humans equally and his prophets 
reveal his concern for just relations between people, and that Israelis and 
Palestinians have an equal right to the land. The declaration calls for an end to 
violence and for all sides to work towards a just solution to the conflict.248  
Ateek’s principles of nonviolent action accord with theories of nonviolent 
resistance, which categorise nonviolent action into three types: nonviolent protest 
and persuasion, for example demonstrations and publications, non-cooperation, 
for example economic and cultural boycotts, and nonviolent interventions, for 
example sit-ins and huger strikes. Ateek is correct that nonviolence attempts to 
undermine the power of the opposing regime or government. The essence of 
nonviolent resistance can be referred to as ‘political jujitsu’, which changes power 
relations in favour of the nonviolent resisters. The opponent cannot ignore the 
resisters because the resistance impedes him from pursuing his goals, damages his 
resources, and raises awareness of the resisters’ cause among third parties who 
may then join the resistance. Thus, the resistance challenges the opponent to 
negotiate a mutually acceptable solution. If the opponent refuses and reacts 
against the nonviolence with violence, then he further undermines his own 
legitimacy and authority. A violent reaction reveals that the opponent is repressive 
and unwilling to hear the appeal of the resisters. This may only strengthen the 
nonviolent campaign, as moral outrage leads more people to join the resistance 
and third parties withdraw their support from the opponent. Dissension may arise 
                                                
246 Younan 2005, 22, 27. Another significant statement by Palestinian Christian leaders is the 
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struggle against Israeli occupation. Ateek was one of the authors. (See Kassis et al. 2009) 
247 Ateek 2008, 181–182.  
248 See United States Institute of Peace: http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/alexandria-process.  
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in the opponent’s ranks, as people begin to doubt the viability and morality of 
repression. The numerous organised Israeli voices for peace are good examples of 
such internal opposition.249  
Nonviolent resistance does not usually result in the conversion of the 
opponent. It is rare for the opponent to come to view the resisters’ position as 
absolutely right. More often, nonviolent resistance succeeds in coercing the 
opponent to accommodate at least some of the resisters’ demands because the 
costs of not compromising are too high. For example, economic losses or rising 
internal dissension may convince the opponent to make concessions. Sometimes 
the nonviolent resistance succeeds in completely undermining the opponent’s 
power, leading to the regime’s disintegration. This may happen if the defiance 
becomes too widespread to control, essential third parties withdraw their support, 
or if a significant internal opposition develops within the regime’s power bases 
like the government, police, and military. The regime simply can no longer 
function.250  
Nonviolent action is a moral and effective way to pursue justice because it 
maintains a connection between means and ends. Even though it uses coercion, it 
upholds respect for the enemy’s life. It does not aim to eliminate the humans that 
constitute or identify with the opposing regime. Rather, it challenges them to 
redefine an unjust, imbalanced relationship into a right relationship that is based 
on a mutual affirmation of rights and not on one side’s domination over the other. 
It desires a relationship in which everyone’s interests and voices are heard. 
Research shows that nonviolent resistance contributes to a diffusion of power and 
allows people greater freedom and control over their lives. Successful resistance 
movements are democratic, enjoy popular support, and depend on moral 
authority. They possess the capacity to formulate common goals, which is 
important for creating democratic societies that are based on the ability to resolve 
conflicts through negotiation.251  
However, nonviolence resistance is by no means always effective. Strategic 
planning is imperative. In order to be effective, nonviolence requires a broad and 
determined support base. Potential resistance movements have to asses whether 
                                                
249 Sharp 2005, 405–412; Sharp 2007, 18–20. 
250 Sharp 2005, 417–421. 
251 Sharp 2005, 417, 427–429. Gene Sharp is a prominent authority on nonviolent resistance. His 
research documents 23 significant nonviolent struggles in the 20th century. 
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they are they unified enough to organise a nonviolent campaign and whether they 
have enough resources to maintain the resistance. They have to assess realistically 
what nonviolent methods they have capabilities in, whether these methods strike 
at the opponent’s weak points, and whether they can count on the support of third 
parties. There has to be an awareness of the costs, especially the readiness to 
suffer violence. If the resisters succumb and begin to react violently, the campaign 
will lose its legitimacy. Violence undermines any sympathy developing among 
the opponent’s ranks or third parties.252   
In the case of the Palestinians, there are serious concerns about whether they 
are unified enough and whether they possess enough power and resources to 
pursue an effective nonviolent campaign. An effective campaign would require a 
broad support base among Palestinians and it would have to convince Israelis to 
join the campaign to pressure their government to end the occupation. Gaining 
adequate Israeli support, fomenting a strong enough internal opposition, is a 
formidable challenge. Although Palestinians have gained increasing international 
support, for example through the divestment campaign that Sabeel has promoted, 
powerful third parties still support Israel or are unwilling to pressure it. These 
include the government of the United States and significant lobby 
organizations.253  
Ateek criticizes the Palestinians and acknowledges that they are still very far 
from a national nonviolent movement which could truly make a difference.254 Too 
many persist in the futile way of violence:  
The Palestinians have tried the way of violence and failed to bring about anything but 
disaster and misery. Now they must turn to nonviolence.255 
 
Ateek envisions a central role for women in the development of a broader 
nonviolent movement because men have committed violence. Still, Palestinians 
are already using nonviolent methods successfully to pursue smaller, limited 
goals, for example protests against Israel’s construction of the separation barrier. 
                                                
252 Sharp 2005, 367–368, 390; Sharp 2007, 27–31. 
253 Ateek refers to the role of the Israel lobby in impeding the peace process. US support for Israel 
prevents the creation of meaningful pressure on Israel. (Ateek 2008, 26–30)  
254 Ateek 2008, 138–139. 
255 Ateek 2008, 180. 
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Ateek’s aim is to encourage especially Palestinian Christians to persevere and 
develop the resistance.256 
 
A Just Peace 
Ateek underlines that the Bible does not only present peace as a state of 
reconciliation between God and man, achieved through Christ’s redemptive work, 
but also as a social reality in which a person can trust others to respect his rights 
and has the means to live a full and secure life.257  
 The major premise of a just peace is that Israel-Palestine is a land for both 
Israelis and Palestinians. Israel must guarantee equal rights to all citizens and 
adhere to international human rights treaties. One democratic state for both 
peoples would be the best solution and it would ensure equal rights for all. 
However, Ateek stresses that creating one state requires a tremendous amount of 
trust. It may be possible in the future but establishing two states is a more realistic 
interim goal. Thus, Ateek concedes that Israel’s fear of a demographic threat and 
its desire to maintain a Jewish majority should be respected. Palestinians, in turn, 
need their own state because they view it as the only way to guarantee their own 
rights. In accordance with UN resolution 242, Israel must withdraw from the 
occupied territories so that the Palestinians can establish an independent state. In 
return, Palestinians must recognize Israel’s right to exist within the 1967 borders. 
Ateek envisions a fully democratic Palestinian state that guarantees the rights of 
Christians and other minorities.258    
 In line with God’s preferential option, compromises should not tax the 
Palestinians more than the Israelis. It would be unfair, for example, if Palestinians 
had to relinquish more of their land when they are already to receive only around 
                                                
256 Ateek 2008, 139, 181. Ateek underlines the need for more training in nonviolent methods: “We 
need people, trained people, who are ready to suffer rather than inflict suffering on others” (Ateek 
2008, 139). 
257 Peace is a holistic concept, which includes a social dimension, in both the Old and New 
testaments. It is not only the absence of war but includes the wholeness of a secure and healthy life 
lived in a relationship with others. (Ateek 1989, 146, 149) 
258 Ateek 1989, 165–167; Ateek 2008, 161–162, 169–171. It should be noted that Ateek follows 
the peace orthodoxy in his support for a two state solution. Ateek’s other views, such as his 
support for divestment and boycotts, do not accord with the peace orthodoxy. Ilan Pappé criticises 
the peace orthodoxy for being over-sensitive to Israel’s concerns. Pappé argues that one 
democratic state is the only solution. Establishing a separate Palestinian state is no longer an 
option because Israel’s policy of segmentation and de facto annexation of most of the West Bank 
have rendered the creation of a contiguous, viable Palestinian state an impossibility. Also, a two 
state solution would allow Israel to retain its ethnocratic identity. Jews would still have more rights 
and privileges than Arabs and the Palestinian refugees would not have an unconditional right to 
return home, as they could only move back to the Palestinian state. (Pappé 2015, 15–21, 32–41)  
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22% of the former mandate for their state. Israel must also acknowledge that it has 
violated Palestinian rights and it must adequately compensate Palestinian refugees 
for their losses and suffering, as international law requires. Settlements built on 
Palestinian land should not be dismantled because they are part of the 
compensation that Israel owes. If they wish, Jewish settlers should be allowed to 
stay as Palestinian citizens or as Israeli citizens under Palestinian jurisdiction.259   
 Ateek underlines that resolving the conflict depends especially on a just 
solution to the question of sharing Jerusalem. Israel is rapidly judaizing 
Jerusalem, driving Palestinians out, in line with Ezra-Nehemiah’s exclusive view 
that reserves Jerusalem for the Jews. Some religious Jews stress that Jewish 
beliefs should take precedence because Jerusalem is entirely holy to Jews, 
whereas only certain sites are sacred to Christians and Muslims. However, God’s 
inclusive love demands recognition of equal rights. Ateek affirms the right to 
particularity but also demands that religions emphasise the obligation to love 
others. The three religions regard Jerusalem as holy for different reasons but they 
need to acknowledge that it is sacred to them all. They should not use their 
particular beliefs about Jerusalem to deny the right of others to hold it sacred. 
Respect for others takes precedence over particular beliefs that are only valid for 
the faith community.260  
 Ateek suggests that the Old City with its holy sites should form a separate 
holy zone under international jurisdiction. Its government would be based on an 
international charter and would include equal representation for Muslims, Jews, 
and Christians. The area around the Old City, West and East Jerusalem, would 
                                                
259 Ateek 2008, 171–172. Ateek does not consider how his demand on Israel to respect refugees’ 
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260 Ateek 1997, 96–99; Ateek 2008, 143. Even though Christians should not regard any land as 
more important to God than other lands, Ateek notes that holy space has a role in the human 
experience of faith. It should never take precedence over the obligation to love others and do 
justice. 
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form the political capitals of Israel and Palestine. Cooperation and compromises 
would be required in order to establish the division of sovereignty.261  
 The two sate solution would allow Palestinians and Israelis to gradually 
rebuild trust. Due to their close proximity, they would be economically 
interdependent, which would solidify the peace. In a secure environment, both 
states could develop into full democracies. When there would be enough trust, 
establishing a confederation could come into question. Citizens could move, live, 
and work freely in the two states but they would still retain their own citizenship. 
A shared bill of rights could be drafted to guarantee a minimum level of rights for 
all people in the confederation. Ateek stresses that the bill of rights and separate 
citizenship would doubly guarantee citizens’ rights and alleviate Israeli fears of 
the perceived demographic threat. Ateek’s even more distant vision is a 
Federation of the Holy Land, which would include Jordan and Lebanon in 
addition to Israel and Palestine. Jerusalem would become a federal capital, a truly 
cosmopolitan city, “free from any narrow and exclusive claims.”262  
 There are two major issues that arise from Ateek’s vision of peace: his view 
on right relations as reconciliation and his vision of peace as historical 
eschatology. First, we shall consider Ateek’s view on right relations and 
reconciliation. Ateek stresses that there is a minimum level of justice that has to 
be reached in order to attain peace. This minimum level can only be attained if the 
conflict is resolved according to the international resolutions concerning the 
division of land and the rights of refugees and if both states begin to build 
institutions that guarantee the rights of their populations. Israel must acknowledge 
its responsibility for violating Palestinian rights and it must compensate victims 
and refugees. In return, Palestinians must accept Israel’s existence and refrain 
from vengeance.263 
 However, Ateek stresses that reciprocal respect for another’s negative rights 
is not enough for a right relationship. Palestinians and Israelis must heal from 
                                                
261 Ateek 2008, 173–175. 
262 Ateek 2008, 175–176.  
263 Ateek 2008, 185–186. Ateek underlines that the UN resolutions constitute the minimum 
requirement for justice for Palestinians (Ateek 2008, 171). Peace theorists (see Philpott 2012, 53–
56, 71–72, 176–206) emphasise the same elements as Ateek in the process towards attaining just 
relations. They underline the need for truth and transparency, reparations, democratic institutions 
that guarantee rights and prevent abuses of power, and the need for states to respect international 
law, including the right of a people to self-determination.    
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their feelings of bitterness and hatred towards each other.264 Addressing the 
resentment will pave the way for more trust and cooperation so that perhaps the 
vision of a confederation could be realised. As we noted earlier, Ateek emphasises 
the need for a transformation of attitudes so that Israelis and Palestinians will 
actively promote each other’s good rather than simply respect each other from a 
distance. In order to tackle the resentment, Ateek mentions the possibility of a 
truth and reconciliation commission. It would reveal the truth about the history of 
injustice and it would encourage apologies and forgiveness, which are essential to 
overcoming resentment. Once bitterness is overcome and there is deeper trust and 
cooperation, reconciliation is a reality. For Ateek, reconciliation describes a right 
relationship and solidifies peace. Reconciliation constitutes a comprehensive 
restoration of relations, which is defined by a lack of resentment towards each 
other and a reciprocal desire to promote each other’s good for mutual gain.265 
Thus, it is more than respect for another’s negative rights that protect against 
violations. It includes this respect but also a sense of mutuality that is required if 
positive rights are to be strengthened. The realisation of positive rights, such as 
everyone’s access to adequate services, employment and education, requires 
cooperation and the setting of common goals.  
 Forgiveness and apology are important for achieving reconciliation. An 
apology is not simply an expression of regret but an acceptance of responsibility 
and a pledge not to repeat the injustice. It commits to redressing the injustice. 
Forgiveness frees the perpetrator from all charges and pledges to relinquish any 
desire for revenge. It holds the perpetrator once more in good standing so that the 
injustice no longer burdens the relationship. Collective apology and forgiveness is 
possible between governments. States should apologise for their policies that have 
violated collective rights and they should redress the injustice that they have 
caused. However, governments should not claim to speak for individuals or 
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265 Ateek 2008, 186. Ateek connects economic development to reconciliation and his idea of a 
confederation is a vision of a society based on a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship (Ateek 
2008, 175). Philpott defines reconciliation as a comprehensive restoration of right relations, which 
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2012, 52–56, 72). 
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pressure individuals to apologise or forgive. Ateek stresses that the Israeli 
government should apologise to Palestinians and offer reparations.266 
It is noteworthy that Ateek does not write about trials or punishments. 
Evidently, he does not view retribution as the best way to restore relations. 
Punishments may hinder the process of rebuilding relations and attaining peace.267 
Still, there is definitely a place for them. Especially serious violations should be 
taken to neutral courts that can provide a fair trial. Retributive justice should not 
be equated with revenge. It is a question of objectively assessing the injustice and 
delivering an appropriate punishment that takes into consideration the legitimate 
concerns of the victims and the situation of the perpetrators. If perpetrators are not 
held accountable for their actions, then the process towards a just and stable peace 
is jeopardised. The victims’ legitimate feelings of resentment are ignored and the 
victims may take justice into their own hands, which will lead to a cycle of 
revenge and the perpetuation of the conflict.268 However, it is understandable that 
Ateek generally stresses the need to hold the guilty accountable and the need for 
Israel to pay reparations. Writing about trials at this point would be very 
premature and would only promote a sense of vengeance because the conflict is 
still going on.   
 From the discussion so far, we can deduce that in Ateek’s view 
reconciliation is the culmination of the process of restoring a right relationship. 
Reconciliation can only occur after a minimal level of justice, which includes 
respect for rights and payment of reparations, has been achieved. Because he 
suggests that reconciliation can only occur after justice, Ateek has been criticised 
for separating justice and reconciliation into different categories. Galen Peterson 
criticises him for demanding a strict justice and only then opening the way to 
reconciliation. In Peterson’s view, Ateek does not consider reconciliation as 
integral to the process of attaining justice, which is reflected in Ateek’s 
uncompromising attitude and harsh demands on Israel without corresponding 
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267 See pages 53–54 on absolute justice and punishment.  
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demands on Palestinians.269 Perhaps Ateek could do more to acknowledge the 
concerns of the Israeli side, for example he could criticise Hamas and the 
Palestinian Authority for their role in perpetuating the conflict. Still, it would be 
unfair to assign responsibility equally to Israelis and Palestinians, for it is the 
Palestinians who have much less power, live under Israeli occupation, and are 
treated as second-class citizens in Israel.  
  However, Ateek could acknowledge Croatian theologian Miroslav Volf’s 
point that reconciliation should be a part of the process of struggling for a right 
relationship from the very beginning and not only after liberation or justice has 
been achieved. If the demand for justice is separated from the goal of 
reconciliation, then the struggle for liberation becomes a pursuit of strict justice 
that is defined solely by the concerns of one’s own side. Because the opposing 
side’s concerns are excluded, justice as right relationship is not achieved. The 
meaning of justice is invariably contested by opposing sides, so the struggle for 
justice should be understood as a dimension of the pursuit of reconciliation. 
Reconciliation underlines a willingness to compromise and recognise the concerns 
of the opposing side because, as we have seen, it describes a restored relationship 
that is based on mutuality. The desire for reconciliation should guide the entire 
struggle for justice from the start so that right means and the desire to approach 
the other side, rather than demonise it, are adopted.270  
 Volf emphasises that, for Christians, the pursuit of reconciliation entails 
adopting a spirit of forgiveness from the very beginning. Christians should be 
willing to forgive before the perpetrator repents or offers to redress the injustice. 
Forgiveness forgoes the demand for strict justice. By doing so, it solves the 
predicament of irreversibility, which contains the idea that no amount of 
reparations, reforms, or punishments can completely rectify horrendous injustice. 
Volf is not arguing that restoring relations could be possible without redressing 
injustice or that the oppressed should not struggle for justice. He is arguing that 
the desire to reach out to the opposing side should be a part of the struggle from 
the beginning. So, Christians should offer forgiveness in order to take the 
initiative in breaking the barrier to the other side. By forgiving, they are inviting 
the oppressor to self-knowledge: to realise his guilt and to repent concretely. By 
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forgiving, they are also refusing to mimic the hatred of the oppressor and are 
thereby taking steps to break the spiral of vengeance and violence.271  
The oppressed have to repent from their demonization of the oppressors, 
their hatred, and excuses for their own reactive behaviour. Volf underlines that 
they must make the conscious choice to abandon the attitudes and practices that 
contribute to the spiral of violence and prevent them from reaching out to the 
enemy. By weeding out their hatred, which inevitably springs up due to the 
injustice, they are refusing to become perpetrators who excuse their own evil on 
account of their victimisation. In effect, they are taking the initiative to transform 
the relationship. This is the only way because they cannot persist in their own 
hatred and absolute demands and simply wait for the oppressor to correct the 
injustice.272 
 It is clear that Ateek basically agrees with Volf’s view. When we considered 
Ateek’s minimum standard of justice, we noted that he lifts up God’s 
righteousness as a model.273 Justice, as a response to wrongs, and mercy, as the 
desire to restore relations, are perfectly balanced in God’s righteousness. God’s 
mercy leads to what Ateek calls a “divine paradigm of forgiveness” in which God, 
through Christ, forgives sins unconditionally. A person only needs to accept the 
gift of forgiveness. Because God is merciful and wants to restore relations, he 
takes the initiative by offering forgiveness without demanding justice first. Ateek 
writes that Christians should endeavour to emulate God’s mercy and offer 
forgiveness always.274 We may suggest that Ateek’s entire argument aims at 
reconciliation and encourages Christians in particular to take the initiative to reach 
out to the Israeli side. We have seen that Ateek advocates nonviolence as a means 
that is compatible with the goal of reconciliation, condemns violence on both 
sides, exhorts Palestinians to relinquish feelings of revenge against Israel, argues 
that both sides must transform their attitudes from victimisation to promoting each 
other’s good, and underlines the need for compromise by accepting a two state 
solution and by allowing Israeli settlers to stay. All of these can be read as an 
exhortation to refrain from absolute demands, vengeance, and violence and to 
reach out to the other side.  
                                                
271 Volf 2000b, 869, 871, 875. 
272 Volf 1996, 114–117. 
273 See page 53. 
274 Ateek 2008, 184, 187. 
 95 
 Even though God’s mercy and forgiveness are unconditional and 
forgiveness can be offered unilaterally, reconciliation cannot be unilateral. 
Reconciliation describes the restoration of a relationship, so it must be mutual. 
Ateek is right that in human relations reconciliation may never be completely 
attained. Some people may never overcome distrust and bitterness towards the 
other even when the injustice is redressed. However, Ateek stresses that the path 
to reconciliation is completely blocked if the opponent persists in the injustice 
despite the best efforts of the other to break the wall of enmity.275 Volf also 
underlines this when he writes that reconciliation, without a mutual commitment 
to justice, will be perverted into a cheap reconciliation in which the oppression 
continues.276  
 Volf’s argument about the necessary connection between liberation and 
reconciliation is a good one. The oppressed should not delude themselves that 
“liberation first, then reconciliation” is possible. Justice and reconciliation are not 
separate categories. Liberation, apart from reconciliation, will remain a strict 
assertion of justice, which cannot lead to peace. Reconciliation, without justice, 
will not result in a right relationship that satisfies both sides.277 The above point 
about Ateek’s entire argument aiming at reconciliation shows that he does not 
think about justice and reconciliation as separate categories. For him, the struggle 
for justice is defined by the desire to attain reconciliation.  
However, Ateek could use Volf’s argument to clarify his position and to 
counter the criticism that he has incurred for seemingly separating reconciliation 
from justice. The reason for this criticism seems to be that Ateek summarises the 
path to reconciliation in six steps in which reconciliation is the final step. The 
steps preceding reconciliation include the demands of the minimum level of 
justice for Palestinians.278 Thus, one might misinterpret Ateek’s steps as rigid, 
discrete categories and misconstrue that the goal of reconciliation does not 
influence the process towards justice and reconciliation. The discussion above 
shows that this is not the case. For Ateek, right relationship, as more than respect 
for another’s negative rights, is defined by reconciliation, and the goal of 
reconciliation is a part of the struggle for justice from the outset.   
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The second issue that arises from Ateek’s vision of peace concerns 
liberation theology’s historical eschatology, which connects salvation and 
practical liberation.279 Ateek grounds his eschatological view in Revelation’s 
vision of New Jerusalem and the vision of Zion in the Old Testament. They are 
symbols of God’s righteous kingdom. Contrary to Ezra-Nehemiah’s exclusivism 
in which Jerusalem is reserved only for Jews, the visions of New Jerusalem and 
Zion are inclusive. God welcomes all nations, including Israel’s former enemies, 
to Zion where justice and peace reign.280 Thus, God calls the faithful to make his 
reign more of a reality on earth. Ateek writes:  
We must continue to work to establish the reign of God here and now; we must continue to 
work for justice and truth; and we must continue to resist the evil of empire.281   
 
 Liberation theology typically juxtaposes the structural sin or structural 
violence of oppressive societies, condemned as the anti-reign, with God’s reign of 
justice. It criticises views that present God’s reign as transcendental and separate 
from historical time because such views have nothing to offer the oppressed. Jesus 
revealed the contents of God’s reign by helping the oppressed concretely and by 
empowering them to reject injustice and practice neighbourly love. In God’s 
reign, relationships are just and serve life. Jesus’s alternative community, which 
became the Church, reflected God’s reign in practice. Following Jesus’s example, 
the faithful have an obligation to stand in solidarity with the oppressed and to join 
them in building God’s reign. Jesus’s identification with suffering humanity 
extends God’s love and justice to the oppressed everywhere, so liberation 
theology emphasises that the Church has an obligation to all oppressed peoples.282  
 Critics of liberation theology argue that it reduces God’s reign to practical 
liberation for the oppressed. If the realization of justice for marginalized people, 
regardless of religious affiliation, constitutes God’s reign, then spiritual salvation 
through Christ and God’s transcendental reign lose their significance. Most 
liberation theologians reject this, however. They stress that God’s reign cannot be 
defined absolutely. The historical emphasis is important because it reflects God’s 
universal concern for justice and reminds Christians of their obligation to witness 
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to God’s love concretely, which demands solidarity with the oppressed. It also 
reminds them that some historical realities certainly reflect God’s reign better than 
others. The utopian eschatological vision should inspire them to make God’s reign 
more of a reality. This does not preclude the idea of personal salvation through 
Christ or the idea that God’s reign will be fully realized beyond history.283  
 Liberation theology’s eschatology can be described as progressive 
millenarianism, which is different from the catastrophic millenarianism of 
religious Zionists.284 Both seek God’s kingdom and promote the role of human 
action in bringing it about. However, as we have seen, nonviolent liberation 
theologians, including Ateek, stress that the faithful have an obligation to work for 
justice and peace through nonviolence. They envision the historical world 
gradually transforming into a better place, reflecting God’s reign more and more, 
as God empowers people to live righteously so that they can build more just 
societies. By contrast, Zionist eschatology is pessimistic. The temporal world is so 
evil that a violent apocalyptic transformation, in which God’s enemies and current 
structures are expunged, is required for the creation of a new and better world, 
which is established through direct divine intervention and exists beyond history.  
 Ateek’s idea that Christians are called to make God’s inclusive reign of 
peace more of a reality through the nonviolent struggle for justice in Israel-
Palestine shows that he follows liberation theology’s concrete eschatology. He 
does not consider the issue of personal salvation because he is concerned with the 
practical application of God’s inclusive love in the Palestinian-Israeli context. 
Ateek’s vision of peace clearly contrasts with the structural violence, the anti-
reign of oppression, which he exposed in his critical task. However, Ateek’s 
specific vision of the reign of God reflects his contextual concerns, as it describes 
a concrete peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Liberation theology has more 
commonly focused on economic justice, for example redressing the injustice in 
the global political economy.285 Still, liberation theologies stresses that the 
oppressed themselves must define the reign because they know best what 
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deliverance from oppression requires in their context.286 At a general level, 
societies that make life and dignity possible for everyone reflect God’s reign.  
 
4. Conclusion  
This thesis has analysed the critical and constructive tasks of Ateek’s Palestinian 
liberation theology. Liberation theologies in general criticise oppression in their 
specific contexts and construct practical, theologically grounded answers to 
oppression. Using the general methodologies of liberation theology and 
postcolonial theology as reference points, this thesis has established that Ateek 
shares certain elements with liberation and postcolonial theologies but does not 
wholly follow the methodology of either one. This highlights the contextual 
nature of theology, especially liberation theologies, which always engage with a 
specific situation of oppression. Contextualisation entails an awareness of the 
ways in which particular political, social, economic, cultural, ethnic, and other 
categories influence the way theology is done. Ateek is fully aware of the 
contextual nature of his theology, as he stresses that he is writing from an Arab 
Christian Palestinian perspective and tackles the issues of oppression and 
liberation in Israel-Palestine.   
Still, theologies consciously adopt and apply ideas from other theologies 
and there are also hidden similarities between them. Ateek has consciously 
adopted the term ‘liberation theology’ to describe his thought, and this thesis has 
shown that he shares certain themes with other liberation theologians. Ateek does 
not refer to postcolonial theology at all but this thesis has established a clear 
connection between some elements in Ateek’s thought and postcolonial 
theological themes. Additionally, this thesis has used the ideas of other 
theologians, who do not identify themselves as liberationists, to comment on and 
clarify Ateek’s views. Also, this thesis has employed some relevant ideas from 
theories concerning violence and religion in order to assess Ateek’s 
presuppositions, suggest clarifications to his argument, and demonstrate tensions 
in his views.  
 In his critical task, Ateek often uses liberation hermeneutics, which 
interprets the Bible as a prophetic condemnation of oppression. This is evident in 
the way that he uses the parable of the persistent widow in Luke 18 to expose 
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Israel as an oppressive empire, and the way in which he employs biblical passages 
to condemn the immorality and futility of violence by referring to the slaughter of 
the innocents, the Joshua paradigm and the Sodom paradigm. He also refers to the 
Essenes and Jesus’s criticism of the Pharisees to censure a passive church that 
does not concern itself with the praxis of justice. He uses biblical passages to 
condemn Christian Zionists for neglecting the Bible’s mandate to be peacemakers 
and practice the ministry of reconciliation. 
  In his constructive task, Ateek uses liberation hermeneutics to empower the 
faithful to practice God’s inclusive love. We have seen that he employs a 
Christocentric hermeneutic, which is common in liberation theology, to interpret 
the Bible as a liberating answer to oppression. He uses biblical passages to 
support his view on God’s inclusive love and its requirements. In Ateek’s 
interpretation, the Bible calls the faithful to work for justice, reveals God’s 
righteousness as a model for balancing justice and mercy, establishes God’s 
universal concern for all people in all lands, exhorts Christians to follow the 
nonviolent way of Jesus, calls Christians to overcome victimisation and become 
Good Samaritans, and exhorts Christians to forgive and pursue reconciliation. 
Thus, we can establish that Ateek’s constructive task, as a theological answer to 
oppression, is based on a liberationist interpretation of the Bible. A liberationist 
interpretation seeks to encourage the faithful to overcome oppression and 
establish justice.   
 In the critical task, Ateek follows liberation and postcolonial theologies in 
exposing power imbalance and the abuse of power as the cause of oppression. 
Like postcolonial theologians, he uses the term ‘empire’ to describe power 
imbalance and oppression. Empire is a concentration of power that pervades all 
spheres of life, including language and definitions of the other. Here, we also 
established that Ateek explains the abuse and concentration of power with 
Niebuhr’s idea of sin which leads humans to drive their own selfish interests. 
However, in the constructive task we noted Ateek’s belief that God empowers 
people to practice inclusive love, which makes transformation possible. This 
notion of God’s empowering grace is central to liberation theology because it 
enables human improvement. As noted, Ateek suggests that empowering religious 
interpretations, which express God’s inclusive love, contribute to the achievement 
of justice and reconciliation.  
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 Ateek does not use the concepts structural violence, repressive violence, and 
demonization as general categories to describe the oppression against Palestinians. 
However, we have used the concept of structural violence from liberation 
theology, repressive violence, the terrorism discourse, and postcolonial theology’s 
idea of demonizing language to systematise Ateek’s criticism of violence against 
Palestinians. The idea of demonization is also prominent in the discourse on 
religion’s role in violence. In general, Ateek follows liberation theology’s critical 
task of understanding and exposing the causes of oppression. The different 
categories of violence serve to elucidate his criticism. Thus, we have arranged his 
criticism under the aforementioned categories of violence. Unlike liberation 
theology, which focuses on structural violence as poverty, Ateek shows that 
ethnic and religious identity is central to the oppression of Palestinians. Especially 
postcolonial theologians affirm the contextual nature of structural violence, which 
is not only related to poverty.  
 Ateek’s critical task establishes the futility and immorality of both 
oppressive and revolutionary violence. We have shown that Ateek understands 
violence as a spiral, which is how Helder Camara perceived violence. Like 
Camara and liberation theology in general, Ateek distinguishes the reactive 
violence of the oppressed from the violence of the oppressor because it would be 
unfair to equate them morally. The oppressive violence is a greater evil because it 
causes the reactive violence of the victims. Still, like nonviolent liberation 
theologians, such as Camara, Esquivel, Romero, and Wink, Ateek condemns 
counter-violence as both ineffective and immoral. Like Wink and Yoder, Ateek 
views just war theory as a futile attempt to legitimate and limit violence. We 
established that he could use Yoder’s and Wink’s criticism of liberationist 
violence from the perspective of just war to augment his criticism of counter-
violence, especially since some strands of liberation theology in Latin America 
have used the just war theory to legitimate revolutionary violence.  
 We have established that a central presupposition of Ateek’s critical task is 
that religious Zionism is a cause of the oppressive violence against Palestinians. 
He does not analyse the connection systematically or in detail but he argues that 
religious Zionism, both Jewish and Christian, promotes exclusive beliefs about 
God, election, and the land. He censures both for regarding Jewish election and 
the land promise as absolute and for demonizing Palestinians as enemies of God. 
Envisioning a violent messianic process, Zionists refer to the Davidic warrior 
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messiah to justify the destruction of God’s enemies and have adopted a 
catastrophic millenarian worldview in which they are God’s good agents battling 
the forces of evil. Using culturalist and structuralist theories, we have established 
that there is no connection between religion and violence, which could be 
separated from other spheres of life. This serves to clarify Ateek’s presupposition. 
Inter-communal violence is always a product of complex interaction between 
different spheres of life and crises in these spheres. Religious traditions and 
interpretations, which promote absolute truth claims, cosmic dualism, and ideas 
about extraordinary or ideal times, may buttress an exclusive worldview and 
justify violence. Ateek suggests that the absolute, demonizing beliefs of religious 
Zionism contribute to the violence against and oppression of Palestinians.  
 Ateek’s criticism of Israel as an oppressive empire and his views on 
religious Zionism and violence have allowed us to establish a connection between 
his thought and postcolonial theology’s criticism of empire theology. Religious 
Zionism, both Jewish and Christian, is an empire theology because it sanctifies 
Israel’s occupation of the land and presents Jewish domination as inevitable and 
ordained by God. We noted that Ateek criticises the Church for colluding with 
empire by comparing it to the Sadducees who cooperated with Roman imperial 
interests. Religious Zionism fits this description. From a postcolonial perspective, 
it is a theology that justifies Israel’s colonisation of Palestine. Ateek stresses that 
religious Zionism has combined forces with right-wing secular Zionism to 
legitimate Jewish expansionist nationalism at the expense of the Palestinians.   
 Unlike liberation theology, Ateek approaches the Old Testament critically 
and has a low view of its authority. He affirms the value of historical-critical 
research, which liberation theology censures for being inert, because it 
delegitimises Zionist literalism. Ateek underlines the need for interpretations that 
express the spirit of the text, its core life-affirming principles, rather than focus on 
the direct application of exclusive passages. However, he still regards the 
ambiguity of the Old Testament as a problem because exclusive and violent 
passages so easily buttress the beliefs of Zionist empire theology. In effect, Ateek 
decolonises the Old Testament using his Christocentric hermeneutic. Oppressive 
passages do not accord with Christ’s revelation of God’s inclusive love. They 
serve only as warnings about exclusive beliefs that justify imperial projects in 
practice, and they do not convey an authentic view of God. Even though Ateek 
does not refer to his method as postcolonial, we have seen that his ‘de-zionization’ 
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or decolonisation of oppressive texts is similar to the approach of postcolonial 
theologians. Of course, postcolonial theologians do not use a Christocentric 
approach but they, like Ateek, identify with the Canaanite victims of the exclusive 
God and question the value of violent and exclusive texts that only seem to 
support imperialist beliefs and structures. We have also established that Ateek’s 
critical approach to the Old Testament differs from other Palestinian Christian 
views, which affirm its value, either for the purpose of inter-faith dialogue or 
because they wish to uphold God’s word as authoritative.   
 In his constructive task, Ateek aims to offer a theologically grounded 
alternative to Zionist empire theology and the spiral of violence. The purpose of 
his theological answer, presented in section 3.1, is to underpin his vision of peace, 
which was presented in section 3.2. We have presented Ateek’s constructive task 
in this particular order precisely because this structure serves to highlight his 
overarching idea that a theological interpretation, which promotes God’s inclusive 
love, can contribute to the process of achieving a just peace, the ultimate goal, 
unlike exclusive Zionist theologies. Ateek upholds the view of liberation theology 
according to which liberationist interpretations result, through God’s grace, in the 
empowerment of the faithful to translate God’s love into practice. Thus, Jesus’s 
nonviolent example and the knowledge that God’s inclusive love demands right 
relationships should inspire people to struggle for justice through nonviolence.  
 Concerning Ateek’s vision of peace, we have established that he views 
human rights and international resolutions as the basis for a just peace in Israel-
Palestine, which accords with the views of peace theorists. Ateek’s emphasis on 
God’s righteousness as a model underpins his view that especially Christians 
should take the initiative to pursue reconciliation. Reciprocal respect for the 
other’s rights is not enough. A deeper level of trust and a healed relationship, 
attained through forgiveness and apology, is the ultimate goal. God’s inclusive 
love demands reconciliation with the enemy because, in Christ, the barrier 
between God and humans is broken and humans are to follow this example in 
their relationships.  
We referred to Miroslav Volf’s view on the interdependence of justice and 
reconciliation to respond to Ateek’s critics who assert that he separates justice 
from reconciliation. Ateek could use Volf’s argument to clarify his view, as it is 
evident that he does not regard the pursuit of justice and reconciliation as 
independent processes. His promotion of justice tempered with mercy and 
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nonviolent struggle aim to enable reconciliation. Ateek stresses that liberation 
cannot be attained through absolute justice. Both oppressors and oppressed need 
liberation from the injustice and they can only attain it by creating a right 
relationship that promotes the dignity and good of both. Thus, liberation cannot be 
the unilateral project of the oppressed who desire revenge against their oppressors. 
The oppression has to be overcome, not repeated. We established that Ateek 
shares liberation theology’s historical eschatology, which is defined by the hope 
that oppression will be overcome, as God empowers people to build better 
societies.  
 We have seen that Ateek stresses the need for a minimum standard of 
justice, which religions should conform to. Unlike liberation theology, Ateek has 
an unequivocally positive view of the human rights regime which he promotes as 
the universal standard of justice. However, like liberation theology, he 
nonetheless adopts a contextual view of human rights since he promotes the 
political and civil rights of Palestinians. God’s preferential option is connected to 
human rights, as God is especially concerned about the need for justice. In 
Ateek’s view, God’s inclusive love as a core principle, revealed in Christ and the 
prophetic tradition, accords with the human rights regime. God’s inclusive love 
shows that all humans are important to God who is the lord of all, that God’s 
universal concern leads to the demand for justice among all people in all lands, 
and that election is at the very least a question of practicing love towards all 
people. Ateek’s view of God’s inclusive love goes beyond the requirements of the 
human rights regime and international law, which do not stipulate nonviolence as 
the right response to injustice or reconciliation as the goal in the pursuit of justice.  
Concerning nonviolence, we established that Ateek’s view accords with 
other nonviolent liberation theologians who stress the pragmatism and morality of 
nonviolence. Only nonviolence can break the spiral of violence and is compatible 
with the goal of justice and reconciliation. It is the way of God’s inclusive love, 
which extends even to enemies, and is revealed in Jesus’s ministry. Following 
liberation theology and the peace church tradition, Ateek refers to Christ as the 
nonviolent suffering servant, in opposition to the Davidic militaristic messiah of 
Zionist empire theology. We have established that Ateek could ground his 
nonviolent theology in a more profound way if he examined the Christological 
basis of nonviolence in the atonement theories, which he could draw from 
liberation theology and the peace church tradition. Also, Ateek does not consider 
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criticisms of nonviolence. We noted that Christian moral arguments for 
nonviolent resistance can be criticised for being too idealistic and for 
downplaying the fact that nonviolent resistance involves coercion. Considering 
Ateek’s suggestions for the practical application of nonviolence, which his 
nonviolent theology underpins, we used Gene Sharp’s analysis of nonviolent 
resistance to fill out Ateek’s view on why nonviolence may or may not succeed.   
It is clear that, for Ateek, God’s inclusive love is an ethical imperative that 
obligates the faithful to love outsiders in practice. Evidently, the precise 
requirements of this love depend on the context. In Israel-Palestine, it requires 
Christians to work with Jews and Muslims for Palestinian political and civil 
rights, a resolution based on international law, and reconciliation between Israelis 
and Palestinians. Ateek affirms the particularity of religions but simultaneously 
emphasises that religions need to affirm the human rights regime as the standard 
of justice, which they should ground in their own traditions that contain the basic 
idea of inclusive love as a requirement to respect outsiders. Ateek refers to the 
human rights regime as an arbiter, so religious views that contradict human rights 
are invalid. Ateek’s particularity, reflected in his own Christocentric view, and his 
promotion of the human rights regime as a universal standard results in an 
unresolved tension. 
 The tension exists because it is difficult to maintain the position that 
religions have a right to particular doctrines and beliefs, which are incompatible 
with other religions’ beliefs, but should nonetheless agree on the praxis of love 
and justice according to the standards of an external human rights regime. 
Particular doctrines naturally influence praxis, so if doctrines about love and 
justice are different, then praxis cannot be the same. If, on the other hand, one 
argues that religions share doctrines or beliefs about justice, which accord with 
human rights, then it is difficult to avoid a pluralist position. A pluralist position 
suggests that different religions reflect the same ultimate core, which is visible in 
their shared promotion of respect and compassion towards fellow human beings. 
Thus, all religions share the liberationist quest of building God’s reign of peace 
and justice on earth. In effect, liberationist praxis becomes a criterion for 
assessing the truth of religious claims. In Ateek’s case, the human rights regime 
defines the meaning of liberationist praxis. The problem with this pluralist view is 
that it does not take religions’ particular beliefs and doctrines seriously, as it 
suggests that they agree on justice and the goals of liberation. Additionally, we 
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noted that human rights are abstract, so their precise meaning depends on the 
context.287 
 However, Ateek cannot uphold a pluralist position because of his strong 
Christocentric view, which promotes the superiority of Christ. We have seen that 
Ateek affirms religious particularity. His view on God’s inclusive love and its 
requirements is based on his Christocentric understanding, which in his view 
empowers Christians to work for justice in Israel-Palestine. This relates to the 
tension above, for it muddles the status that the human rights regime has in 
Ateek’s thought. He promotes human rights as a universal standard because 
religions are ambiguous about the way in which humans should treat each other. 
Still, Ateek maintains that Christ provides unambiguous, objective knowledge 
about God’s inclusive love. This suggests that Christianity is superior to other 
religions and does not need the human rights regime as an arbiter. Instead, it 
appears that God’s inclusive love, revealed in Christ, is the ultimate standard. 
Human rights and international resolutions are lower principles that direct the 
practical application of God’s inclusive love in specific contexts. As noted, Ateek 
seems to agree with the view that the Bible’s core message has primacy, for 
Christians, in decision-making but the specific knowledge required to attain an 
ethically sound solution is provided by other sources. In Israel-Palestine, these 
sources must include international law and human rights, which help in the 
definition of a just relationship.  
The best solution to the tension would be if Ateek abandoned the idea of 
human rights as a universal standard by which to assess religions and instead 
emphasised human rights and international law as necessary sources of knowledge 
on justice in the Israeli-Palestinian context. He could continue to uphold the 
existing agreements between Abrahamic religions on justice and the need for 
them to pursue dialogue with each other to determine the specific meaning of 
God’s love and justice in Israel-Palestine. With his Christocentric interpretation, 
he offers a Christian affirmation that being faithful to God entails loving 
outsiders. His views on God, election, the land, nonviolence, and international law 
define the meaning of this love in practice, from a Palestinian Christian viewpoint, 
in the Israeli-Palestinian context. We have also seen that he explains to his 
                                                
287 The points about the influence of doctrine on praxis and the problematic assumption that 
religions could generally share a minimum standard of liberation or justice are based on 
Kärkkäinen 2013, 231–235. The definition of pluralism is based on Schmidt-Leukel 2008, 96, 99.  
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Christian audience that the Jewish tradition, the prophetic texts and rabbinic 
interpretations, exhorts the elect to respect outsiders. In this sense, Ateek seeks to 
affirm what he sees as the best in the Jewish tradition. By underlining his view as 
a contextual response that reflects his Palestinian Christian perspective and seeks 
dialogical solutions to injustice, Ateek could avoid tensional universalising 
claims.   
Still, Ateek’s particularism contains a universalising tension. This is not 
only visible in his aforementioned promotion of a universal standard of justice, 
which takes him towards pluralism. It is also visible in the exclusive universalism 
of Christocentric views. Ateek argues that Christ’s ultimate revelation of God’s 
inclusive love should inspire Christians to love all people. Because God is 
concerned about all people and because his purpose is to create one humanity in 
Christ, Christians cannot oppress others on the basis of ethnic or cultural 
boundaries. Instead, they must promote the good of all people, like Jesus did, for 
God’s love extends everywhere because of Christ. However, even though Ateek 
stresses that these are confessional Christian beliefs that inspire Christians, 
Christocentric claims do not unequivocally result in love, tolerance, and respect 
towards outsiders. This is because they suggest that other faiths are inferior and 
appear to subsume everyone under the universal Christ. Ateek views the Jewish 
tradition as ambiguous and inferior to Christ because of its ethnic and territorial 
exclusivity, and he criticises the Old Testament but idealizes the New Testament.  
Even though Ateek wishes to affirm the particularity of religions, he could 
still acknowledge and problematize the ambiguity of the New Testament and the 
potential exclusivism in Christocentric views. This would not prevent him from 
affirming that the correct way to interpret Christ is his liberationist view, which 
promotes love and tolerance towards others. It would, however, render his view 
more acceptable to Jews, as he would not ignore the fact that Christocentric 
exclusivism has contributed to the oppression of non-Christians in practice. Even 
Christian Zionism contains exclusive Christocentric beliefs, for example the view 
that ultimately all of those outside Christ are destroyed, which is already reflected 
in the punishment of God’s enemies in this age.  
Still, it is understandable that Ateek maintains the liberationist purity of 
Christ, in accordance with liberation theology. Postcolonial theologians represent 
the views of non-Christian colonised peoples who have been oppressed by 
Christianity. Thus, they seek to decolonise the Judeo-Christian narrative, 
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criticising not only the Old Testament but also exclusive Christocentric views and 
New Testament texts, and develop interpretations that affirm the value of the 
colonised religions. However, in Ateek’s experience, Palestinian Christians are 
members of a colonised people.  Palestinian Christianity is the colonised victim of 
Judaism and western Christianity. So it can be argued that, in Ateek’s context, the 
liberationist Christocentric interpretation is also a postcolonial one. Ateek uses his 
Christocentric view to decolonise the imperialistic texts and beliefs, including the 
violent messianic images, of Zionism. He replaces the violent beliefs of Christian 
Zionism with the nonviolent Christ, the suffering servant, who reveals God’s 
inclusive love for all and special concern for the oppressed. Ateek stresses that the 
nonviolent Christ is the traditional, or original, Christian way of understanding 
Christ.288 In Ateek’s view, it is based on the unambiguous New Testament. 
Christian Zionist views are simply incorrect and are based on the ambiguous Old 
Testament.     
Ateek, like liberation theology typically, does not develop a systematic and 
coherent theology of religions.289 Thus, questions related to soteriology and the 
relationship between Christ and other religions are left open. We have seen that 
Ateek follows liberation theology’s historical eschatology, which stresses the 
historical nature of salvation as liberation from oppression. However, Ateek does 
not consider personal salvation or the precise nature of his liberationist claim that 
God’s concern extends to the oppressed in general, including all Palestinians. 
Some liberation theologies, operating in contexts where Christians are a minority, 
stress that all oppressed people, regardless of religion, are God’s chosen people. 
They affirm the liberationist elements in other religions in order to develop a basis 
for common practices against oppression in their particular contexts.290 Indeed, we 
have seen that Ateek affirms rabbinic views that promote justice. He stresses that 
election in the Abrahamic faiths contains the ethical obligation to respect others. 
However, this once again takes us to the tension between pluralism and 
particularism. If Christ is the ultimate revelation, as Ateek argues, how can non-
Christians ever be as elect as Christians or attain salvation? We must leave the 
precise questions concerning election and the relationship between religions 
                                                
288 Ateek stresses that the early church understood Christ in this way (Ateek 2008, 99–100). 
289 Sugirtharajah stresses that liberation theology has failed to develop a theology of religions and 
is unsure about how to react to religious plurality (Sugirtharajah 2002, 116). 
290 Schmidt-Leukel 2008, 91.  
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unresolved. Ateek’s view is that election in all religions must contain, at the very 
least, the obligation to respect outsiders so that liberation from oppression can be 
attained.   
 Finally, we may suggest topics for further research. Ateek’s organisation, 
Sabeel, has organised nine international conferences on Palestinian liberation 
theology since 1990. Speakers from various backgrounds have presented papers 
on diverse topics, including the politics and economics of the conflict, inter-faith 
relations, religious Zionism, land theologies, nonviolence, and other subjects. 
These papers have been gathered into article collections. Some of Ateek’s articles 
in these collections have been used as primary sources for this investigation and 
other articles have been used as secondary material. Further research could focus 
on the history of Sabeel’s conferences. It could provide an overview of a single 
conference, in relation to its background, or analyse the development of topics 
through several conferences, again in relation to historical events like the Oslo 
Process and the Second Intifada, which influenced the choice of conference 
topics.  
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